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Three Papers on Social Interactions and Labor Market Outcomes 
Tian Lou, PhD 
University of Connecticut, 2017 
In this dissertation, I study the influences of social interactions on individuals’ labor market outcomes.  
The first chapter tests for causality in the positive relationship between teenage alcohol consumption and 
future earnings. Specifically, to investigate this relationship, I exploit the quasi-random variations in high 
school peer compositions as a treatment to teenage alcohol consumption. By using the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) data, I find that high school peer compositions that 
cause teenagers to drink more do not have significant influences on their future incomes. This provides 
indirect evidence that the positive relationship between teenage drinking and future income is not causal.  
The second chapter examines whether immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves have labor market 
advantages. By using 2000 and 2010 U.S. census data and a triple differences model, we find that given the 
same ethnic group average education, ethnic segregation reduces high-skill immigrants’ wages. This may 
be because the returns on education are higher for high-skill immigrants when they have more social 
connections with natives and work in native-dominated labor markets. We also find that as the ethnic group 
average education decreases, the benefits of ethnic segregation for low-skill immigrants also decrease, 
likely because competition between low-skill immigrants drives down their wages. 
The third chapter tests whether teenagers are forward-looking when they choose friends in high school. 
In particular, we assume that when teenagers choose friends, they consider both immediate payoffs (such 
as increases in popularity) and long-term economic gains (such as increases in their future earnings) from 
friendships. Then we estimate which is more important to teenagers when choosing friends, the immediate 
payoffs or the long-term economic gains. By using Add Health data and a three-period dynamic model, we 
find that the marginal utility of popularity is much higher than the marginal utility of future earnings, which 
implies that immediate payoffs are the key factors that influence teenagers’ friendship decisions. Moreover, 
the outcomes in the heterogeneity tests suggest that African Americans and Hispanics have higher returns 
on both popularity and future earnings than whites.    
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Chapter One: Party Hard, Live Large: Adolescents’ Alcohol Consumption and Future 
Wages 
 
Tian Lou 
 
Abstract 
Recent research found a positive relationship between male adolescents’ alcohol consumption and their 
future incomes. One hypothesis is that adolescents gain sociability from drinking activities may help them 
get wage premiums in the future labor market. In this paper, I exploit the quasi-random variations in high 
school peer compositions as a treatment to teenage alcohol consumption and test whether the treatment has 
similar influences on teenage future income. This paper finds that peer variables that can explain teenage 
binge drinking do not have significant impacts on future incomes. This result suggests that the influences 
of high school peers cannot be transmitted to future incomes through binge drinking. Thus, the effects of 
teenage binge drinking on future income might not be causal. This paper also shows that being exposed to 
peers with higher possibilities of binge drinking does not necessarily increase sociability. 
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1. Introduction 
Can drinking lead to higher wages? Economists found contradictory effects of adult alcohol 
consumption on their incomes.1 Since adult alcohol consumption and income are determined at 
the same time (simultaneity) and higher incomes may lead to higher level of alcohol consumption 
(reverse causality), it is hard to identify the causal effect of adult alcohol consumption on income.2 
If the drinking behavior is shaped before individuals enter the labor market, could it have long-
lasting positive impacts on income? In order to explore the long-term effects of alcohol 
consumption, researchers switched the study subjects to teenage drinkers. Chatterji and Desimone 
(2006) and Mundt and French (2012) each found that male adolescent binge drinkers earn wage 
premiums in the future labor market.  
However, it seems counterintuitive that this positive relationship is causal, because alcohol may 
hurt teenagers’ physical and mental development and impair their human capital accumulation. 
Thus, we would expect that teenage alcohol consumption has negative effects on their future 
incomes. In this paper, I further investigate this relationship by testing the possible explanations 
for it. One explanation is that the relationship between teenage alcohol consumption and future 
income is not causal. Drinking might just be one of the characteristics of individuals who are more 
                                                          
1 Many studies found the positive relationship between adult drinking and income (Berger and Leigh 1988; 
Hamilton and Hamilton 1997; Zarkin et al. 1998; Barrett 2002; Auld 2004; Bray 2005; Peters and Stringham 
2006; Peters 2009; Srivastava 2010; Vitaly 2010). Later, researchers pointed out that moderate drinkers 
have higher incomes than abstainers and binge drinkers (French and Zarkin, 1995; Heien, 1996; Lye and 
Hirschberg, 2004). However, other research showed different results. For example, Cook and Peters (2005) 
found that higher alcohol prices increase young adults’ labor supply and the earnings of full-time workers. 
Their result indirectly implies that drinking might be negatively related to adult labor market outcomes. 
Renna (2007) showed that binge drinking decreases young adults’ earnings through its negative effect on 
human capital accumulation. 
2  In Keng and Huffman (2007) paper, they show that binge drinking behavior is quite alcohol-price 
responsive and is a rational addiction, which implies that individuals with higher income are more likely to 
consume alcohol. 
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likely to earn higher wages in the labor market, not the reason why drinkers have advantages in 
the labor market. For example, children who are born in rich families can more easily obtain 
alcohol. They also have more opportunities to go to top schools, participate in social activities and 
get high-paying jobs.  
Another explanation for the positive relationship between male adolescent alcohol consumption 
and future income is that male adolescents may gain sociability (have more social connections) 
through drinking activities. 3 The higher sociability of male adolescent drinkers may help them 
gain wage premiums in the future labor market. However, this explanation may also suffer from 
the reverse causality problem—teenagers with high sociability may choose to drink more alcohol.  
The two possibilities mentioned above have not been tested in the previous literature, because 
of a lack of exogenous variation in a variable influencing teenage alcohol consumption and not 
affecting future incomes directly. This paper expands our understanding of the relationship 
between teenage alcohol consumption and future income by utilizing the quasi-random variation 
in high school peer compositions. This idea is inspired by the literature that has documented effects 
of high school peers on teenagers’ alcohol use (Clark and Loheac 2007; Ali and Dwyer 2010; 
Fletcher 2012) and literature that used within school and across cohort peer compositions to 
identify peer effects (Bifulco et al. 2011, 2014). 4 This method has never been used to test the 
causality between teenage drinking and future income in the current literature. 
    Specifically, I test whether high school peer compositions could explain teenage binge drinking 
and whether they could also influence future income in the same pattern. If binge drinking could 
                                                          
3 Both Chatterji and Desimone (2006) and Mundt and French (2012) found that the positive relationship 
between drinking and future incomes only exists among male adolescents. For female adolescents, drinking 
does not have significant effects or even has negative effects on future earnings. 
4 Parents and teenagers can choose which high school to attend, but they cannot choose the compositions 
of students who attend high school in the same year. So the peer compositions across different years (grades) 
within the same high school are quasi-random. 
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bring labor market benefits, school peers may have indirect positive effects on future labor market 
outcomes through their positive effects on adolescents’ alcohol consumption. Moreover, if the 
hypothesis that sociability could explain the positive relationship between adolescents’ binge 
drinking and future income is true, being exposed to school peers with a higher probability of binge 
drinking should also lead to higher level of sociability.  
    In addition, there are many other channels through which school peer compositions may have 
indirect influences on future income. For example, having more female classmates improves 
students’ math performance (Hoxby, 2000); having more peers with college-educated mother 
increases teenagers’ college enrollment (Bifulco et al, 2011,2014). Thus, including 
contemporaneous variables (for example, educational achievement and working experience) in the 
earning equation may change the estimated peer effects on future income. After controlling for 
contemporaneous variables, if we can observe a similar pattern (at least same signs) of peer effects 
in both binge drinking and earning equations, it would imply that peers have influences on teenage 
binge drinking and those influences are transmitted to future income through drinking behaviors. 
    Based on the potential influences of school peer compositions mentioned above, I use the peer 
effect model to test for causality between adolescent binge drinking and future income. In this 
study, only predetermined peer variables are used to for estimation. Also, following Bifulco et al 
(2011, 2014), I adopt a cross-cohort/within-school strategy to identify peer effects on teenagers’ 
alcohol consumption, sociability and future income. Because parents may select schools for 
children based on the school’s reputation and performance, there might exist correlations between 
students’ unobserved characteristics and peer compositions. Thus, after controlling for school 
fixed effects and grade fixed effects, we compare results of students at the same school but in 
difference grades.  
 5 
 
    In order to replicate the result in Mundt and French (2012) paper and re-estimate it by using 
peer effect model, I use the same dataset—Add Health. Specifically, Add Health provides 
population information at school level—which allows the peer analysis. Also, because this is a set 
of longitudinal data, I could obtain the information of binge drinking in adolescence as well as 
incomes in young adulthood. Other than those key variables, Add Health also contains detailed 
information about teenagers’ social network, family background and educational attainment.  
The results are as follows. I find that percent of black and percent of cohorts with unemployed 
mothers and mothers having some college have significant influences on teenage alcohol 
consumption. However, those variables cannot explain teenagers’ future incomes. In other words, 
high school peer compositions that cause more alcohol consumption during adolescence do not 
lead to higher future incomes. These results imply that the positive relationship between teenage 
alcohol consumption and future income might not be causal. Moreover, after controlling for 
contemporaneous characteristics and occupation fixed effects, the estimated impacts of peer 
compositions on teenage alcohol consumption are still very different from their impacts on future 
income. 
I also find that teenagers with a higher level of binge drinking and those with a higher level of 
sociabilities are in different peer groups. Therefore, it is unlikely that teenagers gain sociability 
through drinking activities. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is the literature review. Section 2 presents 
a description of the data and methodology used in the analysis. Section 3 shows the empirical 
results. Section 4 is the conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
    Arguments about the “drinking-income” puzzle have lasted for almost two decades. Dating back 
to 1988, Berger and Leigh found that adult drinkers earn wage premiums even after controlling for 
all observed characteristics and correcting for selection bias. This implausible relationship between 
drinking and income has been found by using different datasets from different countries. 5 
    Some researchers point out that adult drinking might have indirect effects on labor market 
outcomes, such as through its effect on health status, human capital and social capital.  For example, 
several studies find an inversed-U shape relationship between adult drinking and earnings. The 
level of alcohol consumption at the turning point of the inversed-U shape curve leads to the lowest 
risk of coronary artery disease. Some research argues that the health benefit that moderate drinking 
brings leads to the wage premium for drinkers. Bray (2005) shows that moderate drinking increases 
returns to education or experience. Peters (2009) finds that the drinking gain of military officers is 
higher than that of enlisted personnel because social capital is more important to the promotion of 
officers. 
    However, since adult drinking behavior and earnings might be determined simultaneously, the 
positive correlation between alcohol consumption and incomes cannot prove that the causality is 
from drinking to income. Because alcohol is a normal good, high-income individuals might 
consume more alcohol. Moreover, studying the “drinking-income” puzzle through indirect effect 
of alcohol might be problematic too. Selection bias may lead to spurious results. For example, 
individuals who are healthier or more socialized may drink more and earn higher incomes. 
                                                          
5 Heien (1996), 1979 and 1984 National Household Survey on Alcohol Use; Barrett (2002), Australian 
National Health Survey; Lee (2003), Australian Twin Registry data; van Ours (2004), Netherland survey; 
Auld (2005), Canadian General Social Survey. 
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    Thus, in order to test the credibility of the positive effect of alcohol consumption, economists 
begin to exploit exogenous variation to test the “drinking-income” puzzle. The results are still 
mixed. For example, by using reduced form regression, Cook and Peters (2005) find that increases 
in alcohol prices can lead to more labor supply and higher earnings. However, Auld (2005) shows 
that moderate drinking is associated with 10 percent higher income; the result changes little when 
use alcohol prices as instrument. 
    Briefly, when use adults as study subjects, the concurrent effect of alcohol consumption on 
earnings is uncertain. However, the long-term effect of teenage alcohol consumption might be 
positive. According to the extant literature, the direct effect of adolescent alcohol consumption on 
income is overall positive (Chatterji and Desimone, 2006; Mundt and French, 2012). The effect of 
alcohol consumption for males is positive; for females is negative but statistically insignificant. 
    Same as adult alcohol consumption, teenage alcohol use might influence their future outcomes 
through different channels, such as health status, human capital and social capital. However, 
teenage alcohol use may have different indirect impacts on future income. On one hand, research 
finds negative effect of alcohol consumption on health status and human capital accumulation. For 
instance, adolescents’ binge drinking is associated with brain damage and neurocognitive deficits 
(Zeigler et al., 2004); teenage drinkers have lower GPAs, lower probabilities of graduating from 
school and lower college enrollment rates (Dee and Evans, 2003; Chatterji, 2006; Renna, 2007; 
Balsa, Guiliano and French, 2011). On the other hand, binge drinking may bring social benefits to 
adolescent drinkers. For example, alcohol consumption leads to an increase in popularity, with the 
largest gains experienced by white males and females (Ali et al., 2014). Also, adolescents are 
socially rewarded for keeping up with their peers’ drinking (Balsa et al., 2010).  
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If the positive effects of sociability dominate other negative effects, then the effect of teenage 
binge drinking on future income might be positive. To estimate the effect of teenage binge drinking 
on future income, we still need exogenous variations that influence teenage alcohol consumption. 
Some studies have used parents’ drinking behaviors (ZieBarth and Grabka, 2009) and minimum 
legal drinking age (MLDA) (Renna, 2007) as instruments. The first instrument might violate 
exclusion restriction. For example, parents’ alcoholism may influence teenagers’ future outcomes 
through its negative influence on teenagers’ mental and physical development. MLDA is a good 
exogenous instrument. But the variation in MLDA is limited, because almost all the teenagers are 
constrained to MLDA. 
Thus, we need another treatment that most teenagers are exposed to. Peer effects on teenagers’ 
alcohol consumption have been found in a large number of studies. For example, the probability 
of consuming alcohol for teenagers—starting to drink and frequency of drinking—will increase 
by 4-5 percentage points when 10 percent more of their peers are involved in drinking activities 
(Ali and Dwyer, 2010; Fletcher, 2012). This leads to the conjecture that by exploiting the quasi-
random variations in school peer compositions that influences teenagers’ alcohol consumption, we 
might find evidence of causal relationship between adolescent alcohol consumption and future 
income. Peer effects should be able to explain wage premiums of drinkers if teenage binge drinking 
has positive effect on income in young adulthood, because the influences from school peers could 
be transmitted to future income through binge drinking. 
    In order to correctly estimate the effects of school peers on teenagers’ outcomes, a cross-
cohort/within-school strategy is implemented. As Bifulco et al (2011,2014) and Ross (2011) 
suggest, teenagers may sort into schools based on the average school characteristics and 
compositions, such as reputation, but their parents are unlikely to observe the difference between 
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student compositions in a certain grade and the average school compositions. Thus, even though 
there might exist correlations between peer compositions and students’ unobserved characteristics, 
including school fixed effects and grade fixed effects should be able to solve the selection problem.  
By using the cross-cohort/within-school design, Bifulco et al. (2011) find that high school 
classmate compositions (specifically, percentage of cohorts who have college graduated mothers) 
can influence the probabilities of being high school dropouts and attending college for teenagers. 
In addition, Bifulco et al. (2014) show that high school classmate compositions may have impacts 
on household income through its influences on teenagers’ college attendance decisions, though the 
latter effects reduces as individuals reach their late 20s and early 30s. Those results provide 
evidence that the variations in high school peer compositions may be able to explain teenagers’ 
short-term and long-term outcomes, i.e.: in this paper, adolescent binge drinking behavior, 
sociability and income in young adulthood. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.Data 
    This analysis utilizes data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health 
(Add Health). It is a longitudinal survey of a nationally representative sample of teenagers in the 
United States. It consists of four waves of surveys. 90,118 students in grade 7-12 from 145 schools 
participated in the Wave 1 in-school survey in 1994-1995. 20,745 students and their parents were 
randomly selected from the in-school survey for a detailed in-home interview survey. The most 
recent in-home survey was conducted during 2007-2008. 15,701 participants were 24 to 32 years 
old during the wave 4 survey. Moreover, Add Health contains detailed information about 
adolescents’ drinking behaviors, family background, educational attainment, and contextual data 
with regard to the school, community, and neighborhood they hail from. Since the adolescent 
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“drinking-income” puzzle has been found only among male teenagers, the sample is restricted to 
male respondents. 
    Thus, key information could be obtained from different waves of survey, such as individual 
alcohol use in adolescence and income during young adulthood. Following Mundt and French 
research, I use binge-drinking frequency as the measure of adolescent alcohol consumption. In 
wave 1 survey, the respondents are asked to answer ‘during the past 12 months, on how many days 
did you drink five or more drinks in a row’. Numbers 1 to 6 are assigned to the binge-drinking 
variable to indicate the severity of binge drinking. If a respondent answered ‘1 or 2 days in the past 
12 months’, then binge-drinking frequency is equal to 1. If he or she answered ‘every day or almost 
everyday’, then binge-drinking frequency is equal to 6. If a respondent never drank or only drank 
moderately, this variable is zero. The average binge drinking frequencies of male teenagers in the 
in-school and in-home surveys are 0.82 and 0.76 respectively. 
    The income variable is extracted from wave 4 of the in-home survey. Respondents were asked 
‘in {2006/2007/2008}, how much income did you receive from personal earnings before taxes, 
that is, wages or salaries, including tips, bonuses, and overtime pay, and income from self-
employment’. The sample is restricted to respondents who work more than 10 hours per week and 
have a yearly income of more than 500 dollars. 6 Natural log of the income is used as a measure of 
labor market outcomes. 
    Add Health also includes friend nominations along with identification numbers of individuals 
in the survey. Each respondent is asked to nominate up to five best male friends and five best 
female friends from a school roster. The school roster contains all the students in the respondent’s 
                                                          
6 Respondents have answered the question “are you currently working for pay at least 10 hours a week”? 
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school and in the sister school.7 Therefore, I will use the friend nominations and identification 
numbers from the in-school survey to calculate the actual number of friends that each respondent 
had in the high school. More specifically, the number of friend nominations that each respondent 
received is used as an approximation of sociability. In this paper, I assume that respondents with 
higher sociability interact more actively with their peers, and thus receive more friend nominations. 
In the in-school male sample, the mean friend nomination is 3.89. The least popular respondents 
received zero nominations from school peers. The most popular respondents received 37 friend 
nominations.8 
    All the other individual level control variables are separated into three groups. The first set of 
variables consists of teenagers’ demographic variables (i.e.: age, race, and immigration status), 
and family background (i.e.: maternal and paternal education levels, job characteristics, family 
structure, and whether have siblings in the same school). This set of variables is determined before 
teenagers attend high school. Thus, results of candidate variable regressions using this set of 
variables are convincing, because they are unlikely to be correlated with unobservables that also 
influence outcome variables of interest—binge drinking and sociability. This set of variables is 
also used as the baseline individual-level controls in the earning equation. 
    The second set of controls consists of human capital variables and other endogenous variables—
which are determined simultaneously with drinking. For example, teenage drinkers may have 
worse test scores. However, good students in high school are less likely to binge drink. The last 
set of individual level controls is contemporaneous variables. For example, working experience, 
                                                          
7 If the respondent’s friend was not on the school roster, the respondent needed to indicate whether his or 
her friend attended the same school or sister school (or neither). 
8 The mean of numbers of friend nominations in in-home survey is 4.15. It is also calculated based on the 
in-school friend nomination. This is slightly different from in-school survey because the in-home survey 
sample is smaller.  
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education level, occupation choice, etc. These two sets of variables are likely to be influenced by 
high school peer compositions. Therefore, adding those variables into the earning equation may 
change the estimated coefficients of peer variables.  If we could still find similar patterns of the 
effects of peer compositions on binge drinking and future income after adding those additional 
controls into the regression, then teenage binge drinkers may have wage premiums in the future 
labor market. 
    The most attractive aspect about Add Health is that I could calculate peer-level variables based 
on the in-school survey, which contains more samples than in-home survey. This is critical for the 
peer analysis because it reduces the measurement errors in peer variables and the associated 
attenuation bias (Bifulco et al., 2011).  Peers are defined as those individuals who are in the same 
school and same grade as the individual. This definition is consistent with previous peer effect 
papers (Bifulco et al., 2011, 2014; Fletcher, 2012). Thus, all the peer variables are the grade-level 
mean.9 Individuals with less than 20 grade mates are dropped from the sample.  
3.2.Methodology 
    Due to the concern that teenagers and their parents are likely to choose schools endogenously, 
following Bifulco et al. (2011, 2014), I use a within-school across-cohort strategy to identify the 
influences of high school peer compositions on teenage alcohol consumption and their future 
incomes.10 When teenagers and their parents are making decisions on which high school to attend, 
                                                          
9 Missing variables are excluded from the calculation of cohort variables. So the group average is the mean 
of non-missing variables. For example, if there are 10 observations, and 5 have a value of 1, 4 have a value 
of 0, and 1 is missing, then the missing value is excluded from the calculation of the mean is equal to 5/9 
rather than 5/10.  
10 I only use predetermined characteristics to calculate peer compositions, such as average age, average 
gender, racial compositions, and average family background. This is because the estimation of peer effects 
by using peer outcome variables (such as estimating how peers’ drinking behaviors influence individual’s 
drinking behavior) is likely to be biased (Manski 1993). Also, other endogenous variables, such as peers’ 
average high school GPA, may also bias the estimated results, because they are determined simultaneously 
with teenagers’ alcohol consumption. 
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it is unlikely for them to observe the compositions of students who are going to attend the same 
school during the same year. Thus, this way of comparing students in different grades within the 
same school will help to reduce the potential bias that is caused by students’ and parents’ sorting 
behavior.  
First, I will introduce the income-drinking regression and the regression that I used to estimate 
the peer effects on teenage alcohol consumption. The regression equations are as the following: 
                                 𝑰𝒊𝒈𝒔 = 𝜶𝟏𝑫𝒊𝒈𝒔 + 𝜶𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔 + 𝑺𝒔 + 𝑮𝒈 + 𝜼𝒊𝒈𝒔                                        (1) 
                                 𝑫𝒊𝒈𝒔 = 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐?̅?𝒈𝒔 + 𝑺𝒔 + 𝑮𝒈 + 𝜺𝒊𝒈𝒔                                         (2) 
Equation (1) is the income-drinking regression.  𝑰𝒊𝒈𝒔  is individual 𝑖 ’s income during young 
adulthood. 𝑫𝒊𝒈𝒔  is individual 𝑖 ’s alcohol consumption during adolescence. The influence of 
teenage alcohol consumption on future income is showed by 𝜶𝟏. It is positive in the previous 
literature.  𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔 is a set of individual characteristics.
 11 The random error term is represented by 𝜼. 
Equation (2) is the peer effect regression for teenage alcohol consumption. ?̅?𝒈𝒔 represents the 
average peer characteristics. 12  𝑺𝑠  is a school fixed effect, it ensures that unobserved school 
characteristics have been eliminated; 𝑮𝑔  is, a non-school specific, grade (or cohort, given the 
assumption that individuals interact with peers in the same school and same grade) fixed effect—
thus, the estimated results are a comparison within schools and across cohorts (Bifulco et al., 2011, 
2014). ε is a random error term.  
                                                          
11 𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔 includes age, race dummies, immigration status, presence or absence of male siblings or female 
siblings at the same school, whether living with mother, whether living with father, paternal and maternal 
education levels (a set of dummy variables), and paternal and maternal job information (whether 
unemployed or having a professional job. Having other jobs is the omitted category). 
12  ?̅?𝒈𝒔  includes average age, female percentage, racial compositions, average paternal and maternal 
education levels and job information, and the average of having male siblings or female siblings at the same 
school. 
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𝑰𝒊𝒈𝒔 = (𝜶𝟏𝜷𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐)𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔 + 𝜶𝟏𝜷𝟐?̅?𝒈𝒔 + (𝜶𝟏 + 𝟏)𝑺𝒔 + (𝜶𝟏 + 𝟏)𝑮𝒈 + (𝜶𝟏𝜺𝒊𝒈𝒔 + 𝜼𝒊𝒈𝒔)  (3) 
Equation (3) is the peer effect regression for teenagers’ future income. It is obtained by 
substituting equation (2) into equation (1).  
First, I will use equation (2) to test whether peer compositions have significant influences on 
teenage alcohol consumption. Specifically, coefficients of those peer variables (𝜷𝟐 ) will be 
positive and statistically significant. Second, equation (3) will be used to test whether peer 
variables that have positive coefficients in equation (2) still have the same sign in equation (3). If 
the positive relationship between teenage alcohol consumption and future income is causal, i.e., 
𝜶𝟏  is positive, then it should be possible to translate positive peer effects on teenage alcohol 
consumption into positive peer effects on future incomes, i.e.,  𝜶𝟏𝜷𝟐  should be positive for 
positive 𝜷𝟐, and vice versa. In the end, I will replace  𝑰𝒊𝒈𝒔 with  𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒔, a sociability measure, in 
equation (3). Analogously, 𝜶𝟏𝜷𝟐 should be positive if teenagers gain sociability through drinking 
activities. Using this methodology to understand the relationship between teenage alcohol 
consumption and future income is the major contribution of this paper. 
One concern of the method described above is that drinking might not be the only channel 
through which peer compositions influence teenagers’ future incomes. Other potential channels, 
such as educational attainment, working experiences, occupational choices, etc., may bias the 
estimation in equation (3).13 However, Bifulco et al. (2014) provided evidence that high school 
peer compositions do not have long-lasting effects on teenagers’ human capital development, such 
as college attendance and college completion. Nevertheless, in the robustness test, I will control 
for those potential channels and check whether peer effects influence teenage drinking and future 
                                                          
13 Due to the concern that peer compositions may violate the exclusion restriction, i.e., only influence future 
incomes through drinking, I only use reduced form regressions for estimation. 
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income with the same pattern, i.e., peer variables that have positive influences on teenage alcohol 
consumption should also have positive and statistically significant coefficients in equation (3), and 
vice versa. 
Another concern is that peer effects may directly influence teenagers’ future incomes. These 
direct effects may lead to higher future incomes, which overstate the effect of drinking. 
Alternatively, peer effects may negatively influence future incomes, which would offset the effects 
of drinking. Our estimations in the next section show very minor peer effects on teenagers’ future 
incomes. We argue that since the positive effects of drinking on future income found in the 
previous literature are large and significant, it is almost impossible for peer effects to completely 
offset the drinking effect.  
4. Empirical Results 
This section focuses on the empirical analysis. Table 3 presents the results estimated by using 
the same sets of control variables that were used in the Mundat and French paper. These results 
are very similar to their estimates. Except for in column 1, only demographic characteristics and 
family background are used as baseline control variables. The coefficient of binge drinking is about 
half of the results of the other regressions, which have controlled for human capital variables. The 
change in the estimated effect of binge drinking indicates that high school test scores is negatively 
related to binge drinking. It also suggests that the finding that teenage binge drinkers earn higher 
income might be spurious, because human capital is a key factor for individuals to obtain higher 
income. 
In columns 2 to 5, human capital variables, sociability measures, school fixed effect and grade 
fixed effect are gradually added into the regressions. The coefficients of binge drinking are all 
positive and statistically significant. Noticeably, controlling for the sociability measures cannot 
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significantly erode the impacts of binge drinking. If gain in sociability can explain the implausible 
relationship between binge drinking and income, the coefficient of binge drinking should decrease 
substantially. The positive effect of binge drinking on future income is robust to the school fixed 
effect and grade fixed effect (column 4 and 5).   These results make the explanation that young 
drinkers earn more because they have higher level of sociability less convincing.  
    Columns 1 to 3 in table 4 show the results of candidate variable regressions. In binge drinking 
and friend nomination regressions, all the variables are from Wave I in-school survey. A lot of the 
results are consistent with previous literature. For example, older cohorts drink more. Blacks drink 
less relative to White, but Hispanic are more likely to drink than White. Natives, especially those 
whose father and mother are also born in the U.S., are more likely to drink than immigrants. 
Teenagers whose parents have a higher level of education have lower probabilities of binge 
drinking than those whose parents are high school dropouts. Parents’ job characteristics also have 
significant impacts on children’s drinking behaviors. For instance, if the mother and father have 
professional jobs, such as doctors and lawyers, children are more likely to drink. However, the 
result of mother having no job is very different from that of a father who has no job. This may be 
because if a mother doesn’t have a job, she could stay at home and supervise the children. By 
contrast, if a father doesn’t have a job, he is more likely to binge drink and has a negative influence 
on his children. Having siblings at the same high school can significantly reduce the likelihood of 
teenage binge drinking. This might be because siblings can monitor each other. The only 
unexpected results are the positive impacts of living with mother and living with father on binge 
drinking. In brief, on average, young binge drinkers are older, not black, born in the U.S., and do 
not have siblings in the same school. Their parents are more likely to have a lower level of 
 17 
 
education or to do professional jobs (if they have jobs); and their fathers are less likely to have 
jobs. 
    Column 2 in table 4 tests whether teenagers who have more friend nominations also have the 
same characteristics. Surprisingly, by using the same set of control variables, most coefficients are 
in the opposite direction. For example, older cohorts are less popular. Blacks have more friend 
nominations, though this result is not significant. Teenagers whose parents have lower educational 
levels receive less friend nominations than those whose parents have college degree. Living with 
father or mother leads to less friends. Having siblings in the same school results in more friends. 
The characteristics that have positive impacts on both binge drinking and number of friend 
nominations are Hispanic, born in the U.S., father born in the U.S., and father has a professional 
job.  
    In order to verify whether those four characteristics can also lead to more income in young 
adulthood, the dependent variable is changed to income in column 3 in table 4. Hispanics are more 
likely to binge drink and have more friends. However, Hispanics earn less relative to Whites. 
Individuals whose fathers were born in the U.S. also have less income at wave 4. The only 
characteristic that leads to higher level of drinking, sociability, and income is father having a 
professional job. This may be related to unobserved intergenerational transmission between fathers 
and sons. For example, fathers who have professional jobs may have more income and provide 
teenagers more opportunities to participate in social activities—thus giving sons more chances to 
get access to alcohol and socialize. However, the magnitudes of the impacts of a father’s 
professional job do not seem to dominate influences from other exogenous characteristics in all 
three regressions. 
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Binge drinking frequency and friend nominations are added into the income regression in 
columns 4 and 5, respectively. If the impact of binge drinking on income was causal, the 
coefficients of those predetermined characteristics should change. However, the changes in the 
coefficients in the income-binge drinking regression are no more than 5%.  In the income-friend 
nomination regression, there is a 10% change in the coefficients of age and father professional job. 
Although the estimated impact of binge drinking is positive and significant at 1 percent level, it 
cannot explain any effects of the predetermined characteristics given the condition that there is a 
correlation between binge drinking and those predetermined characteristics.  
Overall, table 4 results show that different predetermined characteristics influence teenage binge 
drinking and future income in different ways. Teenage binge drinking is not able to explain the 
effects of predetermined characteristics on future income. Therefore, though the coefficient of 
binge drinking is positive and statistically significant, it only suggests a positive correlation but 
not causal relationship, between binge drinking and future income.  Teenage binge drinking might 
be correlated with other unobserved characteristics. Moreover, teenage binge drinkers and 
teenagers with more friend nominations are likely to have different characteristics. Thus, using 
sociability to explain teenage “drinking-income” puzzle might also be questionable. Next, I will 
test those results by using peer effect regressions. 
Table 5 shows the results of peer effect regressions. In this model, I test whether high school 
peer compositions could influence future income through their influences on teenage binge 
drinking. If we assume that teenage binge drinking has a positive effect on future income, then 
high school peer compositions should impact both binge drinking and future income in the same 
pattern. Also, I test whether being exposed to peers with higher binge drinking probability could 
lead to higher level of sociability. 
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The first column in table 5 presents the effects of peer compositions on teenage binge drinking 
behaviors. Having more peers who are black, whose mothers have some college education, and 
whose mothers have no job decreases the probability of binge drinking.  The third column shows 
the results of an income regression that controls for peer variables as well as individual 
predetermined characteristics. Only the coefficients of percentage of black and percentage of father 
unemployed are statistically significant. The F-statistics indicate that those predetermined peer 
variables are jointly significant in binge drinking regression but not in income regression.    Again, 
after controlling for binge drinking, the impacts of peer variables do not have considerable 
changes. This implies that in the peer effect model with only baseline individual-level controls, 
binge drinking cannot explain the influence of peer composition on income.  
There are two ways to explain the results of binge drinking and income regressions. First, it is 
likely that teenage binge drinking has no positive impacts on future income. Otherwise, the same 
pattern of influences of high school peer compositions should also be found in the income 
regression. Second, although those peer variables cannot explain income in young adulthood as a 
group, it seems that most of them influence teenage binge drinking and future income in the same 
direction. Because high school peers could have other indirect effects on future income, this 
implies that maybe we should also control other contemporaneous variables in the income 
regressions. 
Similar to the individual level regression results, the characteristics of binge drinking peers are 
different from that of peers who have more friends. For example, black peers impede binge 
drinking among teenagers but bring more friends. Higher average age or having more peers whose 
fathers are unemployed increases binge drinking but reduces social interactions among teenagers. 
From peer aspect, it is unlikely that binge drinking teenagers and high sociability teenagers are in 
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the same social networks. Binge drinking may not necessarily bring social benefits. In column 5 
of table 5, adding friend nominations into the income regression only alters the significance of the 
coefficient of having father with some college education.  
Table 6 shows the results of regressions with additional individual control variables. In the first 
column, high school test scores, delinquency score, and other endogenous individual-level 
variables are added into the earning equation. Students with higher test scores are more likely to 
earn higher wages in young adulthood. Higher delinquency scores negatively influence future 
income, but the coefficient is not significant. When comparing with the previous results, the 
coefficients of peer compositions have slight changes. For example, percentage of father having 
some college education become significant at 10 percent level, but racial composition cannot 
explain future income in this regression. 
In addition, educational attainment and working experience are controlled for in the second 
column. Having more working experience and higher levels of education can result in higher 
incomes. The only noticeable change of peer variables is that the coefficient of percentage of father 
having some college education is significant at 5 percent level. In the last column of table 6, a set 
of occupation dummies is added into the income regression. 14 Only the coefficient of average 
percentage of black is significant. The peer effects on teenage binge drinking cannot be recovered 
after the other endogenous variables are added into the income regression. Moreover, F-statistics 
show that those predetermined peer variables are not jointly significant. The influences of peer 
                                                          
14  In wave 4 survey, respondents were asked “what kind of work (do/did) you do in this job?” The 
respondents’ occupations were coded following the 2000 Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) 
scheme. The final job code is in a six-digit character format, i.e., XX-XXXX. The first two digits denotes 
the major group. The third digit represents the minor group. In this paper, the occupation dummies are 
generated based on the minor group. 
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compositions in earning equations do not mirror their impacts on teenage binge drinking. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the positive relationship between binge drinking and income is causal.  
5. Conclusion 
    By using a cross-cohort/within-school strategy, this paper reexamines the previous finding of a 
positive relationship between teenage binge drinking and future income by exploiting the quasi-
random variations in high school peer compositions.  The major result is that peer variables that 
could explain teenage binge drinking do not have significant impacts on future income. As 
discussed earlier, if this positive effect of teenage binge drinking on income is causal, peer 
variables should be able to explain future income. Also, including contemporaneous variables in 
the earning regressions does not lead to substantial changes in the estimated effects of peer 
compositions. Those results suggest that the positive relationship between adolescent binge 
drinking and future income might not be causal. 
    Moreover, binge-drinking teenagers and high-sociability teenagers are likely to have different 
predetermined characteristics. Also, it is unlikely that being exposed to peers with higher 
probability of binge drinking could increase sociability. Thus, sociability cannot completely 
explain “binge drinking-income” puzzle. There might exist other unobserved factors that are 
correlated with both teenage binge drinking behaviors and their future income. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: individual level variables 
 In-home Survey In-school Survey 
Variables N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Alcohol consumption       
Binge drinking frequency 5467 0.762 1.402 37906 0.819 1.465 
Labor market outcome       
Log of income 5467 10.486 0.753    
Sociability       
Friend Nomination 5467 4.148 3.924 37906 3.889 3.811 
Demographic variables       
Age  5467 15.753 1.696 37906 15.134 1.700 
White  5467 0.581 0.493 37906 0.601 0.490 
Black 5467 0.174 0.379 37906 0.150 0.357 
Hispanic 5467 0.153 0.360 37906 0.163 0.369 
Other race 5467 0.193 0.395 37906 0.130 0.336 
Born in U.S. 5467 0.917 0.277 37906 0.879 0.327 
Family background       
Log Family income 5467 2.769 1.662    
Census income (thousand) 5467 35.190 8.575    
Mother born in U.S. 5467 0.816 0.423 37906 0.827 0.450 
Father born in U.S. 5467 0.811 0.486 37906 0.830 0.487 
Mother high school dropout 5467 0.142 0.334 37906 0.107 0.275 
Mother high school graduate 5467 0.420 0.485 37906 0.438 0.474 
Mother some college 5467 0.133 0.325 37906 0.108 0.277 
Mother college graduate 5467 0.303 0.446 37906 0.356 0.444 
Mother no job 5467 0.134 0.332 37906 0.250 0.401 
Mother professional job 5467 0.077 0.258 37906 0.124 0.298 
Mother other job 5467 0.790 0.437 37906 0.626 0.500 
Father high school dropout 5467 0.147 0.308 37906 0.113 0.263 
Father high school graduate 5467 0.393 0.450 37906 0.381 0.434 
Father some college 5467 0.130 0.291 37906 0.103 0.252 
Father college graduate 5467 0.329 0.425 37906 0.402 0.442 
Father no job 5467 0.050 0.192 37906 0.059 0.194 
Father professional job 5467 0.278 0.342 37906 0.271 0.387 
Father other job 5467 0.722 0.493 37906 0.670 0.498 
Live with mother 5467 0.879 0.419 37906 0.908 0.321 
Live with father 5467 0.634 0.450 37906 0.778 0.430 
Male sibling at same school 5467 0.185 0.342 37906 0.122 0.295 
Female sibling at same school 5467 0.116 0.279 37906 0.096 0.398 
Endogenous variable       
English GPA 5467 2.617 1.021    
Math GPA 5467 2.469 1.196    
Delinquency Score 5467 4.891 5.732    
Safe neighborhood 5467 0.902 0.298    
Stay at same home since born 5467 0.207 0.405    
Contemporaneous variable       
Working experience 5467 8.326 3.631    
High school dropout 5467 0.075 0.264    
High school graduate 5467 0.285 0.452    
Some college 5467 0.341 0.474    
College graduate 5467 0.298 0.457    
Notes: Family income, census income, endogenous variables and contemporaneous variables are only available 
in in-home survey.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: peer variables 
Peer variable N Mean SD 
Average age 37906 15.053 1.562 
% White  37906 0.610 0.301 
% Black 37906 0.162 0.217 
% Other race 37906 0.128 0.112 
% Born in U.S. 37906 0.910 0.120 
%Mother high school dropout 37887 0.127 0.097 
%Mother high school graduate 37887 0.434 0.129 
%Mother some college 37887 0.115 0.044 
%Mother college graduate 37887 0.327 0.150 
%Mother no job 37887 0.258 0.088 
%Mother professional job 37887 0.113 0.053 
%Mother other job 37887 0.629 0.083 
%Father high school dropout 37879 0.131 0.100 
%Father high school graduate 37879 0.391 0.137 
%Father some college 37879 0.101 0.043 
%Father college graduate 37879 0.377 0.172 
%Father no job 37883 0.064 0.050 
%Father professional job 37883 0.247 0.144 
%Father other job 37883 0.689 0.130 
%Live with mother 37903 0.924 0.038 
%Live with father 37904 0.770 0.099 
%Male sibling at same school 37906 0.119 0.063 
%Female sibling at same school 37906 0.112 0.062 
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Table 3. Replicated Results 
 Dependent variable: income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Binge drinking 
 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Human capital 
variables 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sociability 
measures 
No  No   Yes  Yes  Yes  
School fixed 
effects  
No  No  No  Yes  Yes  
Grade fixed 
effects 
No  No  No  No   Yes  
Observations  5963 5963 5963 5963 5963 
𝐑𝟐 0.069 0.094 0.110 0.080 0.084 
Notes:Base line controls include age, age-squared, race, maternal and paternal education, family income, whether 
live in the same home since birth, census income, and whether neighborhood is safe.  Human capital variables 
are English score, Math score, delinquency score and work experience. The major sociability measure is number 
of friend nomination. Other sociability controls are participation in sports, clubs and student council, whether 
get together with friends after school, whether talk on phone with male and female friends, whether play video 
or computer games, and whether paly rollerblade, skateboard and bicycle. Number of observations is slightly 
different from the original paper (n=5995). Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
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Table 4. Candidate variables regressions results 
 Dependent variable: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Binge drinking 
Friend 
nomination Income Income Income 
Binge drinking    0.0186***  
    (0.0069)  
Friend nomination     0.0166*** 
     (0.0026) 
Age 0.202*** -0.167*** -0.0627*** -0.0652*** -0.0588*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0313) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0156) 
Black -0.194*** 0.123 -0.221*** -0.212*** -0.217*** 
 (0.0435) (0.105) (0.0434) (0.0440) (0.0418) 
Hispanic 0.148*** 0.185** -0.0638 -0.0656* -0.0692* 
 (0.0327) (0.0776) (0.0386) (0.0384) (0.0390) 
Other race 0.0669** -0.125* -0.0688** -0.0699** -0.0683** 
 (0.0304) (0.0716) (0.0342) (0.0338) (0.0334) 
Born in the U.S. 0.141*** 0.476*** 0.0261 0.0206 0.0224 
 (0.0430) (0.0720) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0402) 
Living with mother 0.361*** -0.344** 0.0554 0.0540 0.0558 
 (0.0997) (0.140) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0382) 
Mother high school dropout 0.120*** -0.225*** -0.0933** -0.0941** -0.0947** 
 (0.0334) (0.0720) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0400) 
Mother some college -0.0122 0.0862 0.0179 0.0175 0.0183 
 (0.0314) (0.0629) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0267) 
Mother college graduate -0.0287 0.228*** 0.0508** 0.0506** 0.0478** 
 (0.0210) (0.0634) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0239) 
Mother born in the U.S. 0.111*** -0.0182 -0.0971* -0.0998** -0.0961* 
 (0.0416) (0.0942) (0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0506) 
Living with father 0.0588 -0.608*** 0.0326 0.0350 0.0311 
 (0.0791) (0.160) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0283) 
Father high school dropout 0.180*** -0.143* 0.0141 0.0126 0.0179 
 (0.0377) (0.0864) (0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0315) 
Father some college -0.0271 0.262*** 0.0450 0.0455 0.0388 
 (0.0303) (0.0837) (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0428) 
Father college graduate -0.0759*** 0.437*** 0.0406 0.0413 0.0311 
 (0.0254) (0.0700) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0302) 
Father born in the U.S. 0.0760** 0.210*** -0.0905* -0.0895* -0.0938* 
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 (0.0338) (0.0792) (0.0495) (0.0493) (0.0479) 
Male siblings in the same school -0.0834*** 0.295*** 0.0457 0.0474 0.0406 
 (0.0266) (0.0674) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0290) 
Female siblings in the same 
school -0.118*** 0.140** -0.0192 -0.0204 -0.0170 
 (0.0230) (0.0665) (0.0378) (0.0376) (0.0376) 
Mother unemployed -0.0257 -0.341*** -0.0378 -0.0384 -0.0339 
 (0.0233) (0.0538) (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0383) 
Mother professional job 0.181*** -0.0394 0.0256 0.0244 0.0206 
 (0.0234) (0.0699) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0393) 
Father unemployed 0.150*** -0.134 -0.142** -0.144** -0.140** 
 (0.0441) (0.103) (0.0606) (0.0608) (0.0597) 
Father professional job 0.0790*** 0.256*** 0.0762*** 0.0767*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0656) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0263) 
Observations 37,906 37,906 5,467 5,467 5,467 
R-squared 0.055 0.027 0.051 0.052 0.058 
F-statistics 18.29 19.06 12.77 12.65 11.34 
Prob >F 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Coefficients of missing variables are not shown in the table. Omitted categories are white, mother high school graduate, father high 
school graduate, mother other jobs, and father other jobs. The F-statistics is for the joint effect of individual-level variables. Significance is 
defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
  
 30 
 
Table 5. Peer effect regressions results 
 Dependent variables: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Binge 
drinking 
Friend 
nomination Income  Income  Income  
Binge drinking    0.0181**  
    (0.0071)  
Friend nomination     0.0170*** 
     (0.0027) 
Age  0.194*** -0.163*** -0.0641*** -0.0666*** -0.0607*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0305) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0155) 
Black  -0.189*** 0.111 -0.211*** -0.202*** -0.208*** 
 (0.0427) (0.103) (0.0447) (0.0453) (0.0431) 
Hispanic  0.146*** 0.195** -0.0651* -0.0668* -0.0709* 
 (0.0326) (0.0774) (0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0397) 
Other race 0.0631** -0.136* -0.0677** -0.0688** -0.0674** 
 (0.0304) (0.0705) (0.0342) (0.0338) (0.0333) 
Born in the U.S. 0.143*** 0.476*** 0.0212 0.0161 0.0178 
 (0.0422) (0.0719) (0.0407) (0.0405) (0.0398) 
Living with mother 0.371*** -0.378*** 0.0603 0.0589 0.0609 
 (0.100) (0.144) (0.0381) (0.0380) (0.0383) 
Mother high school dropout 0.119*** -0.228*** -0.0868** -0.0878** -0.0891** 
 (0.0331) (0.0718) (0.0406) (0.0407) (0.0402) 
Mother some college -0.00690 0.0868 0.0147 0.0144 0.0155 
 (0.0316) (0.0638) (0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0270) 
Mother college graduate -0.0280 0.225*** 0.0437* 0.0435* 0.0418 
 (0.0211) (0.0636) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0254) 
Mother born in the U.S. 0.114*** -0.0174 -0.0980* -0.100** -0.0964* 
 (0.0413) (0.0945) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0503) 
Living with father 0.0521 -0.614*** 0.0301 0.0323 0.0290 
 (0.0784) (0.160) (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0281) 
Father high school dropout 0.177*** -0.139 0.0199 0.0184 0.0232 
 (0.0381) (0.0877) (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0326) 
Father some college -0.0277 0.270*** 0.0426 0.0430 0.0366 
 (0.0303) (0.0835) (0.0419) (0.0424) (0.0428) 
Father college graduate -0.0763*** 0.441*** 0.0388 0.0395 0.0298 
 (0.0251) (0.0705) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
Father born in the U.S. 0.0781** 0.210*** -0.0987* -0.0978* -0.101** 
 (0.0338) (0.0791) (0.0506) (0.0504) (0.0491) 
Male siblings in the same school -0.0820*** 0.288*** 0.0449 0.0466 0.0395 
 (0.0267) (0.0673) (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0293) 
Female siblings in the same school -0.117*** 0.140** -0.0262 -0.0275 -0.0243 
 (0.0228) (0.0668) (0.0373) (0.0372) (0.0372) 
Mother unemployed -0.0214 -0.344*** -0.0300 -0.0307 -0.0265 
 (0.0234) (0.0533) (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0380) 
Mother professional job 0.178*** -0.0505 0.0236 0.0225 0.0194 
 (0.0233) (0.0695) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0400) 
Father unemployed 0.143*** -0.117 -0.132** -0.134** -0.132** 
 (0.0437) (0.104) (0.0620) (0.0622) (0.0612) 
Father professional job 0.0757*** 0.259*** 0.0689** 0.0694*** 0.0620** 
 (0.0247) (0.0655) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0264) 
Average age 0.117 -0.798*** 0.186 0.186 0.224 
 (0.0977) (0.290) (0.148) (0.149) (0.146) 
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% Black -1.082* 1.908* -0.765* -0.746* -0.765* 
 (0.600) (0.993) (0.427) (0.431) (0.423) 
% Hispanic 0.574 -0.803 -0.718 -0.722 -0.724 
 (0.384) (0.947) (0.471) (0.470) (0.460) 
% Other race 0.207 2.108** -0.310 -0.312 -0.302 
 (0.358) (0.909) (0.321) (0.321) (0.322) 
% Born in the U.S. -0.129 -0.228 0.445 0.449 0.526 
 (0.386) (1.157) (0.408) (0.409) (0.400) 
% Male siblings in the same school 0.0417 1.374 0.232 0.222 0.244 
 (0.295) (1.059) (0.230) (0.230) (0.226) 
% Female siblings in the same school -0.153 0.642 -0.00749 0.0209 -0.0119 
 (0.319) (1.119) (0.365) (0.370) (0.365) 
% Father high school dropout 0.204 -1.021 -0.171 -0.164 -0.171 
 (0.353) (0.930) (0.262) (0.261) (0.258) 
% Father some college -0.385 -0.329 -0.534 -0.525 -0.563* 
 (0.425) (1.052) (0.326) (0.323) (0.323) 
% Father college graduate -0.177 0.0501 -0.0886 -0.0733 -0.0825 
 (0.280) (0.855) (0.241) (0.241) (0.237) 
% Father unemployed 0.533 -2.515** 0.607* 0.610* 0.666* 
 (0.399) (1.089) (0.352) (0.351) (0.341) 
% Father professional job 0.0712 -0.0927 -0.399 -0.390 -0.377 
 (0.299) (0.742) (0.258) (0.258) (0.254) 
% Living with father -0.234 0.565 -0.0681 -0.0688 -0.0829 
 (0.340) (0.959) (0.301) (0.300) (0.297) 
% Mother high school dropout 0.0988 0.758 0.0788 0.101 0.0818 
 (0.377) (1.112) (0.291) (0.291) (0.297) 
% Mother some college -0.761* -0.572 -0.151 -0.147 -0.184 
 (0.409) (1.048) (0.315) (0.316) (0.310) 
% Mother college graduate -0.00509 -0.155 0.176 0.175 0.165 
 (0.296) (0.864) (0.236) (0.239) (0.236) 
% Mother unemployed -0.484* 0.0194 -0.0224 -0.0128 -0.0404 
 (0.251) (0.708) (0.239) (0.240) (0.239) 
% Mother professional job 0.537 1.600 -0.406 -0.404 -0.442 
 (0.333) (1.124) (0.316) (0.313) (0.315) 
% Living with mother -0.0865 -0.712 -0.296 -0.278 -0.329 
 (0.403) (1.441) (0.396) (0.394) (0.392) 
Observations 37,869 37,869 5,455 5,455 5,455 
R-squared 0.054 0.028 0.056 0.057 0.063 
F-statistics 2.59 1.71 1.37 1.40 1.70 
Prob > F 0.0008 0.0411 0.1547 0.1379 0.0443 
Notes: Coefficients of missing variables are not shown in the table. Omitted categories are white, mother high school 
graduate, father high school graduate, mother other jobs, and father other jobs. Peer omitted categories are % white, % 
father high school graduate, % mother high school graduate, % father job and % mother other job. Regressions (3) to 
(5) also include household income, census income, and missing indicators. The F-statistics is for the effect of peer 
variables. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
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Table 6. Results of peer effects regression with additional controls 
 Dependent variable:  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Income  Income  Income  
English GPA 0.0809*** 0.0546*** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0107) 
Math GPA 0.0418*** 0.0296*** 0.0205** 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0101) 
Delinquency score -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Safe neighborhood 0.0643* 0.0517 0.0665** 
 (0.0335) (0.0323) (0.0290) 
Stay at same home since born 0.0445* 0.0361 0.0416* 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0250) 
Working experience  0.0112*** 0.0074** 
  (0.0036) (0.0037) 
High school dropout  -0.218*** -0.165*** 
  (0.0494) (0.0513) 
High school graduate  -0.0685** -0.0461* 
  (0.0274) (0.0241) 
College graduate  0.200*** 0.161*** 
  (0.0251) (0.0255) 
Average age 0.179 0.193 0.121 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.142) 
% Black -0.696 -0.672 -0.747* 
 (0.444) (0.433) (0.388) 
% Hispanic -0.609 -0.607 -0.312 
 (0.472) (0.466) (0.432) 
% Other race -0.300 -0.392 -0.245 
 (0.319) (0.323) (0.301) 
% Born in the U.S. 0.460 0.478 0.335 
 (0.407) (0.404) (0.374) 
% Male siblings in the same 
school 0.299 0.237 
0.320 
 (0.230) (0.231) (0.207) 
% Female siblings in the same 
school -0.0755 -0.0972 
0.149 
 (0.352) (0.3 50) (0.330) 
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% Father high school dropout -0.229 -0.241 -0.119 
 (0.253) (0.260) (0.268) 
% Father some college -0.576* -0.619** -0.430 
 (0.319) (0.312) (0.363) 
% Father college graduate -0.109 -0.126 -0.075 
 (0.234) (0.230) (0.239) 
% Father unemployed 0.645* 0.636* 0.329 
 (0.351) (0.353) (0.322) 
% Father professional job -0.278 -0.247 -0.222 
 (0.254) (0.251) (0.235) 
% Living with father -0.0980 -0.121 -0.137 
 (0.294) (0.290) (0.265) 
% Mother high school dropout 0.165 0.0939 0.265 
 (0.286) (0.283) (0.278) 
% Mother some college -0.208 -0.149 -0.033 
 (0.295) (0.284) (0.285) 
% Mother college graduate 0.176 0.175 0.237 
 (0.229) (0.228) (0.232) 
% Mother unemployed 0.0250 0.0302 -0.048 
 (0.242) (0.234) (0.223) 
% Mother professional job -0.493 -0.469 -0.466 
 (0.327) (0.320) (0.291) 
% Living with mother -0.250 -0.142 -0.012 
 (0.411) (0.402) (0.389) 
Occupation fixed effects No  No  Yes  
    
Observations 5,455 5,455 5,455 
R-squared 0.075 0.092 0.193 
F-statistics 1.32 1.32 1.10 
Prob > F 0.1820 0.1832 0.3548 
Notes: Coefficients of predetermined and missing variables are not shown in the table. Omitted category for 
individual educational attainment is some college. Omitted categories of peer variables are same as previous 
regressions. Columns 1 to 3 are results of regressions that control for endogenous variables. Columns 4 to 6 are 
results of regressions that control for both endogenous and contemporaneous variables. The F-statistics is for the 
effect of peer variables. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
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Abstract 
While previous literature has found that ethnic segregation positively affects immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes, other papers have found the opposite. A number of studies have reconciled these 
conflicting findings by showing that segregation is more beneficial to immigrants from high 
income or well-educated ethnic groups. In this paper, we further investigate how segregation 
effects vary with immigrants’ own education. We also test the differential segregation effects for 
immigrants with different education levels and from ethnic groups with different average human 
capital. We find that ethnic segregation, when the ethnic group average human capital is held 
constant, has a more significant reductive effect on high-skill immigrants’ wages. Furthermore, 
living in ethnic enclaves with low average human capital is especially harmful to the wages of 
low-skill immigrants. This may be because competition for the limited number of jobs in ethnic 
enclaves drives low-skill immigrants’ wages down. Finally, we did not find any significant 
segregation effects on immigrant employment. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1960s, the number of immigrants in the U.S. has increased substantially. Researchers 
have observed that immigrants from the same ethnic groups tend to cluster together in the same 
geographic areas (Cutler et al., 2008). It is however unclear whether this residential segregation 
positively or negatively affects immigrants’ labor market outcomes. Previous studies have found 
that ethnic segregation is beneficial for immigrants (Edin et al., 2003; Munshi, 2003; Damm, 2009; 
Cutler et al., 2008), while others have shown that ethnic segregation either leads to deteriorated 
labor market outcomes (Borjas, 2000; Beamean, 2012) or has no impact at all (Grönqvist, 2006). 
These conflicting results may be because ethnic segregation impacts immigrants differently 
depending on their individual characteristics. For example, Edin et al. (2003) and Cutler et al. 
(2008) found that ethnic group average income and average education, respectively, positively 
influence the effects of segregation on immigrants’ wages. 
In this paper, we further explore whether immigrants’ individual education levels can reconcile 
the contradictory findings on segregation effects. Specifically, we first argue that the impacts of 
ethnic segregation change according to immigrants’ individual education levels and that it is 
unclear whether segregation is more beneficial to high-skill or to low-skill immigrants. If 
segregation is harmful to immigrants’ outcomes in general, then high-skill immigrants may not be 
as affected as low-skill immigrants. Because of language barriers (Carliner, 2000) and labor market 
discrimination (Edin et al., 2003), low-skill immigrants are more likely to be restricted to labor 
markets near ethnic enclaves, whereas high-skill immigrants can find jobs in broader labor 
markets. On the contrary, however, high-skill immigrants might be more affected by segregation 
since their returns on education may be higher if they have more interactions with natives and look 
for jobs in native dominated labor markets.  
 36 
 
Second, the differential segregation effects mentioned above may depend on the average 
education level of the immigrants’ ethnic group, although how exactly they would vary is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, when immigrants’ individual education levels are similar to their 
ethnic enclaves’ average education levels, they may benefit from ethnic segregation because the 
quality of job networks and job matching might be higher when immigrants are exposed to more 
co-ethnics who have similar skill levels.  
On the other hand, matches between immigrants’ individual education levels and group average 
education levels may also worsen segregation effects. Low-skill immigrants may face more 
competition from other low-skill co-ethnics for a limited number of jobs within ethnic enclaves 
(Cortes, 2008; Beaman, 2012).  Furthermore, for high-skill immigrants from well-educated ethnic 
groups, their high group average education level may correlate with unobserved talents, such as 
analytical and quantitative skills. Thus, both education and unobserved talents may be more 
valuable in native dominated labor markets. The opportunity costs of segregation would therefore 
be especially high for high-skill immigrants from well-educated ethnic groups. 
 Since it is unclear which of the aforementioned effects dominate, this study uses empirical 
estimations to examine possible answers. It nevertheless remains difficult to estimate impacts of 
segregation because immigrants are likely to endogenously choose where to live based on observed 
and unobserved factors. For example, previous research using neighborhood-level segregation 
intensity measures (such as percentage of immigrants from the same ethnic group in the same 
tract/block) found that segregation harms immigrants’ labor market outcomes (Clark and 
Drinkwater, 2002). However, this finding might be driven by low-skill immigrants selecting 
neighborhoods with more co-ethnics due to housing market discrimination (Ihlanfeldt and 
Sjoquist, 1998), lack of fluency in the host country’s language (Carliner, 2000), etc. A number of 
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papers exploited policies that exogenously place refugees in host countries (Edin et al., 2003; 
Damm, 2009; Beaman, 2012). Their results are more convincing, but may not be comprehensive 
enough to generalize to all immigrants, since refugees are often low-skill immigrants.  
 In this paper, instead of exploiting such exogenous variations in segregation intensity, we utilize 
two strategies to alleviate the biases caused by immigrants’ selections into ethnic enclaves. Instead 
of neighborhood-level measures, our first strategy is to use an MSA-level isolation index to 
measure segregation intensity. Within the same MSA, low-skill immigrants are more likely to stay 
in ethnic enclave neighborhoods, while high-skill immigrants may move to more diversified 
neighborhoods with better economic conditions. It is however more difficult for immigrants to 
move between MSAs (Evans et al., 1992; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Cutler et al., 2008). Thus, the 
comparisons between MSAs generate more accurate estimates. 
Since immigrants may also endogenously choose the MSAs in which they live, our second 
strategy is to adopt a triple differences model to minimize the selection bias associated with MSA-
level segregation intensity. Specifically, we control for MSA-specific time trends, group-specific 
time trends, and ethnic-group-specific MSA factors. Thus, any unobserved MSA or ethnic group 
factors that influence immigrants’ outcomes over time, as well as any MSA factors impacting 
outcomes of immigrants from a certain ethnic group, are eliminated.  
In order to estimate the differential segregation effects, we introduce a set of double and triple 
interaction terms between the segregation intensity, immigrants’ own education, and ethnic group 
average education. By using a sample of immigrants who are between ages 22-32 and who 
migrated to the U.S. at age 17 or later, we find that, given the same ethnic group average education 
level, ethnic segregation has more of a decreasing effect on the wages of high-skill immigrants. 
We also find that living in ethnic enclaves with low group average education levels is especially 
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harmful to low-skill immigrants. This result indicates that, although interacting with more co-
ethnics with similar skill levels may bring positive network effects, it is also likely that competition 
among low-skill immigrants drives down wages and that this latter negative effect dominates. 
However, the effects of ethnic segregation on high-skill immigrants’ wages do not change with 
ethnic group average education. Finally, we did not find any significant segregation effects on 
immigrant employment.  
From a policy standpoint, this paper suggests that policy makers should promote class diversity 
in ethnic neighborhoods as a means to intermix differently-skilled co-ethnics. While residential 
segregation may benefit low-skill immigrants by accelerating assimilation, the components of 
ethnic enclaves are also important to the labor market outcomes of immigrants. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss in greater detail how immigrants’ 
individual education levels and ethnic group average education levels may influence segregation 
effects. In Section 3, we introduce the data used for our empirical estimations and the measure of 
segregation intensity. In Section 4, we discuss the triple interaction and triple differences model. 
In Section 5, we test the validity of our identification strategy. In Section 6, we present the results 
of our main model and, in Section 7, we conclude. 
2. Why Immigrants’ Individual Education Levels and Group Average Education 
Levels Matter? 
2.1.  Inconsistent Segregation Effects 
In the current literature, there is no definite conclusion as to how ethnic segregation influences 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes. Some papers showed evidence that immigrants gain labor 
market advantages from ethnic segregation. For example, using the natural experiment of the 
Swedish immigration policy, Edin et al. (2003) showed that, when sorting is taken into account, 
living in enclaves improves labor market outcomes for less-skilled immigrants. Mushi (2003), 
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using rainfall of the origin community to instrument the network size, found that Mexican 
immigrants with larger network sizes in the host country have better labor market outcomes. 
Damm (2009) showed that immigrants’ hourly wages increase with enclave size by using a natural 
experiment where a policy randomly dispersed refugees throughout Denmark.  
However, other research found negative or no segregation effects on immigrants’ outcomes. For 
instance, Borjas (2000) showed that ethnic segregation slows down wage growth for immigrants 
in the U.S. Beaman (2012) took advantage of U.S. refugee policy and found that an increase in 
network size can negatively impact new arrivals yet benefit tenured members.  Grönqvist (2006) 
used Swedish data and found that the size of enclave negatively affects the probability of obtaining 
higher education but has no effect on earnings.  
Moreover, segregation effects might change with the quality of ethnic groups.  For example, 
Edin et al. (2003) found that immigrants from high income groups benefit more from ethnic 
segregation. Cutler et al. (2008) showed that ethnic group average education levels negatively 
impact segregation effects. However, this relationship was reversed when they used the mean years 
since immigration for an ethnic group within a city to instrument the endogenous segregation 
intensity.  
In this paper, we propose that ethnic segregation has different impacts on immigrants with 
different education levels and from ethnic groups with different average education levels. If these 
hypotheses are true, it may help explain why findings regarding segregation effects are inconsistent 
in the previous literature. We will analyze different cases in the following sections.  
2.2. Individual Education and Segregation Effects 
Given the same ethnic group average education level, the effects of ethnic segregation might be 
different for immigrants with different skill levels. The direction of these effects, however, is 
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uncertain. Living in ethnic enclaves may lead to worse outcomes for low-skill immigrants than for 
high-skill immigrants. Low-skill immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves have fewer chances 
to practice the host country language. Therefore, the longer they stay in ethnic enclaves, the less 
likely they are to assimilate into native communities. Furthermore, jobs in ethnic enclaves might 
be of a lower quality (Cutler et al., 2008). High-skill immigrants however may have broader 
networks extending beyond their local neighborhoods and may be able to more easily search for 
jobs across broader labor markets. If ethnic segregation has negative effects on immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes in general, education may in some part protect high-skill immigrants from these 
effects. 
On the contrary, segregation may be more harmful to high-skill immigrants because their 
opportunity costs of staying in ethnic enclaves might be much larger than for low-skill immigrants. 
More interactions with natives and job searching in native-dominated labor markets may bring 
high-skill immigrants more job opportunities and higher returns on education. Low-skill 
immigrants might however benefit from ethnic segregation, as they are often not proficient in the 
host country language, and ethnic enclaves provide job networks and language environments 
where low-skill immigrants can more easily obtain job market information (Bayer et al., 2005). 
2.3. Ethnic Group Average Education and Segregation Effects 
Similarly, ethnic segregation may have different impacts on immigrants from ethnic groups with 
different average education levels, and differential segregation effects might still be unclear.15  
Immigrants from well-educated groups may receive higher wages if they assimilate into native 
communities than if they live in ethnic enclaves, since group average education might correlate 
                                                          
15 Cutler et al. (2008) concluded that group average education positively influences segregation effects. 
However, this result is based on an instrumental variable which we argue might violate the exclusion 
restriction.  Our analysis suggesting this is in the Appendix. 
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with unobserved talents which have higher returns in native-dominated labor markets. For 
example, recently arrived Asian immigrant cohorts tend to have high average levels of education 
and are more likely to have high-tech or engineering-related occupations (Zong and Batalova, 
2016). This indicates that immigrants from Asian countries may have higher levels of analytical 
and quantitative skills than other immigrants, which may complement natives’ interactive and 
communication skills. 16 Thus, if they chose to work with natives rather than compete for low-skill 
jobs in ethnic enclaves they would have higher wages. 
Alternatively, high group average education levels may strengthen positive segregation effects 
for immigrants. With more high-skill immigrants in the same ethnic enclave, immigrants of all 
education levels may benefit from better job network quality. Also, high-skill immigrants may 
create more job opportunities near ethnic enclaves by building businesses, such as ethnicity-
specific restaurants or companies (Borjas, 2000). 
2.4. Differential Segregation Effects for Different Individual and Group Education Levels 
    Finally, we discuss how the segregation effects change with both immigrants’ individual 
education levels and their ethnic group average education levels. The differential segregation 
effects are again indeterminate for the following reasons. 
For immigrants living in ethnic enclaves with many co-ethnics who have similar skill levels, 
ethnic segregation may have positive or negative effects on their labor market outcomes. First, 
ethnic segregation may be beneficial to high-skill (low-skill) immigrants from ethnic groups with 
high (low) group average education levels. This may be due to the fact that, when immigrants are 
interacting with individuals who are at the same labor market skill levels, positive network effects 
                                                          
16 Peri and Sparber (2011) showed that high-skill immigrants are more likely to have jobs which require 
analytical and quantitative skills. With more high-skill immigrants, high-skill natives switch to jobs which 
require more interactive and communication skills. 
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of ethnic segregation could be multiplied and job matching quality improved. For example, it 
might be easier for a low-skill Chinese immigrant to find a waiter job through a Chinese 
community in Chinatown (where there are a lot of low-skill Chinese immigrants). However, a 
high-skill Chinese immigrant who wants to be a computer engineer may obtain better job 
information through the Chinese community near Silicon Valley (where there are a lot of high-
skill Chinese immigrants).  
Second, ethnic segregation may lead to adverse labor market outcomes as competition between 
immigrants with similar skill levels may drive wage rates down. This negative effect may be 
especially harmful for low-skill immigrants who are bound to labor markets near ethnic enclaves.17 
For example, a low-skill Chinese immigrant who is living in a community in Chinatown may face 
more competition from low-skill co-ethnics than he would if her were living in a Chinese 
community near Silicon Valley. Also, as was mentioned above, both education and unobserved 
talents related to high group average education levels may have higher returns in the native-
dominated labor market. Therefore, the costs of segregation are especially high for high-skill 
immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves with high levels of group average education. 
In conclusion, we conjecture that segregation effects may vary with immigrants’ individual 
education levels, group average education levels, and the two factors combined. However, the 
direction of these effects remains unclear. This paper therefore empirically tests these differential 
segregation effects.  
                                                          
17 One could argue that low-skill immigrants may not work in the same industries or occupations as their 
equally-skilled co-ethnics. It might therefore not be true that competition between immigrants with the same 
skill levels drives wage rates down. There is no direct evidence to refute this hypothesis.  However, Patel 
and Vella (2013) found that newly arrived immigrants are more likely to choose the same occupations as 
their co-ethnics. Immigrants from non-English-speaking countries tend to have jobs which require less 
communication skills (Chiswick and Taengnoi, 2007).  
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3. Data 
3.1. IPUMS 
Our study uses the Integrated Public Use Micro Series (Ruggles et al., 2015) from the 2000 
U.S. Census and the American Community Survey (ACS) five-year sample for 2006-2010. The 
census data are 5-percent samples of the U.S. population. The 2006-2010 ACS sample merges 1-
percent samples from 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. Weights are adjusted appropriately.  
Since we focus on estimating the differential segregation effects on immigrants’ labor market 
outcomes, the outcome variables are log of hourly wage and a dummy variable indicating whether 
an immigrant is currently employed.18 Immigrants who are currently students, who are not living 
in metropolitan areas, or who are not in the labor force were dropped from our sample.  
We also restrict our sample to immigrants between the ages of 22 and 32, and who migrated 
when they were 17 or older. There are several reasons for this decision. First, for young adult 
immigrants, it is more likely that their parents selected their residential locations for them (Cutler 
et al., 2008). Also, older immigrants have more time to decide where to live in the host country 
based on their own preferences. 19  Therefore, young adult immigrants are the least likely to 
endogenously sort into ethnic enclaves. Second, we are concerned that ethnic segregation may 
influence immigrants’ individual education levels if they move to the host country before having 
graduated from high school. It is therefore difficult to separate direct segregation effects on 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes from indirect segregation effects (through the influence of the 
latter on immigrants’ individual education levels). Immigrants who migrated to the U.S. at age 17 
                                                          
18 Hourly wage is calculated by total wage (inflation adjusted) divided by total hours worked. 
19 We run balancing tests by using samples from different age groups. We found that samples of older 
immigrants are more likely to fail the balancing tests. Also, when we do not restrict the age of migration to 
the U.S., results of the balancing tests also show systematic selections into ethnic enclaves.  
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or later would normally have made their education decisions regarding high school completion 
and college attendance before immigrating. Then, even if their ethnic group impacted their 
education, the influence would be more limited. The summary statistics are shown in Table 1.20  
3.2.Isolation Index 
In this paper, we use the isolation index as a measure of ethnic segregation intensity. It thereby 
shows the extent of an immigrant’s exposure to other immigrants from the same ethnic group in 
the same area. Following Cutler et al. (2008), we use Equation (1) to calculate the isolation index, 
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 =
∑
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
×
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
−
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1,
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
) −
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
                      (1) 
where 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 is the population of immigrants from ethnic group 𝑔 living in tract 𝑖; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is 
the population of immigrants from ethnic group 𝑔 living in MSA 𝑚; 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  is the total 
population in tract 𝑖; 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  is the total population in MSA 𝑚; 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡  is 
the population of the tract with the least residents in MSA 𝑚. 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 is the MSA-level isolation 
index according to country of origin, calculated based on tract-level data. The isolation index 
ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates a complete absence of co-ethnics and 1 is the presence of 
only co-ethnics. 
    This method considers the effects of the total population and the ethnic group population on 
isolation intensity. For example, if we use the traditional equation to calculate isolation intensity, 
even if the population of an ethnic group is very small, we may still get a very large isolation 
                                                          
20 Because we restrict our sample to immigrants who have jobs when we test the segregation effects on 
immigrants’ wages, the size of wage regression samples is different from the size of employment regression 
samples. 
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index.21  However, it is inevitable that immigrants of that group will come into contact with 
individuals from other ethnic groups. Due to these cases, the traditional way of calculating 
isolation index may not be an ideal measure for our purposes.  
We utilize the tract-level information in the 2006-2010 ACS five-year sample (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2016) and the 2000 Summary Tape File 3 tables to construct the isolation index. Ethnic 
group is defined by an immigrant’s country of origin. We have 60 different ethnic groups for the 
2000 sample and 74 groups for the 2010 sample. Since we are interested in using multiple cross-
sections of data across time, we will, after merging, use the 2000-2010 with 59 ethnic groups that 
are consistently defined across all years. 
Following previous literature (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Cutler et al., 2008), we use the MSA-
level isolation index instead of neighborhood level measures, such as percentage of immigrants 
from an ethnic group in a tract/block. We focus on comparing the outcomes of immigrants living 
in highly-segregated MSAs with those of immigrants living in less-segregated MSAs. This is due 
to the fact that, within a same MSA, immigrants with higher socioeconomic status are more likely 
to move to better neighborhoods. Hence, the selection bias associated with neighborhood-level 
                                                          
21  The traditional equation for the isolation index is ∑
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
×
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
𝑖  (Bell, 1954). It is the 
percentage of immigrants from a specific ethnic group in a given tract where an average number of 
immigrants from the same ethnic group live. In an extreme case, where all of the immigrants from ethnic 
group 𝑔 all live in one tract, both both 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 and 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
  can be very large. However, the percent 
of immigrants from ethnic group g among the total population in MSA m might be very small. Therefore, 
immigrants from ethnic group g must interact with non-group members. For more details about the isolation 
index, see Cutler et al. (1999). 
Another method that is often used to measure ethnic segregation is the dissimilarity index. The equation is 
1
2
∑(
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
−
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
). Again, the value of the dissimilarity index might be driven by a few 
neighborhoods within an MSA. In other words, if segregation intensities are very high in a few 
neighborhoods, the dissimilarity index might show that immigrants from a certain group are highly 
concentrated within an MSA, even if group members in most neighborhoods are being extensively exposed 
to natives (Cutler et al., 2008). 
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segregation intensity might be more substantial than the selection bias associated with MSA-level 
segregation intensity. The comparison within MSA will overstate the segregation effects. 
4. Model 
In this section, we begin by discussing our use of a triple differences model to deal with the 
selection bias caused by immigrants’ sorting behaviors, then discuss how we estimate the 
differential isolation effects. 
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡Γ + 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡Λ + 𝜃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜇𝑔𝑡 + 𝛿𝑚𝑡 + 𝜏𝑔𝑚 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡   (2) 
Equation (2) shows the triple differences model. Here,𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 represents either the log hourly 
wage of immigrant who belongs to ethnic group 𝑔 living in MSA 𝑚 in year 𝑡, or a dummy variable 
indicating that this same person is employed. The independent variable of interest is 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 , 
which is the isolation index of ethnic group 𝑔 in MSA 𝑚 in year 𝑡. If isolation has a positive effect 
on immigrants’ labor market outcomes, then 𝛽 will be positive and significant, and vice versa. The 
percentage of immigrants from group 𝑔 in MSA 𝑚 in year 𝑡 is denoted by 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑡. Individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, children in the household, and race are included 
in 𝑋. Individual level of educational attainment is represented by 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 . 
Since we utilize multiple cross-sections of data across years, we can adopt the triple differences 
technique in order to control for ethnic group-specific time effects (𝜇𝑔𝑡), time-varying MSA 
effects (𝛿𝑚𝑡), and MSA-specific ethnic group effects (𝜏𝑔𝑚). The triple differences model removes 
unobserved factors that influence the labor market outcomes of immigrants from different ethnic 
groups, living in different MSAs, and in different years. In addition, the triple differences model 
could also eliminate other types of unobserved factors such as if immigrants from some ethnic 
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groups experience faster wage growth rates over time or if economic conditions in some MSAs 
deteriorate or improve faster than in others’ over time.22  
However, if unobserved ability factors cause low-skill (or high-skill) immigrants to be more 
likely to sort into their ethnic enclaves (Cutler et al., 2008), our identification strategy might not 
remove all of the selection bias. For example, if immigrants with lower levels of social skills are 
more likely to live in ethnic enclaves, then social skills will to some extent determine the labor 
market outcomes.  In this type of situation, the triple differences model cannot eliminate the bias 
associated with social skills. As such, we opt for the method used in Bifulco et al. (2011) to test 
the validity of the triple differences model. We will discuss this more in detail in Section 4.  
We are also interested in measuring how segregation effects vary with immigrants’ individual 
education levels and ethnic group average education levels. Cutler et al. (2008) investigated the 
differential segregation effects on incomes of immigrants from ethnic groups with different group 
average education levels. The estimation equation can be written as the following: 
             𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 + 𝜙(𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡)
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡𝛤+𝜃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜇𝑔𝑡 + 𝛿𝑚𝑡 + 𝜏𝑔𝑚 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡                                      (3) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 and 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 are the immigrant’s individual and group average education levels (both are 
measured in years).23 The coefficient of the interaction term between the isolation index and ethnic 
group average education level (𝜙) shows how the ethnic group average education level influences 
                                                          
22 More examples of the triple differences model can be found in Yelowitz (1995) and Ravallion et al. 
(2005). Angrist and Pischke (2008) also briefly discuss the triple differences model in their book. 
23 Cutler et al. (2008) used MSA and group fixed effects model to identify segregation effects. In Equation 
(3), we modify their estimation equation by using the triple differences model. 
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the segregation effects. It is likely that 𝜙 is positive, since exposure to more high-skill individuals 
from the same ethnic groups may help immigrants obtain better job opportunities.24  
    In this paper, we complement the existing literature by introducing additional two-way 
interaction terms among the isolation index, individual education, and ethnic group average 
education, as well as the triple interaction term of the three variables. The following represents the 
main regression:  
             𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 + 𝜌(𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡) + 𝜙(𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡)
+ 𝜒(𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡) + 𝜓(𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡)
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡𝛤+𝜃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑡 + 𝜇𝑔𝑡 + 𝛿𝑚𝑡 + 𝜏𝑔𝑚 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡                                       (4) 
 
where 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  and 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  are the variables of interest. The coefficient 𝜌 
shows how the segregation effects are different for high-skill and low-skill immigrants. For 
example, a negative 𝜌 would imply that segregation hurts high-skill immigrants more than low-
skill immigrants, given the same level of ethnic group average education levels. The coefficient of 
the triple interaction term (𝜓) illustrates how immigrants’ individual education and their ethnic 
group average education levels simultaneously influence the segregation effect. For example, a 
positive 𝜓 and a negative 𝜌 indicate that, although segregation might hurt high-skill individuals, 
being isolated with well-educated co-ethnics can help high-skill individuals gain labor market 
advantages. In the end, the parameter 𝜒 represents how ethnic group average education levels 
influence the effects of immigrants’ individual education levels. For example, if 𝜒 is positive, the 
implication is that high-skill immigrants will be more productive if they are exposed to more high-
skill co-ethnics, when the segregation intensity is held constant. 
                                                          
24 Cutler et al. (2008) found that ϕ is negative in the MSA and group fixed effects model, and that ϕ is 
reversed after using mean years since immigration of members from the same ethnic group within a city to 
correct for the endogeneity of the isolation index.   
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5. Validity of Identification Strategy 
Before addressing our results, we need to test whether our primary identification strategy—the 
triple differences model—eliminates, or at least attenuates, the potential biases that are caused by 
immigrants’ sorting behaviors. Immigrants are likely to choose their residential areas based on 
observed and unobserved characteristics, such as language, social connections, dietary habits, etc. 
It is thus likely that immigrants’ sorting behaviors will influence the estimated results. For 
example, immigrants who cannot speak native languages may prefer to reside within their ethnic 
enclaves. However, because they cannot communicate with natives, they have fewer overall 
opportunities for high-paying jobs regardless of where they live. Thus, we are more likely to find 
that ethnic segregation negatively influences immigrants’ wages.  
We will therefore conduct balancing tests to determine if immigrants’ characteristics can predict 
their own ethnic segregation intensity in the triple differences model. If the isolation index is 
unrelated to immigrants’ observed characteristics, then our estimated results should not be 
influenced by immigrants’ sorting behaviors based on observed characteristics. Also, as Altonji et 
al. (2005) and Bifulco et al. (2011) have pointed out, the extent of individuals’ sorting behaviors 
based on observables can be used as a guideline for the extent of their sorting behaviors based on 
unobservables. Thus, a lack of correlation between immigrants’ observed characteristics and the 
isolation index suggests that the triple differences model minimizes the likelihood that the 
estimated results are driven by immigrants’ selections into ethnic enclaves based on unobserved 
characteristics. 
We also examine whether the interaction terms between immigrants’ individual education levels 
and other characteristics are correlated with the isolation index. We do this because the interaction 
terms between the isolation index and individual education levels (and also the triple interaction) 
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are included in our main model. If the interaction terms between individual education levels and 
other individual characteristics fail the balancing tests, then the estimated differential segregation 
effects associated with immigrants’ individual education levels might be biased. For example, if 
we observe that the coefficient of the interaction between age and education is negative in the 
balancing test, then the implication is that immigrants who are older and have higher education 
levels are less likely to sort into their ethnic enclaves. If they are in groups who are more likely to 
be harmed by ethnic segregation, then the estimated results of how immigrant education influences 
segregation effects might be underestimated, and vice versa. 
In Table 2, we present balancing test results by using the triple differences model. 25 In Column 
1, the coefficients of individual characteristics are mostly insignificant. Only the coefficient of age 
is significant at 0.10 level. The value of the F-test shows that individual characteristics cannot 
explain the isolation index as a whole. In Column 2, we add interaction terms between individual 
education and other characteristics into the regression. The joint effects of all the interaction terms 
are also insignificant. Results of the balancing tests show that the triple differences model is 
sufficient to remove immigrants’ systematic selections into ethnic enclaves based on their 
observables. Therefore, the concern that immigrants’ sorting behaviors might lead to biased 
estimates is minimized.   
6. Main Results  
6.1.Baseline Models 
In this section, we begin by presenting the results of the two simple models—one with only the 
isolation index (henceforth referred to as the simple 𝐼𝑆𝑂  model) and the other with both the 
                                                          
25 In order to show the magnitudes of the coefficients, we multiply the isolation index by 100 in all balancing 
tests. We also use the wage regressions sample for all balancing tests. The results remain unchanged if we 
use the sample for employment regressions.   
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isolation index and interaction term between the isolation index and ethnic group average 
education level (henceforth referred to as the 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ model). We then gradually add other two-
way and three-way interaction terms into the regressions between the isolation index, ethnic group 
average education level, and individual education level in order to estimate the differential 
segregation effects.  
 Table 3 shows the wage results of the simple 𝐼𝑆𝑂 and the 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ models. When the simple 
𝐼𝑆𝑂  model is used, we find positive and insignificant segregation effects. The sign for the 
coefficient of the isolation index reverses after we control for individual characteristics and 
individual education levels. Our findings in the 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ model are consistent with the findings in 
Cutler et al. (2008)’s OLS model.26 In general, the segregation effect depends on ethnic group 
average education levels. Ethnic segregation has a greater negative effect on the wages of 
immigrants from ethnic groups with high levels of group average education. This implies that the 
loss on returns of unobserved abilities is larger than the benefits from job networks in ethnic 
enclaves for immigrants from well-educated ethnic groups.  
Also, both coefficients of the isolation index and the interaction term become less significant 
and much smaller when we control for individual education. The changes in the coefficients may 
imply that the segregation effects and the impacts of group average education levels on segregation 
effects may change with immigrants’ individual education levels. Therefore, we continue to 
investigate whether 1) the treatment effects of segregation are different for high-skill and low-skill 
immigrants, and 2) the interaction effects of segregation and group average education vary with 
an immigrant’s individual education level.  
                                                          
26 We also use yearly data (the 2000 and 2010 samples) to replicate findings in Cutler et al. (2008). The 
results are shown in Appendix Table A1. In general, the outcomes are similar. 
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In Table 4, we show the results of regressions with other two-way and three-way interaction 
terms between the isolation index, individual education, and group average education level. We 
also center all variables of interest, making it easier to illustrate the meaning of their coefficients.27   
We begin with the regression containing only the isolation index and the interaction term 
between the isolation index and immigrants’ individual education levels. The main effect of 
segregation is positive but insignificant. However, the coefficient of 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆  is negative and 
significant. This suggests that high-skill immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves have worse 
labor market outcomes than they would in diversified or native communities. It also implies that 
returns on education are much lower for high-skill immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves.  
Next, in Column 2, we show the results for the regressions that only include double interactions. 
The coefficients of the isolation index, 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅, and 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆 are all insignificant. The directions 
of the segregation effects and the impacts of immigrants’ individual education and group average 
education levels on segregation effects are the same as before.  
In Column 3, we include the triple interaction term in the regressions. The most significant 
change is that the coefficient of the interaction term between the isolation index and individual 
education level returns to being significant and negative. Its magnitude decreases by about two 
thirds. The implication here is similar to the one above: when the ethnic group average education 
is held at the average level, ethnic segregation reduces the wages of high-skill immigrants.  
Furthermore, the coefficient of the triple interaction term is negative and significant at a 0.01 
level. This implies that immigrants are hurt more by ethnic segregation if they are isolated with 
                                                          
27 To center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝑡, respectively. Individual education is centered by the average education of immigrants from 
the same ethnic group and in the same year. This is due to our controlling for group-year trend and, as such, 
subtracting by group-year average will not change the estimated coefficients. 
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co-ethnics who have similar skill levels. In other words, being segregated with more low-skill co-
ethnics leads to worse segregation effects on the wages of low-skill immigrants. For example, for 
immigrants whose individual and group average education levels are one year lower than their 
average levels, a one percent increase in segregation intensity leads to a 0.014 percent decrease in 
log hourly wages. Similarly, the negative ethnic segregation effects on the wages of high-skill 
immigrants are exacerbated if they are from well-educated ethnic groups. 
As we mention above in the background section, the negative coefficient of the triple interaction 
terms might have different implications for immigrants with different levels of individual 
education. The negative impacts of ethnic segregation on high-skill immigrants from well-
educated ethnic groups might be caused by lower returns on education and to unobserved talents 
correlating with high group average education that are higher in native-dominated labor markets. 
The worse labor market outcomes for low-skill immigrants living with other low-skill co-ethnics 
are due to the competition for a limited number of jobs in ethnic enclaves. Therefore, in Column 
4, instead of using one triple interaction term, we consider the results of immigrants from well-
educated groups and less-educated groups separately.28 We find that the negative coefficient of the 
triple interaction term in Column 3 is only driven by the negative effects on low-skill immigrants 
from less-educated groups. However, high-skill immigrants are generally hurt by ethnic 
segregation, regardless of the group average education level.  
In summary, our findings in the triple interaction model indicate that 1) ethnic segregation leads 
to lower wage rates for high-skill immigrants, and 2) ethnic segregation leads to worse outcomes 
for immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves with co-ethnics who have similar skill levels. The 
                                                          
28 Specifically, we generate two new variables. One is equal to the value of the triple interaction term if the 
ethnic group average education level is higher than the average level. The other is equal to the value of the 
triple interaction term if the ethnic group average education level is lower than the average level. 
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second differential segregation effect is primarily caused by negative effects on low-skill 
immigrants from less-educated ethnic groups, since competition for jobs in ethnic enclaves might 
drive the low-skill immigrants’ wage rates down. However, the negative segregation effects on 
high-skill immigrants do not change with ethnic group average education level.  
6.2.  Robustness Tests 
While we restrict our sample to immigrants who migrated to the U.S. at age 17 or later, 
individual education levels may still be influenced by ethnic segregation. In the robustness tests, 
we further restrict the sample to immigrants who would have completed their education before 
they came to the U.S. We use two samples—one with immigrants who migrated to the U.S. at age 
23 or later and the other with immigrants who migrated to the U.S. at age 25 or later. 
Table 5 shows the results of the robustness tests. Our previous findings are generally robust to 
changes in the sample. In the first column, we still find negative interaction effects between 
segregation intensity and immigrants’ individual education levels. This effect becomes smaller 
when immigrants came to the U.S. at an older age. In Column 2, the coefficients of the isolation 
index and the two interaction terms involving the isolation index are still insignificant. In Column 
3, the coefficient of the interaction term between the isolation index and individual education level 
remains negative but becomes insignificant. However, the coefficient of the triple interaction term 
is negative and stable, regardless of which sample we use. While its precision has decreased, its 
magnitude is similar to what we found in the previous section. Outcomes in the last column still 
show that the negative effects of segregation on the wages of low-skill immigrants from less-
educated ethnic groups drive the results in Column 3. 
In addition, ethnic segregation may influence immigrants’ labor market outcomes through 
factors such as limited language ability, years in the U.S., and intermarriage with natives. 
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Therefore, in Table 6, we include interaction terms between the isolation index and a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not the immigrant speaks English, the number of years they have 
been in the U.S., as well as a dummy variable indicating that the immigrant is married to a native. 
The results show that ethnic segregation is more helpful to immigrants who are not proficient in 
English and who are married to natives, but hurts immigrants who have been in the U.S. longer. 
The coefficients of the triple interactions and the double interaction between the isolation index 
and the immigrants’ individual education levels are still consistent with our previous estimates.  
These results imply that, although the effects of segregation correlate with the mechanism 
variables, they do not influence the differential segregation effects based on immigrants’ individual 
and group average education levels. For example, low-skill immigrants are less likely to be fluent 
in English. Therefore, segregation may benefit low-skill immigrants by allowing them to speak 
their own languages in ethnic enclaves. However, since the coefficients of 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆 and the triple 
interaction do not change significantly, limited language ability may not play a role in 
differentiating the segregation effects on outcomes of high-skill and low-skill immigrants. 
Finally, since over 60% of the individuals in our sample are Hispanic and are more likely to 
have low levels of education, we also examine whether the differential segregation effects are 
different for Hispanic immigrants and non-Hispanic immigrants. These results are shown in the 
last two columns of Table 6. High-skill Hispanic immigrants are particularly negatively affected 
by segregation, while the segregation effects on non-Hispanic immigrants do not change with their 
individual education levels. Moreover, living with co-ethnics who have similar skill levels is 
harmful to Hispanic immigrants, but has no impact on other immigrants. Particularly, high-skill 
Hispanic immigrants who are from well-educated ethnic groups also experience negative 
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segregation effects. These results could be driven by differences between the observed and 
unobserved qualities of Hispanic ethnic enclaves and those of other immigrant enclaves.  
The results in this section indicate that our findings of the negative segregation effects on low-
skill immigrants from less-education ethnic groups is robust, even when we restrict our sample to 
immigrants who came to the U.S. after they finished their education or when we include 
interactions between the isolation index and mechanism variable. The differential segregation 
effects on immigrants with different education levels are robust to the inclusion of mechanism 
variables but not to restrictions on samples. 29 
6.3. Employment Regression Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of ethnic segregation effects on the likelihood of an 
immigrant being employed, and whether these effects vary with group average and immigrants’ 
individual education levels.  In Table 7, we find insignificant and negative segregation effects on 
immigrants’ employment. The effects also do not vary with immigrants’ ethnic group average 
education levels.  
    Next, we include other two-way interaction terms and the triple interaction term in Table 8. The 
coefficient of the isolation index becomes positive, but stays insignificant. The segregation effects 
on immigrants’ employment do not change with immigrants’ individual education levels or ethnic 
group average education levels. In Column 4, we find that ethnic segregation increases the 
probability of finding jobs for high-skill immigrants from well-educated ethnic groups, whereas it 
decreases this likelihood for low-skill immigrants from less-educated ethnic groups. These results 
imply that, with more high-skill immigrants living in ethnic enclaves, job networks for high-skill 
                                                          
29 We also run robustness tests by using the sample without black immigrants and the sample without 
English speakers. Our main findings remain the same. The results are shown in Appendix Table A4. 
 57 
 
immigrants improve. However, when more low-skill immigrants live in ethnic enclaves, 
competition between low-skill immigrants increases the likelihood of unemployment. 
We also run the robustness tests and check mechanism variables for all the employment 
regressions. In the first three columns of Table 9, there is no substantial change in the significance 
of the coefficients. In the last column, however, the coefficients of the two triple interaction terms 
become insignificant.  
Overall, we do not find significant segregation effects on the likelihood of immigrants being 
employed. Changes in individual education or in ethnic group average education levels also do not 
have significant impacts on the employment effects of segregation. However, the directions of the 
differential segregation effects on the employment of Hispanic immigrants are the same as on 
Hispanic immigrants’ wages.  
7. Conclusion  
Residential segregation may have positive or negative impacts on immigrants’ labor market 
outcomes. On the one hand, segregation provides social networks where immigrants can exchange 
job information in their own languages. On the other hand, segregation somewhat slows the 
assimilation process by isolating immigrants from natives. In the current literature, there is no 
consensus on whether ethnic segregation is beneficial or harmful to immigrants. In this paper, we 
attempt to use immigrants’ individual education levels to reconcile the inconsistent findings on 
segregation effects, as well as to measure the impacts of ethnic group average education on 
segregation effects.  
We propose that the influence of ethnic segregation might vary depending on immigrants’ skill 
levels. For example, it might be more important for high-skill immigrants to interact with natives 
and obtain high-skill job information or promotion opportunities, while low-skill immigrants may 
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benefit from job networks in ethnic enclaves. Our estimation shows that ethnic segregation reduces 
the wages of high-skill immigrants more than it does the wages of low-skill immigrants, while it 
does not have differing impacts on the employment of immigrants with different skill levels. 
Moreover, the quality of ethnic enclaves might also lead to different segregation effects on 
immigrants with different skill levels. We found that ethnic segregation reduces the wages of 
immigrants who are living in ethnic enclaves with many co-ethnics who have similar skill levels. 
This result might be counterintuitive, since one could expect that immigrants would experience 
more positive network effects if they are segregated with co-ethnics who have similar skill 
levels. Our additional estimates show that this is mainly due to the negative segregation effects 
on low-skill immigrants from less-educated ethnic groups, since competition for jobs inside 
ethnic enclaves might drive the wage rates down. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Wage regression sample Employment regression 
sample 
Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Log hourly wage 2.305 0.716 - - 
Employment  - - 0.923 0.266 
Isolation index 0.221 0.142 0.223 0.142 
Group average education 11.238 2.694 11.133 2.665 
Immigrant share 0.238 0.244 0.244 0.248 
Education 11.426 4.248 11.243 4.274 
Age  28.000 2.947 27.955 2.965 
Male  0.659 0.474 0.639 0.480 
Married  0.455 0.498 0.453 0.498 
Have children 0.368 0.482 0.373 0.484 
White  0.137 0.344 0.134 0.340 
Black  0.027 0.162 0.028 0.164 
Asian  0.213 0.409 0.200 0.400 
Hispanic  0.623 0.485 0.638 0.480 
N 135,549 159,975 
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Table 2. Balancing Tests, Triple Differences Model 
Dependent Variable: Isolation Index × 100 
 (1) (2) 
Education -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Age -0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Male 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
Black 0.009 
(0.011) 
0.009* 
(0.006) 
Other Nonwhite -0.004 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Age×Education - -0.000 
(0.000) 
Male×Education - -0.001 
(0.001) 
Black×Education - 0.001 
(0.004) 
Other Nonwhite×Education - -0.000 
(0.003) 
F-test 1.49 0.80 
P-value 0.190 0.525 
N 135,549 
Notes: The isolation index is inflated by 100. We use the sample of immigrants who are from age group 22-32 and 
arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by 
country of origin level. The values of F-statistic in column 1 are for the joint effect of all the individual characteristics 
that are included in the regressions. The values of F-statistic in column 2 are for the joint effect of all the interaction 
terms. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 3. Triple differences, 𝑰𝑺𝑶 Model and 𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? Model, Wage Results 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.035 
(0.154) 
-0.047 
(0.151) 
-0.013 
(0.139) 
1.968*** 
(0.424) 
1.639*** 
(0.414) 
0.953** 
(0.389) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - - - -0.171*** 
(0.038) 
-0.149*** 
(0.037) 
-0.090** 
(0.035) 
?̅? - - - 0.072*** 
(0.010) 
0.064*** 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
+characteristic 
control 
No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes Yes 
+individual 
education control 
No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
F-test - - - 10.97 8.18 3.28 
P-value - - - 0.000 0.000 0.038 
N 135,549 
Notes: We use the sample of immigrants who are from age group 22-32 and arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. 
We control for MSA-specific time trends, MSA-specific group effects, and group-specific time trends in all 
regressions. Characteristic controls include age, gender, marital status, children in the household, black, Asian, and 
Hispanic dummy variables. The values of F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and the interaction 
term between isolation index and group average education. Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to 
clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 4. Triple Differences and Triple Interactions Model (Centered), Wage Results 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.012 
(0.144) 
0.019 
(0.142) 
0.053 
(0.143) 
0.033 
(0.143) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.099*** 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.037** 
(0.018) 
-0.074*** 
(0.029) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - -0.052 
(0.038) 
-0.043 
(0.038) 
-0.060 
(0.038) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 - - -0.014*** 
(0.005) 
- 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 - - - 0.016 
(0.011) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 - - - -0.030*** 
(0.010) 
?̅? × 𝑺 - 0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
?̅? - 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
𝑺 0.034*** 
(0.002) 
0.047*** 
(0.002) 
0.045*** 
(0.002) 
0.046*** 
(0.002) 
F-test 28.77 1.05 2.45 2.65 
P-value 0.000 0.367 0.044 0.021 
N 135,549 
Notes: We use the sample of immigrants who are from age group 22-32 and arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. 
To center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝑡 , 
respectively.  𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅𝐻 × 𝑆  is equal to 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ × 𝑆  if 𝑆̅  is greater than its MSA-year mean, and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅𝐿 × 𝑆 is equal to 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ × 𝑆 if 𝑆̅ is lower than its MSA-year mean, and 0 otherwise. The values 
of the F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and all the interaction terms, except for 𝑆̅ × 𝑆. Control 
variables include age, male dummy, whether married, whether have children in the household, black, Asian, Hispanic, 
group average education (centered), and immigrants’ own education (centered).  Figures in parentheses are standard 
errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests, Triple Differences and Triple Interactions Model (Centered), 
Wage Results 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
Panel 1: immigrants who arrived at the U.S. after age 23 or later 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 -0.148 
(0.248) 
-0.119 
(0.239) 
-0.091 
(0.240) 
-0.105 
(0.239) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.086*** 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.028 
(0.020) 
-0.048 
(0.032) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - -0.103 
(0.065) 
-0.085 
(0.064) 
-0.093 
(0.065) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 - - -0.016*** 
(0.006) 
- 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 - - - -0.001 
(0.015) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 - - - -0.025** 
(0.011) 
?̅? × 𝑺 - 0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
F-test 20.14 0.93 3.21 2.85 
P-value 0.000 0.427 0.012 0.014 
N 54,130 
Panel 2: immigrants who arrived at the U.S. after age 25 or later 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 -0.453 
(0.347) 
-0.414 
(0.337) 
-0.396 
(0.337) 
-0.415 
(0.336) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.072*** 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
-0.010 
(0.024) 
-0.033 
(0.040) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - -0.096 
(0.090) 
-0.080 
(0.090) 
-0.091 
(0.092) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 - - -0.013* 
(0.007) 
- 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 - - - 0.004 
(0.020) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 - - - -0.023* 
(0.014) 
?̅? × 𝑺 - 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
F-test 9.74 1.13 2.07 1.93 
P-value 0.000 0.335 0.082 0.086 
N 32,513 
Notes: The sample used for robustness test is restricted to immigrants who arrived at the U.S. after age 23 or 25. To 
center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 ,  𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝑡 , 
respectively. Control variables include age, male dummy, whether married, whether have children in the household, 
black, Asian, Hispanic, group average education (centered), and immigrants’ own education (centered).  The values 
of the F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and all the interaction terms, except for 𝑆̅ × 𝑆. Figures 
in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined 
as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 6. Mechanisms and Heterogeneity Tests, Wage Results 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 Baseline English 
insufficiency 
Years in the 
U.S. 
Intermarriage Hispanic only Non-Hispanic 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.033 
(0.143) 
0.008 
(0.142) 
0.131 
(0.145) 
0.001 
(0.143) 
0.160 
(0.236) 
0.250 
(0.283) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.074*** 
(0.029) 
-0.071*** 
(0.027) 
-0.075*** 
(0.028) 
-0.076*** 
(0.028) 
-0.069*** 
(0.017) 
0.069 
(0.058) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? -0.060 
(0.038) 
-0.047 
(0.038) 
-0.050 
(0.038) 
-0.057 
(0.038) 
0.036 
(0.056) 
-0.117 
(0.079) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 0.016 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.067*** 
(0.020) 
0.016 
(0.020) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 -0.030*** 
(0.010) 
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.010) 
-0.030*** 
(0.010) 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.030) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒇𝑬𝒏𝒈 - 0.080* 
(0.047) 
- - - - 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒏𝑼𝑺 - - -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
- - - 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒓 
 
- - - 1.934*** 
(0.250) 
- - 
F-test 2.45 2.99 3.03 2.40 9.97 3.00 
P-value 0.044 0.011 0.010 0.035 0.000 0.010 
N 135,549 135,549 135,549 135,549 84,482 51,067 
Notes: To center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝑡 , respectively.  The values of the F-
statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and all the interaction terms, except for 𝑆̅ × 𝑆. Control variables include age, male dummy, whether 
married, whether have children in the household, black, Asian, Hispanic, group average education (centered), and immigrants’ own education (centered).  
Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<
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Table 7. Triple differences, 𝑰𝑺𝑶 Model and 𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? Model, Employment Results 
Dependent variable: if employed, =1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.015 
(0.053) 
0.007 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.053) 
-0.017 
(0.161) 
-0.024 
(0.161) 
-0.052 
(0.161) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - - - 0.003 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
?̅? - - - 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
+characteristic 
control 
No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes Yes 
+individual 
education control 
No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
F-test - - - 0.10 0.05 0.14 
P-value - - - 0.909 0.950 0.869 
N 159,975 
Notes: We use the sample of immigrants who are from age group 22-32 and arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. 
We control for MSA-specific time trends, MSA-specific group effects, and group-specific time trends in all 
regressions. Characteristic controls include age, gender, marital status, children in the household, black, Asian, and 
Hispanic dummy variables. The values of the F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and the interaction 
term between isolation index and group average education. Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to 
clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 8. Triple Differences and Triple Interactions Model (Centered), Employment Results 
Dependent variable: if employed, =1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.012 
(0.054) 
0.012 
(0.053) 
0.015 
(0.053) 
0.010 
(0.053) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - 0.005 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 - - -0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 - 
 
- - 0.006* 
(0.003) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 - 
 
- - -0.004** 
(0.002) 
?̅? × 𝑺 - 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
?̅? - -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
𝑺 - 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
F-test 1.13 0.16 0.31 1.30 
P-value 0.323 0.924 0.871 0.259 
N 159,975 
Notes: We use the sample of immigrants who are from age group 22-32 and arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. 
To center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝑡 , 
respectively. 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅𝐻 × 𝑆  is equal to 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ × 𝑆  if 𝑆̅  is greater than its MSA-year mean, and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅𝐿 × 𝑆 is equal to 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ × 𝑆 if 𝑆̅ is lower than its MSA-year mean, and 0 otherwise.  The values 
of the F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and all the interaction terms, except for 𝑆̅ × 𝑆. Control 
variables include age, male dummy, whether married, whether have children in the household, black, Asian, Hispanic, 
group average education (centered), and immigrants’ own education (centered).  Figures in parentheses are standard 
errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 9. Robustness Test, Triple Differences and Triple Interactions Model (Centered), 
Employment Results 
Dependent variable: if employed, =1 
Panel 1: immigrants who arrived at the U.S. after age 23 or later 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 -0.029 
(0.082) 
-0.039 
(0.082) 
-0.036 
(0.082) 
-0.039 
(0.083) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - -0.005 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
-0.005 
(0.021) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 - - -0.002 
(0.002) 
- 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 - - - 0.002 
(0.004) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 - - - -0.004 
(0.003) 
?̅? × 𝑺 - 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
F-test 0.28 0.58 0.83 0.88 
P-value 0.755 0.628 0.508 0.495 
N 64,359 
Panel 2: immigrants who arrived at the U.S. after age 25 or later 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 -0.035 
(0.108) 
-0.036 
(0.108) 
-0.034 
(0.108) 
-0.035 
(0.108) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.005 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? - 0.014 
(0.024) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.025) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 - - -0.002 
(0.002) 
- 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑯 × 𝑺 - - - -0.000 
(0.006) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅?𝑳 × 𝑺 - - - -0.002 
(0.004) 
?̅? × 𝑺 - 0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
F-test 0.73 0.12 0.23 0.20 
P-value 0.484 0.947 0.924 0.964 
N 38,932 
Notes: The sample used for robustness test is restricted to immigrants who arrived at the U.S. after age 23 or 25. To 
center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 ,  𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝑡 , 
respectively. Control variables include age, male dummy, whether married, whether have children in the household, 
black, Asian, Hispanic, group average education (centered), and immigrants’ own education (centered).  The values 
of the F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and all the interaction terms, except for 𝑆̅ × 𝑆. Figures 
in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. Significance is defined 
as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Appendix 
In the appendix, we show replicated results and balancing test results from the Cutler et al. 
(2008) model. We also test the validity of Cutler et al.’s (2008) instrumental variable. 
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚 + 𝜙(𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚 ∙ 𝑆?̅?𝑚) + 𝜃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑚 + 𝑋𝑖𝑔𝑚𝛤 + 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚𝛬 + 𝜇𝑔 + 𝛿𝑚
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑚   (5) 
    Equation (5) is the model used by Cutler et al. (2008). All notations are the same as above 
(Section 4). Here, Cutler et al. (2008) included MSA and group fixed effects (𝜇𝑔  and 𝛿𝑚) to 
eliminate unobserved differences across MSAs and ethnic groups. In addition, they also used mean 
years of ethnic group 𝑔 in MSA 𝑠 since immigration (referred to as mean years since immigration 
in the rest of the appendix) to correct for the potential endogeneity of the isolation index. 
In Column 1 of Table A1, when we only control for MSA and group fixed effects, the coefficient 
of the isolation index is insignificant, although its sign changes as we vary data years.  After using 
mean years since immigration to instrument the isolation index, the estimated segregation effects 
are mostly positive and significant.  
In the 𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑆̅ model, Cutler et al. (2008) found that, if they only controlled for MSA and group 
fixed effects, the main effect of segregation on immigrants’ wages is positive and an increase in 
group average education decreases the positive segregation effects. After they instrumented the 
isolation index by mean years since immigration, the signs of the coefficients are all reversed. The 
patterns of the coefficients in the fixed effects model can be replicated, regardless of the data year 
used or whether the sample is restricted to immigrants who moved to the U.S. after age 17. 
However, the IV results cannot be replicated. This may imply that the finding that high group 
average education can moderate the negative segregation effects on immigrants’ wages might be 
 71 
 
specific to the 20-30 years old cohort group in 1990. Otherwise, there may exist unobserved time 
trends that influence the estimated segregation effects. 
Next, we show the results of the balancing tests by using the Cutler et al. (2008) model. In 
addition to the isolation index, we also run balancing tests for Cutler et al. (2008)’s instrumental 
variable. Since it is used for correcting the endogeneity of the isolation index, the instrumental 
variable should satisfy the exclusion restriction—only influencing immigrants’ labor market 
outcomes through ethnic segregation. However, if the instrument is correlated with immigrants’ 
individual characteristics, it implies that the selection bias might still deviate from the estimate in 
the IV model. For example, if we find that males are negatively correlated with mean years since 
immigration, then it indirectly suggests that males are less likely to sort into highly-segregated 
ethnic enclaves (since isolation intensity is positively correlated with mean years since 
immigration (Cutler et al., 2008)). Consequently, we are more likely to observe negative 
segregation effects.  
We first run MSA and country of origin fixed effects regressions by year. The results are shown 
in Table A2. We find that there is a steady negative relationship between individual education and 
the isolation index in both years’ results. This implies that immigrants with higher levels of 
education are less likely to reside in their own ethnic enclaves. The values of the F-test indicate 
that individual characteristics can explain the isolation index as a group. The results of the mean 
years since immigration balancing tests are shown in Columns 3 and 4. The correlations between 
individual characteristics and mean years since immigration are even stronger. This evidence 
suggests that there are still selection biases associated with immigrants’ sorting behaviors even 
after we control for differences across MSAs and ethnic groups. 
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We also compare the results of the MSA, group fixed effects model, and triple differences model 
by using multiple cross-sections of data. In Tables A3, individual characteristics and the 
interactions between immigrants’ education levels and other individual characteristics have strong 
correlations with both isolation index and mean years since immigration in the fixed effects model. 
When we switch to the triple differences model, the coefficients of individual characteristics are 
mostly insignificant. The values of the F-test show that individual characteristics cannot explain 
the isolation index as a group. The joint effects of all the interaction terms are also insignificant. 
These results indicate that, compared with the MSA and group fixed effects model, the triple 
differences model can better explain immigrants’ systematic selections into ethnic enclaves.  
Regarding the results for mean years since immigration, although the triple differences model 
cannot help explain all the correlations between individual characteristics (or interaction terms 
between individual education and other characteristics) and mean years since immigration, it 
largely decreases the value of the F-test. However, because mean years since immigration fails the 
balancing tests, we did not use it to instrument the isolation index in our main model.  
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Table A1. Cutler et al. (2008) Model, Wage Results, Age [22,32] 
Dependent Var:  
log hourly 
 wage 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 Model 𝑰𝑺𝑶, 𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS+FE IV OLS+FE IV 
ISO ISO ISO ISO× ?̅? ISO ISO× ?̅? 
Cutler et al. (2007) 0.250 
(0.512) 
2.963** 
(1.525) 
2.965* 
(1.600) 
-0.331* 
(0.183) 
-14.021*** 
(5.212) 
1.637*** 
(0.568) 
 22,564 22,564 22,564 22,564 
 
2000, 60 groups 
(age 22-32) 
-0.047 
(0.066) 
2.029*** 
(0.677) 
0.808*** 
(0.236) 
-0.082*** 
(0.020) 
1.196 
(1.782) 
0.069 
(0.140) 
N 115,557 
 
2010, 74 groups 
(age 22-32) 
0.090 
(0.067) 
1.561*** 
(0.475) 
1.201*** 
(0.215) 
-0.100*** 
(0.018) 
4.052*** 
(1.020) 
-0.238*** 
(0.075) 
N 122,130 
 
2000, 60 groups 
(age 22-32, arrived 
after age 17) 
-0.050 
(0.076) 
0.148 
(0.561) 
1.257*** 
(0.256) 
-0.127*** 
(0.023) 
5.517** 
(2.647) 
-0.453** 
(0.208) 
N 67,082 
 
2010, 74 groups 
(age 22-32, arrived 
after age 17) 
0.062 
(0.083) 
1.039* 
(0.558) 
1.400*** 
(0.235) 
-0.122*** 
(0.020) 
5.394*** 
(1.302) 
-0.410*** 
(0.089) 
N 69,805 
Notes: We control for MSA and country of origin fixed effects in the OLS model. All the control variables are the same 
as models in Cutler et al. (2008). The instrumental variable used for IV estimation is mean years of ethnic group 𝑔 in 
MSA 𝑠 since immigration. Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of 
origin level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A2. Balancing Tests for Isolation Index and Cutler et al. (2007) Instrument Variable 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Isolation Index × 100 Mean Years of Immigrant Group 
𝒈 in MSA 𝒔 since immigration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Education -0.133*** 
(0.026) 
-0.117*** 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
Age -0.013 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
Male  -0.112* 
(0.058) 
-0.044 
(0.075) 
-0.115*** 
(0.023) 
-0.154*** 
(0.025) 
Black  1.037** 
(0.512) 
0.162 
(0.420) 
0.082 
(0.210) 
0.410 
(0.271) 
Other 
Nonwhite  
0.221 
(0.210) 
0.078 
(0.234) 
-0.634*** 
(0.132) 
-0.368*** 
(0.139) 
F-test 6.90 6.06 13.93 17.38 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 67,082 69,805 67,082 69,805 
Notes: Sample is restricted to immigrants who are from age group 22-32 and arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. 
MSA and country of origin fixed effects are included in all the regressions. The isolation index is inflated by 100. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin level. The F-statistic is 
for the joint effect of all the individual characteristics that are included in the regressions. Significance is defined as 
follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A3. Balancing Tests, MSA and Group Fixed Effects vs. Triple Differences Model 
Panel 1. Dependent Variable: Isolation Index × 100 
 MSA FE, Group FE Triple Differences 
Education -0.109*** 
(0.023) 
-0.179** 
(0.075) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Age 0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.057** 
(0.026) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Male -0.164*** 
(0.055) 
-0.502*** 
(0.165) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
Black 0.758** 
(0.364) 
0.892 
(1.109) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.009* 
(0.006) 
Other Nonwhite 0.519*** 
(0.168) 
-1.628** 
(0.668) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Age×Education - -0.003 
(0.002) 
- -0.000 
(0.000) 
Male×Education - 0.029** 
(0.014) 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
Black×Education - -0.018 
(0.071) 
- 0.001 
(0.004) 
Other Nonwhite×Education - 0.160*** 
(0.045) 
- -0.000 
(0.003) 
F-test 7.68 9.30 1.49 0.80 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.525 
N 135,549 
Panel 2. Dependent Variable: Mean Years of Immigrant Group 𝒈 in MSA 𝒔 since immigration 
 MSA FE, Group FE Triple Differences 
Education 0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.157*** 
(0.029) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Age 0.062*** 
(0.005) 
0.093*** 
(0.010) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Male -0.229*** 
(0.023) 
-0.146** 
(0.056) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Black 0.425** 
(0.188) 
-0.175 
(0.502) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Other Nonwhite -0.214* 
(0.110) 
0.133 
(0.313) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Age×Education - -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
- 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Male×Education - -0.007 
(0.004) 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
Black×Education - 0.046 
(0.034) 
- 0.000 
(0.003) 
Other Nonwhite×Education - -0.026 
(0.021) 
- -0.003* 
(0.002) 
F-test 59.69 6.67 5.43 4.81 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
N 135,549 
Notes: The isolation index is inflated by 100. The sample is restricted to immigrants who are from age group 22-32 
and arrived at the U.S. after age 17 or later. Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA 
by country of origin level. The values of F-statistic in column 1 and 3 are for the joint effect of all the individual 
characteristics that are included in the regressions. The values of F-statistic in column 2 and 4 are for the joint effect 
of all the interaction terms. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A4. Additional Robustness Tests Results 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 Baseline Drop blacks Drop English 
speakers 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.053 
(0.143) 
0.086 
(0.146) 
0.065 
(0.153) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? -0.043 
(0.038) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
-0.020 
(0.038) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.037** 
(0.018) 
-0.038** 
(0.018) 
-0.038** 
(0.017) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 -0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
+characteristic 
control 
Yes Yes  Yes  
F-test 2.45 2.46 2.75 
P-value 0.044 0.044 0.027 
N 135,549 131,904 122,722 
Dependent variable: if employed, =1 
 Baseline Drop blacks Drop English 
speakers 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 0.015 
(0.053) 
-0.004 
(0.053) 
-0.005 
(0.062) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? 0.006 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × 𝑺 -0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
𝑰𝑺𝑶 × ?̅? × 𝑺 -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
+characteristic 
control 
Yes Yes  Yes  
F-test 0.31 0.69 0.29 
P-value 0.871 0.597 0.882 
N 159,975 155,574 145,169 
Notes: To center the variables, we replace 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡  , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡  by 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑔𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚𝑡 , 𝑆?̅?𝑚𝑡 − 𝑆̅
̅
𝑚𝑡  , and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑡 −
 𝑆?̅?𝑡 , respectively.  The values of the F-statistic are for the joint effect of the isolation index and all the interaction 
terms, except for 𝑆̅ × 𝑆. Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to clustering at the MSA by country of origin 
level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Chapter Three: Popularity or Future Success? Friendship Network Formation for 
Forward-Looking Teenagers 
 
Tian Lou  
Stephen L. Ross 
 
Abstract 
Previous literature has documented that teenagers gain utility from being popular in high school 
and that they tend to make friends with those who share similar attributes, such as same 
race/ethnicity and maternal education. Moreover, other than the immediate payoffs, teenagers may 
also obtain long-term economic gains from friendships: high school friends may influence 
teenagers’ future educational attainment and incomes through their academic performance during 
high school. This paper aims to determine whether the immediate payoffs or the long-term 
economic gains play a more important role for determining teenagers’ friendship choices. By using 
the Add Health data and a three-period dynamic model, we find that male teenagers value their 
popularity during high school much more than they do long-term benefits from friendships. The 
heterogeneity tests show that in general, African American and Hispanic students have higher 
returns on both popularity and long-term economic gains than whites. 
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1. Introduction 
        What factors influence our friendship choices in high school? Previous literature has found 
that high school students enjoy being popular among their peers (Haskell, 2015).  Moreover, 
teenagers care about their friends’ attributes. They are more likely to make friends with those who 
behave similarly (Weinberg, 2007) and who have similar characteristics, such as same race, 
gender, and maternal education (Moody, 2001; Goodreau et al., 2009; Fletcher et al., 2013), which 
is usually referred to as homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). In addition, high school friends 
may also benefit teenagers in the long run through their influences on teenagers’ behaviors and 
outcomes. For instance, researchers found that high school friends have significant impacts on 
teenagers’ health behaviors (Fletcher and Ross, 2012; Badev,2013; Haskell, 2014), likelihood of 
committing crime (Patacchini and Zenou, 2009; Liu et al., 2012), and future labor market outcomes 
(Conti et al., 2013). However, among all these factors that influence teenagers’ friendship choices, 
which is more important, the short-term payoffs (such as popularity and homophily) or the long-
term economic gains (such as future incomes)? 
    To answer this question, in this paper, we assume that teenage friendship network formation is 
a forward-looking problem. Specifically, we assume that when teenagers choose friends in high 
school, they consider both immediate payoffs and long-term economic gains from friendships. Our 
goal is to investigate how forward-looking teenagers are, i.e., how important the long-term 
economic gains are for determining teenage friendship choices relative to the immediate payoffs. 
In particular, the immediate payoffs are captured by returns on popularity. In this paper, we use 
Katz-Bonacich centrality to represent teenagers’ popularity. The long-term economic gain is 
measured by returns on one outcome, future earnings.  
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Then, we use a three-period dynamic model to describe teenagers’ friendship choices and 
outcomes in high school, as well as decisions and outcomes in college and labor market that are 
related to high school friendship choices. From this model, we estimate teenagers’ preferences, 
when choosing friends, between popularity during high school and future incomes. In the first 
period, individuals choose their high school friends by considering the potential increase in their 
popularity and whether they share similar characteristics with these potential friends. We calculate 
teenagers’ Katz-Bonacich centralities based on their friendship choices. We also assume 
teenagers’ high school education outcomes are related to their centralities. In the second period, 
everyone leaves high school. They choose whether to attend college and decide how long they stay 
in college. In the third period, all the individuals are in the labor market. Their incomes are 
determined by outcomes in the previous periods. In addition, we exclude female teenagers from 
our sample, because the model does not include marriage and fertility decisions. The setup may 
not be proper for studying females, because compared to males, females usually have a weaker 
attachment to the labor market. Their labor participation decisions are more likely to be influenced 
by factors such as childcare (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Neal, 2004). 
The data we use is from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add 
Health). It includes an in-school survey, which covers most of the students in the schools 
participated in the survey. Each participant was asked to nominate their friends from school rosters. 
Based on the friend nominations, we know the actual friendships between male teenagers. 
Moreover, within each school, Add Health interviewed students from different cohorts. Thus, we 
can exploit the quasi-random variations in student compositions across cohorts for identification. 
Specifically, we define a friendship network as male students who are in the same school and same 
grade. Then we compare friendship choices and outcomes of students who have similar friendship 
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preferences but are in different cohorts. The differences in cohort compositions should lead to 
different friendship opportunities for similar students, as well as different friendship choices and 
outcomes. In addition, Add Health conducted four in-home interviews, which cover individuals’ 
information from high school to young adulthood, including demographic characteristics, family 
backgrounds, high school education outcomes, educational attainment, and labor market 
outcomes. 
Thus, by using the Add Health data, we estimate the dynamic model in three stages. In the first 
stage, we use a multinomial logit model to estimate teenagers’ friendship preferences. Particularly, 
we test how teenagers’ friendship choices change with the increases to their own popularity from 
linking with a potential friend and the costs of forming that friendship, which are measured by the 
differences between teenagers’ own characteristics and the potential friends’ characteristics. 
Before the estimation, firstly, we generate a set of link level data by pairing each student with all 
the other members in his friendship network. Secondly, for each teenager, we calculate the increase 
in his popularity from forming a link. To do this, we initially disconnect all of his links with his 
friends and keep the connections between all other people the same. Then, each time, we only let 
that teenager connect with one potential friend and calculate the increase in his Katz-Bonacich 
centrality, which is equivalent to the increase in his popularity. Furthermore, we include school by 
grade fixed effects in the Stage 1 multinomial logit model to minimize differences in probabilities 
of forming friendships across different schools and different cohorts. The results show that 
teenagers are more likely to choose popular peers as their friends, since they lead to higher levels 
of popularity. We also observe friendship homophily based on race and maternal education. One 
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thing to notice is that we focus on modeling teenagers’ own choices. Thus, throughout this process, 
we look at one-way nominations and use them to define friendships.30 
In the second stage of the model, we examine how teenagers’ popularity during high school 
influences their outcomes, including high school GPA, high school graduation, years of college, 
and future incomes. Based on the estimations in Stage 1, we calculate the probabilities of forming 
friendships for each teenager in each link. Thus, we can predict each teenager’s centrality. Then, 
we use a school by type (type is defined by students’ race and maternal education) and school by 
grade fixed effects model for estimation. The school by type fixed effects alleviate the bias caused 
by teenagers sorting into schools based on their types and unobserved school level factors. Hence, 
within each school, we can compare the outcomes of same type students in different grades. Notice 
that students of the same type should have similar friendship preferences, since we use the same 
set of variables to calculate costs of forming friendships and to define teenagers’ types. Thus, 
predicted centrality does not vary for the same type of students in the same school and grade. The 
school by grade fixed effects eliminate network level unobserved factors that influence both 
teenagers’ friendship choices and outcomes.  
We find that a higher level of centrality leads to higher high school GPAs, more years of college, 
and higher future earnings. The effect of centrality on high school graduation is insignificant. 
Moreover, after controlling for the education outcomes determined in previous periods, the effects 
of predicted centrality on future incomes decreases. This implies that high school popularity may 
                                                          
30 This means that for two individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗, we distinguish the link 𝑖𝑗 from the link 𝑗𝑖. If the person 𝑖 
nominated person 𝑗 as his friend, then the link 𝑖𝑗 exists. It does not depend on person 𝑗’s choices. The way 
we define the friendship fits the multinomial logit model, since it only tells us teenagers’ own preferences 
for friendships. In the model section, we also provide empirical evidence to show that the one-way 
nominations are very likely to reflect real friendships between teenagers. 
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influence individuals’ future earnings through its positive effects on high school GPA and years 
of college.  
Finally, in the third stage, we investigate how forward-looking teenagers are by looking at 
whether popularity or future income has a larger effect on the probability of forming friendships 
between teenagers. We firstly predict each teenager’s expected income from linking with a 
potential friend, using estimated results from Stage 2. Then, we add the predicted income variable 
into the multinomial logit model in Stage 1 and determine which parameter is larger, the coefficient 
of the predicted income or the coefficient of the increase in centrality. Moreover, since future 
income is linearly correlated with centrality, we need to utilize variations in peer compositions that 
influence teenagers’ expected incomes independent of their friendship choices to identity the 
effects of expected incomes. Thus, instead of school by grade fixed effects, we control for school 
by type and grade fixed effects. This strategy retains the differences in expected incomes caused 
by different peer compositions across cohorts.  
The results show that increase in popularity and predicted income both have positive effects on 
the likelihood of forming friendships. However, the marginal utility of predicted incomes is much 
smaller than the marginal utility of an increase in popularity. Therefore, we draw the conclusion 
that immediate payoffs are more important than long-term economic gains for determining teenage 
friendship choices during high school.  
To the best of our knowledge, among the network formation literature, our paper is the first one 
to investigate whether teenagers are forward-looking when they make high school friendship 
decisions.  Moreover, this paper provides empirical evidence regarding the preferences of 
teenagers from different racial groups. Specifically, results in the heterogeneity tests show that 
African American and Hispanic students have higher returns on both popularity and future 
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earnings than White students. To some extent, these findings contradict Fordham and Ogbu’s 
(1986) “oppositional culture” theory, in which they state that students from disadvantaged minority 
groups view behaviors associated with higher academic achievement and future success as the 
privilege of white students and perceive lower returns from education. In this case, minorities 
would decrease their academic effort in order to gain popularity within their own racial groups.  
However, our results show that contingent upon the returns on popularity, minority students care 
more about future success than white students. This result is consistent with findings in Ainsworth-
Darnell and Downey (1998) and Harris (2006). 
2. A Three-Period Dynamic Model 
Model Overview: 
This section presents a model that describes how teenagers choose friends during high school and 
how teenagers’ friendship choices are related to their decisions and outcomes during college and 
in the labor market. The outline of the model is as below: 
Period 1: During high school, teenagers select friends based on how much the potential friend 
would increase his popularity and in terms of exogenous characteristics, how much they share in 
common. Their high school outcomes, such as high school GPA and high school graduation, 
depend on their popularity. In addition, when choosing friends, teenagers also consider the 
expected future payoffs from being popular which is included in stochastic high school outcomes. 
Period 2: Conditional on high school outcomes, individuals decide whether to attend college by 
taking into account the expected payoffs in the labor market. If yes, they also need to choose how 
long they stay in college. Some individuals may skip college and enter the labor market 
immediately. 
Period 3: All individuals work in the labor market. Income is the only variable we use to measure 
individuals’ long-term economic gains. 
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    For simplicity, we do not model marriage and fertility in this paper. Therefore, our sample only 
includes male teenagers, because females’ labor participation is more likely to be complicated by 
marriage and childcare than males’. Thus, the variations in females’ wages caused by factors that 
are not captured by our model may lead to biased estimations.31 
 Model Setup: 
The Utility Functions. In period 1, teenagers choose friends from their same-school same-grade 
peers. Also, we only look at friendships between male students, since friendships between different 
genders are likely to be romantic relationship. Teenagers consider whether the potential friends 
increase their own popularity and whether they share characteristics with these potential friends. 
Specifically, having more friends and making friends with popular peers may both increase 
teenagers’ own popularity. To take into account both possibilities, we use a measure called 
centrality as an approximation of teenagers’ popularity. Details for the calculation of centrality 
will be discussed in the empirical estimation section. In the model used, 𝑏𝑖  denotes teenager 𝑖’s 
centrality. In addition, friends may also influence teenagers’ short-term outcomes through their 
impacts on popularity, such as high school GPA and high school graduation. For example, students 
who have better academic performance may also be more popular in some schools. Making friends 
with these students may positively influence teenagers’ own popularity, as well as their own 
education outcomes. 
    Moreover, the costs of making friends are from the differences between teenagers’ own 
characteristics and their friends’ characteristics. This idea is based on previous findings that high 
school students prefer to make friends with people who have similar characteristics, especially 
                                                          
31 For example, we may observe that female teenagers earn lower future incomes than their male teenagers. 
However, the differences in male and female wages may have nothing to do with their friendship choices 
during high school. Instead, it might be because females have less working experience due to marriage and 
childcare. 
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with those who are from the same racial group or have similar family backgrounds (Moody, 2001; 
Weignberg, 2007; Marmoros and Sacerdote, 2006; Mayer and Puller, 2008; Carrell et al., 2013; 
Flether et al., 2013). Thus, some teenagers may face a tradeoff between being more popular and 
having friends who are similar to themselves. For example, minority students may have to choose 
friends from majority racial groups in order to become more popular during high school. 
    Thus, the Period 1 utility function consists of two parts: the benefits from popularity and high 
school academic achievement and the cost of having friends who have dissimilar characteristics.  
(1)   𝑈𝑖1 = 𝑈(𝑏𝑖, 𝐴𝑖𝑙) − 𝐶(𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑗) 
= 𝛽1𝑏𝑖 +∑𝛽2𝑙𝐴𝑖𝑙
2
𝑙=1
+ ∑ 𝛽3𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽4𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑋𝑗𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
 
In Equation (1), as mentioned above, teenager 𝑖’s popularity is measured by his centrality, 𝑏𝑖.
32 
Teenagers’ high school outcomes are denoted by 𝐴𝑖  ( 𝐴𝑖 = (𝐴1𝑖, 𝐴2𝑖), 𝐴1𝑖  is teenager 𝑖’s high 
school GPA, 𝐴2𝑖 is a dummy variable which shows whether teenager 𝑖 has graduated from high 
school). The characteristics of teenager 𝑖 and his friends are represented by 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗, respectively.
 
We consider 𝑀 demographic variables, including race and maternal education.  
    Although both centrality and high school education outcomes are incorporated in the Period 1 
utility function, in this version of the model, we want to focus on teenagers’ choices on friends, 
rather than their choices on efforts on education. 33 Hence, we assume that teenagers only make 
choices on friendships, which determine their centralities. Then, high school outcomes depend on 
their own centralities and characteristics, as shown in Equation (2). 
                                                          
32 Similar to the utility function in Haskell (2015), we let the measure of popularity directly enter teenagers’ 
utility function. 
33 For example, in the earlier work by Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009), they took the links 
between teenagers as given and investigated how teenagers chose their academic efforts. 
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(2)  𝐴𝑖𝑙 = 𝐴𝑙(𝑏𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) = 𝜑0,𝑙 + 𝜑1,𝑙𝑏𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑2,𝑙𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑙 
However, we recognize the simultaneity between high school GPA and centrality. It is likely that 
higher high school GPAs also lead to higher (or lower) levels of popularity.34 Therefore, instead 
of estimating the 𝛽s and 𝜑s in Equations (1) and (2), we plug Equation (2) into Equation (1). Then, 
we estimate the parameters in the reduced-form utility function, as shown in Equation (3). The 
parameter 𝛽1 represents the total effects of centrality on teenagers’ utilities.  
(3)   𝑈𝑖1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽3𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑋𝑗𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 𝜀?̃?𝑙 
where 𝛽0 = ∑ 𝛽2𝑙
2
𝑙=1 𝜑0,𝑙 , 𝛽1 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑙
2
𝑙=1 𝜑1,𝑙 ,  𝛽2𝑚 = 𝛽3𝑚 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑙
2
𝑙=1 𝜑2,𝑙𝑚 , 𝛽3𝑚 = 𝛽4𝑚 , 
𝜀?̃?𝑙 = ∑ 𝛽2𝑙
2
𝑙=1 𝜀𝑖𝑙.  
    In period 2, all individuals will have graduated or left high school. Depending on their outcomes 
from period 1, they make decisions on whether to attend college and how long they stay in college. 
Utility in this period only depends on educational attainment, which is measured by years of 
college.35 Thus, the period 2 utility function is: 
(4)   𝑈𝑖2 = 𝑈(𝑌𝑜𝐶𝑖) = 𝜔1𝑌𝑜𝐶𝑖   
where years of college is determined by centrality during high school, high school GPA, high 
school graduation, and teenager 𝑖’s characteristics.  
(5)  𝑌𝑜𝐶𝑖 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑏𝑖 +∑𝜌2𝑙𝐴𝑖𝑙
2
𝑙=1
+ ∑ 𝜌3𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 𝜖𝑖 
                                                          
34 In the results section, we show that there is a positive correlation between centrality and high school 
GPA. Moreover, in Table 13, results of balancing tests indicate that the bias associated with the simultaneity 
between high school education outcomes and centrality is limited. 
35 We didn’t include other college outcomes, such as GPA or major choices, since this information is not 
available in the data.  
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    In period 3, all the individuals enter the labor market. Individual 𝑖’s utility depends on his 
income.36 Therefore, the utility function of period 3 is: 
(6) 𝑈𝑖3 = 𝑈(𝑊𝑖) =  𝜇1ln (𝑊𝑖) 
where 𝑊𝑖 is individual 𝑖’s income. It is determined by individual 𝑖’s years of college, outcomes in 
period 1, and other observed and unobserved characteristics. Thus, the income function is: 
(7)  𝑙𝑛 (𝑊𝑖) = 𝑊(𝑌𝑜𝐶𝑖, 𝑏𝑖, 𝐴𝑖𝑙 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝜉𝑖)  
  = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑌𝑜𝐶𝑖 + 𝜋2𝑏𝑖 + 𝜋3𝐴𝑖 + 𝜋4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 
The Utility Maximization Problem. Individual 𝑖’s lifetime utility is the summation of his utilities 
in the three periods described above. In particular, individuals’ outcomes in periods 2 and 3 (years 
of college and incomes) are all related to their friendship choices in period 1. Hence, we assume 
that when teenager 𝑖 chooses his friends during high school, he takes into account three factors: 1) 
how his friendship choices influence his popularity, high school GPA, and high school graduation, 
and thus his utilities during high school; (2) how his friendship choices impact his college 
attendance decision, years of college, and thus utilities during period 2; (3) how his friendship 
choices directly and indirectly influence his utilities in period 3 through their influences on human 
capital. Therefore, the utility maximization problem becomes: 
(8) 𝑉 = max
𝑏𝑖
{( 𝐸𝑈1 + 𝐸𝑈2 + 𝐸𝑈3)} 
If teenagers were forward-looking, they would prefer the friendship choices that lead to higher 
future incomes increase period 3 utilities more.37 Alternatively, if the short-term benefits were 
                                                          
36 Originally, individual 𝑖’s lifetime utility depends on consumption. After solving the utility maximization 
problem, utility is a function of income only (Arcidiacono, 2005). Moreover, since we can only observe 
individuals’ incomes for one year (Wave IV survey in Add Health), we use it as an approximation for 
earnings during young adulthood. 
37 In the theoretical model, although period 2 and 3 utilities are separated, in the empirical estimation, we 
estimate predicted incomes, which contain returns both in period 2 and 3. Thus, when looking at whether 
teenagers are forward-looking, we only need to check the weights they put on their period 3 utility. 
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more important to teenagers, they would choose individuals who increase their period 1 utilities 
more as friends.38 
3. Data 
This paper utilizes data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health 
(Add Health), which conducted surveys on representative grades 7 to 12 students in 1994-1995 
and followed up with the same individuals in 1995-1996, 2000-2001, and 2007-2008. We use the 
Wave I in-school survey, and Wave III and IV in-home surveys to get individuals’ information 
during high school, college, and labor market. Also, we restricted the sample to male students who 
were in grades 9 to 12 during the Wave I survey.39 
The Wave I in-school survey includes multiple cohorts of students from different schools. It 
also asked each respondent to nominate up to 5 best male friends and 5 best female friends from 
the school rosters. Thus, according to the friendship nominations, we construct teenagers’ 
friendship networks. Specifically, for teenager 𝑖 in school 𝑠 and grade 𝑔, we define all the other 
male students in school 𝑠 and grade 𝑔 as teenager 𝑖’s potential friends. Thus, all the across-grade 
friend nominations are omitted. Moreover, although respondents may have nominated both male 
and female friends, we only consider male-male friendship, since female nominations may include 
romantic relationships (Fletcher et al., 2013).  
Then we construct a set of link level data by matching each teenager with each of his potential 
friends, i.e., each observation represents a link with the potential friend 𝑗  for teenager 𝑖 . The 
descriptive statistics for how teenagers select friends based on their own and potential friends’ race 
                                                          
38 This includes both returns on popularity and high school education outcomes. 
39 Some schools do not have clear grade information. Individuals in these schools are dropped from the 
sample. 
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and maternal education are shown in Table 1 Panel 1.40  We can see that the frequencies of 
friendships within the same racial groups or within the same maternal education groups are higher 
than the frequencies of friendships across different racial groups or across different maternal 
education groups. The only two exceptions are the other-other and the mom high school dropout-
mom high school dropout pair. This may be because the population of students from the two groups 
is so small that they have to make friends with those who have different backgrounds.  
Wave III in-home survey provides teenagers’ high school transcripts, which we use to generate 
the high school GPA variable. We create the high school graduation variable from the question 
about the highest degree individuals obtained.  The average high school GPA is about 2.6. About 
94.5% individuals have graduated from high school. In Wave IV in-home survey, the respondents 
were between 28-31 years old. Most of them should have graduated from college (if attended 
college). When estimating the period 3 model, the sample is constrained to respondents who at 
least work for 10 hours per week and who have reported their yearly earnings.41 The years of 
college variable is created based on the question about the highest degree individual obtained in 
Wave IV survey. 42  
We will discuss the calculations of the Katz-Bonacich centrality in the next section. In this 
section, we show some descriptive statistics related to the centrality measure. In Table 1, we can 
see that the means of the centrality measure are almost the same in the three different samples we 
                                                          
40 The sample used for analyses includes every possible link for each network. However, the summary 
statistics only shows means and standard errors of the friendships that were nominated by at least one of 
the individuals involved. 
41 Personal earnings are obtained from the question “in {2006/2007/2008}, how much income did you 
receive from personal earnings before taxes—that is, wages or salaries, including tips, bonuses, and 
overtime pay, and income from self-employment?”. 
42 Add Health did not provide specific years of education. We calculate the years of college variable as the 
following: 1) if high school graduate or high school dropout, 𝑌𝑜𝐶=0; 2) if attended some college, 𝑌𝑜𝐶 =2; 
if college graduate, 𝑌𝑜𝐶 =4; if some master education, 𝑌𝑜𝐶 =5; if master degree, 𝑌𝑜𝐶 =7; if Ph.D. degree 
or other professional training, 𝑌𝑜𝐶 =9. 
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use.43 In Table 2, we report all the variables by the tertile of the Katz-Bonacich centrality. A higher 
value of centrality means a higher level of popularity. Thus, students in the top tertile groups are 
the most popular (Column 2) and students in the bottom tertile groups are the least popular 
(Column 4). We can see that the most popular white students have more white-white links and less 
links with African American and Hispanic students than less popular white students. However, 
compared to white students, minority students who have more links within their own racial groups 
are more likely to fall into the bottom tertile centrality groups. When we look at maternal education 
links, within group links are associated with higher centralities for students who have mothers with 
some college education and students who have college-educated mothers.  
Individual outcomes and characteristics reported by tertile of the centrality measure are 
presented in Panel 2 and Panel 3. We can see that popular students tend to have higher academic 
achievement during high school, more years of college, and higher future earnings. The 
percentages of white students, students who have mothers with some college education, and 
students who have college-educated mothers in the top tertile centrality groups are higher than 
their percentages in the full sample. This implies that students with these attributes are more likely 
to become popular in high school. 
4. Empirical Estimation Strategy 
In this section, we describe the procedures for estimating the dynamic model in Section 1. We 
begin with the calculation process of centrality, which is used to measure individuals’ popularity 
during high school. Then we introduce a three-stage empirical model (notice that the three stages 
are not entirely the same as the three periods in the dynamic model). In Stage 1, we use a simple 
                                                          
43 Because of sample attrition in each survey wave and the different sample sizes of the in-school and in-
home surveys (90,118 vs. 20,746), the samples used in different stages of estimation are different. To 
minimize the bias caused by data attrition, we only drop observations when key variables are missing (such 
as identification number) and keep the sample size as large as possible.  
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model to estimate teenagers’ preferences on centrality and friends’ characteristics. In Stage 2, we 
study how individuals’ educational and labor market outcomes are related to centralities during 
high school. In Stage 3, we examine the importance of potential gains in future incomes relative 
to the gains in centrality for determining teenagers’ friendship choices.  
The samples and the structures of the data for each stage are different. In Stages 1 and 3, we use 
link level data rather than individual level data, i.e., each observation represents a link between 
two teenagers. We differentiate the nominator and the nominee of a potential link. This means for 
any two individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗, we consider both link 𝑖𝑗 and 𝑗𝑖. 44 Then, we estimate a reduced form 
model for whether teenager 𝑖 wants to nominate 𝑗 in part based on the increase in 𝑖’s popularity. 
Also, we use the data on all friendship nominations to model the likelihood that 𝑖 nominates 𝑗, 
regardless of whether the nominations are one-way (only one person nominated the other person) 
or two-way (both people involved nominated the other person). The samples used for Stages 1 and 
3 are from the Wave I in-school survey, during which everyone was in high school. Stage 2 
samples are from Wave III and IV in-home surveys, in which we can observe teenagers’ outcomes 
in later life stages.   
Following Fletcher et al. (2013), we define a friendship network as individuals who are in the 
same school and same grade, since we will compare outcomes of similar students who are in the 
same school but in different grades. The variations in peer compositions across cohorts lead to 
different friendship opportunities for students who have similar preferences on centrality and 
friends’ characteristics. Thus, although these students have similar preferences, they may make 
different friendship choices and have different future outcomes. The omission of cross-grade 
friendships should not lead to severe bias, since, according to Fletcher et al. (2013), more than 
                                                          
44 Every possible link is included in the sample, regardless whether the two individuals are friends in real 
life. For example, if a network has five members, then there are 5 × 4 = 20 potential links.  
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80% of the within-school same-gender friendships with valid identification numbers are within the 
same grade.45 Furthermore, since we focus on male teenagers in this paper, only male-male links 
are considered.46 
4.1. Katz-Bonacich Centrality: Definition and Calculation Process 
    Suppose a friendship network 𝒈 has 𝑛 members. The relationship between any two members 
can be shown by using an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix 𝑮, which is usually referred to as the adjacency matrix 
(Jackson, 2010). In this paper, we define each element 𝑔𝑖𝑗 of the adjacency matrix 𝑮 as follows: 
(9)  𝑔𝑖𝑗 = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑗 𝑎𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑
0                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                       
   ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛; 𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 0 
In particular, the element 𝑔𝑖𝑗 denotes a one-way link between teenager 𝑖 and teenager 𝑗. It shows 
whether 𝑖 has nominated 𝑗 as his friend.  Note that the value of 𝑔𝑖𝑗 does not depend on 𝑗’s choices. 
For example, in a network with five individuals, the adjacency matrix may look like:  
𝑮 =
(
 
 
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0)
 
 
 
Each row shows the corresponding teenager’s one-way nominations. In this example, the values 
of  𝑔12 and 𝑔13 are one, which implies that teenager 1 has nominated teenagers 2 and 3 as his 
friends, regardless of 2 and 3’s friend nominations (𝑔21 = 0, 𝑔31 = 1).   
    Then, using the adjacency matrix 𝑮, a teenager’s popularity is measured by the Katz-Bonacich 
centrality, 𝑏𝑖, which has been widely used in teenage network studies (for example, Ballester et al. 
                                                          
45 Although Add Health allowed participants to nominate their friends in other schools, those nominations 
are coded as 77777777 or 88888888, which are not identifiable. According to Fletcher et al. (2013), out-of-
school nominations are about 15% of all the nominations. 
46 Omitting friend nominations between different genders will decrease the potential friendship choices and 
the number of friends each individual has. This may lead to downward bias in estimations. However, 
friendships across genders may be romantic relationships, which may not suit the setup of our model.  
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(2006,2010), Ballester and Zenou (2014), Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), and Liu et al. (2012)).47 
It is defined as: 
(10)    𝑏𝑖(𝒈,𝜙, 𝛼) = (𝑰 − 𝜙𝑮)
−1𝛼 = ∑𝜙𝑝𝑮𝑃𝛼
∞
𝑝=0
 
where 𝑰  is an identity matrix; 𝜙  is the power weight; and 𝛼  is a scaling vector.48  The Katz-
Bonacich centrality measures the relative importance of a teenager in his friendship network by 
considering both connections with his immediate friends and indirect connections to other 
individuals through his immediate friends. If two individuals have the same number of immediate 
friends, the one whose friends have more friends has a higher value of centrality and thus is more 
popular in the network.49  
Thus, based on the friend nominations in Add Health, we can create the adjacency matrices for 
each friendship network and then calculate the Katz-Bonacich centrality for each individual 
according to Equation (10). However, we have the concern that the one-way nomination may not 
represent a real connection between two individuals. Instead, it was merely because popular 
students are more likely to be nominated by other teenagers, regardless of whether or not they are 
friends with the nominators.  
Therefore, we provide the empirical evidence suggesting that most one-way referrals are very 
likely to be real friendships. In Table 3, the sample size column shows how many people have 0-
5 reciprocal friends. In this case, both individuals nominated each other in the survey. Therefore, 
we know they are real friends. The following columns show that among the people in each row, 
                                                          
47 This centrality measure is originally based on the papers by Katz (1953) and Bonacich (1987). 
48 Later, we set 𝜙 to be 0.1, which is consistent with Haynie (2001). The scaling vector 𝛼 is a vector of 
ones. To test whether our results are driven by the choice of 𝜙, we also present results of regressions by 
using different values of 𝜙. 
49 Within the same network, individuals who have higher values of centrality should be more attractive than 
those who have lower values of centrality. This assumption is verified in Table 4, Table A2, and Table A9.  
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how many of them have received 0-8 or more one-way friend nominations (in this case, these 
individuals did not nominate the persons who nominated them). We can see that more than 80% 
of the individuals have 0 or only 1 reciprocal friend, while the number of popular students (who 
have more than 3 reciprocal friends) is small. If the concern about one-way referrals is valid, we 
should observe that popular students have received many one-way friend nominations, while less 
popular students have received very few one-way friend nominations. However, the data shows 
the opposite: most of the one-way friend nominations are to the less popular students. This implies 
that most of the one-way nominations should not be motivated by aspirational nominations (for 
example, some teenagers may want to show their friendship with popular students by listing them 
as friends, but popular students may only make friends with some of the people who nominated 
them). Instead, most of the one-way nominations are probably reciprocal friendships that are not 
recorded because of measurement errors. 
4.2. Stage 1 Multinomial Logit Model with School and Grade Fixed Effects 
In Stage 1, we estimate teenagers’ friendship preferences. Specifically, we are interested in 
estimating the likelihood of teenager 𝑖 linking with a potential friend 𝑗, given the potential increase 
in teenager 𝑖’s centrality (potential payoffs in short term) and the potential friend’s demographic 
characteristics (potential costs arising from having different backgrounds). To begin with, we use 
∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔 to denote the increase in teenager 𝑖’s centrality when he chooses to link with teenager 𝑗 and 
only links with 𝑗. 
(11)    ∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔 = (𝑰 − 𝜙𝑮)
−1𝛼 = ∑𝜙𝑝𝑮𝑃𝛼
∞
𝑝=0
 
Equation (11) is used to calculate ∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔. Although the expression is the same as Equation (10), 
we make several changes to the adjacency matrix 𝑮 and calculate ∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔.  The first change is that 
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if teenager i has nominated any friends, we remove all the links between teenager 𝑖 and the friends 
he nominated. In other words, based on the definition of a one-way link, the values of these links 
were one. So here, we replace the value of these links with zero. The links between all the other 
individuals are kept the same and are assumed to be two-way, since although some of the 
nominations may be one-way, they are reciprocal friendship from teenager 𝑖’s perspective. This 
means that the part of the adjacency matrix excluding 𝑖’s links should be symmetric. Note that 
removing these links reduces teenager 𝑖 ’s real friends’ centralities. To take into account this 
downward bias, after we remove 𝑖’s real links, our second change is to randomly assign a link (not 
with teenager 𝑖) to each of 𝑖’s real friends. The third change is, we only let teenager 𝑖 link with one 
potential friend at a time and calculate his centrality (this is equivalent to his centrality gain, since 
we have removed all his links in the first step so that his initial centrality is zero). We repeat this 
process for every one-way link in a friendship network to calculate the potential increase in 
centrality from forming a link for all the individuals.50  
The reason for looking at the increase in each teenager’s centrality when they are only linking 
with one potential friend is because we cannot observe how a teenager ranks his friends. If 𝑖 
nominated more than one friend, we do not know which friend 𝑖 likes more, or whether 𝑖 likes 
                                                          
50 During the calculation, this process takes very long time. For example, for a network with 100 members, 
we need to calculate the centrality gain variable 100 × 99 = 9900 times. There are more than 300 same-
school same-grade networks in the Add Health data. Therefore, instead of repeating the process described 
above, we replace teenager 𝑖’s identification number with fake identification numbers which do not exist 
in network (the idea is that we replace links between teenager 𝑖 and all his potential friends with links 
between fake members and his potential friends). Then we calculate the centralities of teenager 𝑖’s potential 
friends and multiply them by the power weight, 𝜙. These values are used as the centrality gains for teenager 
𝑖. In this way, we only need to calculate the centrality gain variable once for each member in the network. 
This method works since, if person 𝑖 links with person 𝑗, then people who are directly linked with person 𝑗 
are linked with person 𝑖 through two links, people who are linked with person 𝑗 through two links are linked 
with person 𝑖 through three links, and so on. Thus, according to the expression of the Katz-Bonacich 
centrality, we only need to increase the power of the power weight by 1. The only difference is that the term 
associated with 𝑖’s immediate friend (which is equal to 1) is omitted. However, this does not influence the 
estimation. 
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them equally. Thus, given a group of friend options, we focus on estimating whether teenager 𝑖 
will form a link with a potential friend, instead of which friend he will choose first. This implies 
that we also need to rearrange the data so that each teenager only chooses one friend from his 
choice set. We make changes to the data as follows: suppose teenager 𝑖’s friendship network has 
fifty individuals (including himself) and he nominated two friends, 𝑗  and 𝑚 . We create two 
friendship choice sets for teenager 𝑖. The first choice set only contains the link 𝑖𝑗 and links between 
𝑖 and the other forty-seven people who were not nominated by 𝑖. Similarly, the second choice set 
only includes the link 𝑖𝑚 and the other forty-seven links that 𝑖 did not choose.51 
In this way, we can use a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of linking with a 
potential friend over the probability of not linking with that potential friend. Specifically, we define 
𝑓𝑖 as teenager 𝑖’s friendship choice. The utility associated with choosing teenager 𝑗 as a friend is 
denoted by 𝑢𝑖𝑗. In addition, the choice of having no friend is represented by 𝑓𝑖 = 0. The utility 
yields from no friend choice is 𝑢𝑖0 . In this model, we use 𝑓𝑖 = 0 as the baseline choice and 
normalize 𝑢𝑖0 to zero. 
(12)  𝑢𝑖0 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑓𝑖 = 0; 𝑋𝑖) = 0 
Then, given a friendship choice set for teenager 𝑖 (which includes only one friend that 𝑖 nominated 
and all the other students that 𝑖 did not nominate), the individual that teenager 𝑖 nominated should 
                                                          
51 One caveat associated with this data structure is that we have to omit teenagers who did not nominate 
any friends in the survey, since they did not provide any information as to their friendship preferences. 
Thus, our estimations may overstate teenagers’ preferences, since teenagers who are more concerned with 
being popular and those who prefer having friends who have similar backgrounds are more likely to 
nominate friends. Alternatively, we may underestimate the degree of homophily, since teenagers who have 
stronger homophily preferences may find it more difficult to make friends in some circumstances.  
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lead to a positive utility for 𝑖, while the other students that teenager 𝑖 did not nominate should lead 
to utilities less than zero.52 
(13)  𝑓𝑖 = 𝑗   𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑖𝑗 > 𝑢𝑖0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑖𝑘 ≤ 𝑢𝑖0, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
(14)  𝑢𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑢𝑖(𝑓𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝛽0,𝑓 + 𝛽1,𝑓∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔 + 𝛽2,𝑓𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑔 + 𝛽3,𝑓𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑔 + 𝑆𝑠 + 𝐺𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔 
Equation (14) shows the regression for estimating the parameters in Equation (1). Teenager 𝑖’s 
friendship choice 𝑓𝑖 is defined by his own friend nominations. Since we model teenagers’ own 
choices as to whether to build a connection with a potential friend, this piece of information is 
embodied in teenagers’ self-reported friend nominations, rather than their peers’ nominations. The 
coefficient of the centrality gain variable,  𝛽1,𝑓, shows an increase (or decrease) in teenager 𝑖’s 
utility when his centrality increases. For example, if 𝛽1,𝑓 is positive, it implies that teenagers prefer 
to connect with people who increase their centralities more (such people are also more popular in 
the network, since they have more direct and indirect connections with other members in the 
network). 
We also control for teenagers’ own race and their maternal education dummy variables (𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑔), 
and interactions between teenagers’ own characteristics and their potential friends’ characteristics 
(𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑔). These variables capture the costs associated with the link 𝑖𝑗. The school fixed effects 
(𝑆𝑠)  and the grade fixed effects (𝐺𝑔)  eliminate the differences in the likelihood of forming 
friendships in different schools and for different cohorts. For example, unobserved school level 
factors or grade level factors may lead to students in some schools or from some cohorts to make 
                                                          
52 For teenagers who have listed five friends in the survey, the options they did not choose may be better 
than the friend option that yields zero utility. However, in our data, very few have listed five friends. Also, 
even if these individuals had the chance to list more than five friends, only a fraction of them would do so. 
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more friends than other students. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔  is a stochastic variable that captures 
unobserved factors that influence the return of the link 𝑖𝑗 for teenager 𝑖.53 
4.3. Stage 2 Reduced-form Model with School by Type and School by Grade Fixed Effects 
At Stage 2, we initially calculate each teenager’s predicted centrality as the following: 1) for 
every one-way link 𝑔𝑖𝑗, we calculate the probability of 𝑖 linking with a potential friend 𝑗, based 
on: the estimated parameters in the first stage, the potential increase in 𝑖’s centrality, his own 
characteristics, and 𝑗’s characteristics; 2) then we replace the value of 𝑔𝑖𝑗  with the probability 
calculated in the first step; 3) given the adjacency matrix which consists of the probabilities of 
forming links and Equation (10), we predict each teenager’s Katz-Bonacich centrality (?̂?𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡). The 
predicted centrality measure is used to test the relationship between centrality and students’ 
education and labor market outcomes. 
Equation (15) is the regression for examining the effects of centrality on high school academic 
achievement. The dependent variable 𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 includes two outcomes, high school GPA and high 
school graduation. If the coefficient of the predicted centrality, 𝜑1, is positive, that implies that 
teenagers who have higher levels of centralities (who are more popular in high school) would have 
higher high school GPAs and/or be more likely to graduate from high school. 
(15) 𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1?̂?𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜈𝑠𝑡,1 + 𝜍𝑠𝑔,1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 
Our strategy for identifying the causal effects of centrality is to include the school by type 
(𝜈𝑠𝑡,1) and school by grade fixed effects (𝜍𝑔𝑠,1). Student types are defined by two sets of exogenous 
attributes: race and maternal education (they are the same as the variables we use to calculate the 
                                                          
53 Except for the unobservables associated with the link 𝑖𝑗, it is likely that some unobserved characteristics of teenager 
𝑖  and/or his potential friend 𝑗  also influence the cost of forming the link. To take into account this kind of 
unobservables, we need to use a more complicated random effects model. However, this extension is not within the 
scope of this dissertation. 
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costs of forming friendships in Stage 1). The racial groups include non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic black, Hispanics, and Other.54 The maternal education groups include maternal high 
school dropouts, maternal mom high school graduates/maternal some college education, maternal 
college graduates, and maternal education missing. Therefore, there are 16 different types of 
students in total.  
The school by type fixed effects minimize the bias caused by students sorting into schools 
according to their own types and unobserved school level factors. For example, some students may 
prefer more diversified peers, while others prefer to have more peers who are from their own racial 
groups or with similar family backgrounds. Thus, within the same network, teenagers who are in 
the same school and type cells should face similar costs for forming friendships, since we use the 
same variables to define teenagers’ types and measure friendship preferences. This implies that 
within the same school, we can compare students who are the same type but in different 
cohorts/grades. The quasi-random variations in compositions of different cohort groups would lead 
to different friendship opportunities, as well as different predicted centralities and different high 
school outcomes. This across-cohort within-school strategy is a standard approach that is often 
used in peer effects literature (Hoxby, 2000; Bifulco et al., 2011, 2014). The idea is that when 
teenagers and their parents choose schools, although they can observe the school level peer 
compositions, they cannot predict the compositions of the cohort that will attend the school that 
year. Hence, within the same school, students who have the same preferences on friends but are in 
different cohorts may have different friendship options. 
                                                          
54 We define a student as Hispanic, if he identifies himself as Hispanic, regardless of whether he also 
identified himself as black and/or white. Also, since the Asian population in this sample is relatively small, 
we combine the Asian group with other small racial groups.  
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 In addition, some network level characteristics may be related to both friendship choices and 
high school outcomes, such as the size and the density of the network. For example, in a large 
dense network where individuals form more links than individuals in other networks, teenagers 
may tend to have higher centralities and better or worse academic performance due to the overall 
influence of the network. To reduce this kind of bias, we also include school by grade fixed effects, 
since we define a friendship network as teenagers in the same school and same grade.  
(16) 𝑌𝑜𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1?̂?𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜌2𝐴1,𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐴2,𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡+𝜈𝑠𝑡,2 + 𝜍𝑠𝑔,2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 
(17) 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1?̂?𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋2𝐴1,𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋3𝐴2,𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋4𝑌𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜈𝑠𝑡,3 + 𝜍𝑠𝑔,3 + 𝜉𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 
We also use the same identification strategy to explore how the predicted centrality measure 
impacts individuals’ years of college and young adulthood incomes. In Equations (16) and (17), 
we further control for outcomes that are determined in the previous stages, including high school 
GPA, high school graduation, and years of college (in the wage equation only).  
Thus, all the Stage 2 models allow us to test the mechanisms through which friendship choices 
may influence long-term economic gains. For example, popularity during high school may affect 
individuals’ future incomes through its impacts on educational attainment. 
Throughout Stage 2, we use predicted centralities for estimation, instead of teenagers’ real 
centralities, because some unobserved factors in the error terms of Equations (15) - (17) may be 
related to both outcome variables and friendship choices (which determine teenagers’ real 
centralities). For example, students who are more motivated to go to better colleges may be more 
eager to become popular during high school (such as become the football team leader or the 
president of student association). However, the predicted centrality is mainly based on a student’s 
exogenous characteristics, his potential friends’ characteristics, and links between other 
individuals (which determine his potential friends’ centralities). Thus, the predicted centrality is 
 101 
 
very unlikely to correlate with the error terms. We will test this assumption by using a balancing 
test in the result section. 
 Moreover, this implies that we could also use the predicted centrality measure to instrument 
teenagers’ real centralities, since the predicted centrality should be highly correlated to the real 
centrality and should not have direct impacts on teenagers’ outcomes. In Section 4, we present 
both results from Equations (15) to (17) and results from IV regressions.  
4.4. Stage 3 Multinomial Logit Model with School by Type and Grade Fixed Effects 
    In the last stage, we attempt to separate the effects of centrality on friendship choices from the 
effects of future earnings. Similar to Stage 1, we use the link level data and a multinomial logit 
model. However, there are several differences in the estimation strategy. First, based on the 
estimates in Equation (16), we predict the expected income (?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡) for teenager 𝑖 from only 
linking with the potential friend 𝑗, given 𝑖 and 𝑗’s types, and the potential gain in centrality for 𝑖. 
Then the predicted income variable is included in the multinomial logit model to estimate the 
effects of expected future earnings on the probability of teenager 𝑖 linking with the potential 
friend 𝑗. 
(17)   𝑢𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝜓1,𝑓∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜓2,𝑓?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜓3,𝑓𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡′ + 𝜅𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑔 + 𝜂𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 
?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1∆𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡 + ?̂?𝑠𝑡,3 + 𝜍?̂?𝑔,3 
Second, in Equation (17), we control for school by type (𝜅𝑠𝑡) and grade fixed effects (𝜆𝑔). As 
mentioned before, the school by type fixed effects allow us to compare students in different cohorts 
within the same school-type cell. However, we still face the difficulty of separating the effects of 
centrality from the effects of expected earning, since the expected earning is linearly correlated 
with centrality (as shown in Equation (14)). Basically, it is hard to identify the direct effects of 
centrality and the indirect effects of centrality through future earnings on teenagers’ utility.  
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Therefore, to identify 𝜓1,𝑓 and 𝜓2,𝑓, we need to rely on variables that could influence expected 
incomes outside of the friendship choices. Note that other than centrality, peer compositions may 
also affect teenagers’ future outcomes. This suggests that being exposed to different cohorts does 
not only mean different friendship options, but also means different peer effects. Thus, teenagers’ 
tastes to expected earnings may change as they expect different future earnings from different 
cohorts. For example, when being exposed to peers that have positive impacts on future earnings, 
in order to gain higher utilities, students may increase the weight they put on expected incomes 
when choosing friends,. Hence, we only control for grade fixed effects in the Stage 3 model. In 
this way, we keep the variations in future earnings that were caused by peer effects, which were 
absorbed by school by grade fixed effects in the Stage 2 model. 
5. Results  
    In this section, we first present the estimations calculated from the three-stage model in section 
3. Then we show results of the heterogeneity tests and balancing tests.  
5.1. Major Results 
5.1.1. Stage 1: What kinds of friends do teenagers prefer? 
Table 4 shows the results from applying the Stage 1 model, in which we estimate how the 
increases in centrality and the match between teenagers’ own characteristics and the potential 
friends’ characteristics impact friendship choices. We find that teenagers are more likely to form 
links with individuals who increase their centralities more. This implies that increases in popularity 
lead to greater utilities for teenagers. Thus, teenagers would want to connect with the more popular 
peers (who increase their popularity more) in the network. Notice that in this case, the number of 
friend is no longer important for getting higher levels of popularity, since each individual can only 
choose one friend at a time. Also notice that we are not attempting to measure the value of these 
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utilities. Instead, we are interested in the relative importance of the social factors and long-term 
economic gains for determining friendship choices. However, we will still use expressions such as 
“marginal utility” to interpret the results from the multinomial logit models.  
In addition, our results are consistent with previous papers that documented network homophily 
based on race and maternal education (Moody, 2001; Weignberg, 2007; Marmoros and Sacerdote, 
2006; Mayer and Puller, 2008; Carrell et al., 2013; Flether et al., 2013). For example, teenagers 
are more likely to form friendships within their own racial groups than across racial groups. 
Particularly, the white-black and black-white links are more costly than other interracial 
friendships (the absolute values of the coefficients on these two kinds of links are much higher 
than coefficients on other kinds of interracial links). Moreover, the degree of homophily is 
different across racial groups. For instance, compared to whites, students from minority groups are 
more likely to form friendships with individuals from their own racial groups. This tendency is 
especially strong among African Americans (the coefficient on the African American dummy is 
larger than the coefficients on the Hispanic dummy and other race dummy).  
Maternal education also influence teenagers’ friendship patterns. For example, it is less likely 
for students with different maternal education backgrounds to become friends, especially for the 
maternal high school dropouts and maternal college graduates pairs. Also, teenagers with a high 
school dropout mom or college graduate mom are more likely to form friendships within the same 
maternal education groups than those whose mothers are high school graduates or have some 
college education. 
5.1.2. Stage 2: Is being popular beneficial to teenagers’ short-term and long-term 
outcomes? 
Given the parameters in Table 4, we predict the probability of forming a friendship with each 
potential friend for each teenager and then calculate their predicted centralities. In Table 5, we 
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present how predicted centrality influences teenagers’ high school GPA, high school graduation, 
years of college, and future incomes. We also test the potential mechanism through which 
predicted centrality impacts future earnings.  
The results show that being more popular in high school leads to significantly higher high school 
GPAs, but not higher likelihood of graduating from high school.  Moreover, the effects of predicted 
centrality on years of college and future incomes are positive and significant. However, after we 
control for high school education outcomes (and years of college in income regression), the effects 
of predicted centrality are reduced.  
These results imply that instead of directly influencing future incomes, teenagers’ centralities 
may indirectly impact future earnings through education outcomes: those who are more popular 
during high school are more likely to have higher high school GPAs; better high school 
performance may lead to more years of college; since college education is an important indicator 
of an individual’s ability, those who have more years of college earn higher incomes in the future 
(Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo, 2011).55 In addition, our results show that high school graduation 
may not be the mechanism through which teenagers’ friendship choices influence their future 
outcomes. 
In Table 6, we also present results from regressions using the predicted centrality measure to 
instrument teenagers’ real centralities, due to the concern that real centralities may be related to 
unobserved factors that influence outcomes. The first stage estimations and the F-statistics (which 
                                                          
55 They showed that college degrees reveal more information about individuals’ abilities than do high 
school diplomas. Therefore, college graduates’ wages are more likely to match their abilities since the 
beginning of their jobs, while high-ability high school graduates only experience increases in wages after 
they work for a few years. Our results and Arcidiacono et al.’s (2011) results are not consistent with the 
findings in Altonji and Pierret (2001). They found that after a few years of working, college degrees no 
longer signal individuals’ abilities. Instead, work experience becomes more important for determining 
college graduates’ wages. 
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are between 31 to 68) show a strong correlation between predicted centrality and real centrality. 
In general, the patterns of the IV results confirm our findings in Table 5. 
5.1.3. Stage 3: Are Teenagers Forward-looking When Choosing Friends? 
Finally, we use the parameters from the income regressions in Table 5 (Column 3 in Panel 2) to 
predict expected wages from linking with a potential friend for each teenager. Then we estimate 
how centrality gain and expected incomes from forming a link influence the likelihood of forming 
that link. In Column 1 of Table 7, we find that compared with the result in the Stage 1 model, the 
coefficient of the centrality gain measure in the Stage 3 model becomes slightly higher (9.278 vs. 
9.978). Moreover, although the coefficient of the expected income variable is positive and 
significant, its magnitude is much smaller than the coefficient of the centrality gain measure. These 
results indicate that when teenagers make friendship choices during high school, they care more 
about being popular (short-term benefits) than having higher incomes in the future (long-term 
economic gains).  
We also investigate if the returns on expected incomes are nonlinear by adding the squared and 
the cubed terms of the expected incomes in Column 2 and 3. However, neither model produces a 
significant coefficient. Therefore, the model in Column 1 is our preferred model. 
For now, we assume that returns on expected earnings capture the effects of long-term economic 
gains, which include the effects of years of college. However, having higher future incomes may 
not be the only reason that teenagers care about college education. Our current model cannot 
capture the effects of college education that do not influence teenagers’ utilities through future 
earnings. To take this into account, we further predict teenagers’ years of college and add this 
variable to the Stage 3 model in Column 4-6 of Table 7.56 Recall that we exploit the peer effects 
                                                          
56 The predicted years of college is calculated based on parameters in Column 1 of Panel 2 in Table 5. 
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to identify the effects of expected earnings. The identification of the expected years of college 
relies on the same variations. We find that the predicted years of college positively influence the 
likelihood of forming friendships as well. This also partially absorbs the effects of future earnings 
in Column 4. In addition, there is no significant reduction in the payoffs from centrality gains, 
which is consistent with our findings in Column 1.  
To show the relative importance of short-term payoffs for determining teenagers’ friendship 
choices in a more straightforward way, in Table 9, we calculate the change in utility associated 
with a one standard deviation increase in centrality gain and show its direct and indirect effects 
(which is through its impacts on expected incomes). The calculations are based on the model in 
Column 1 of Table 7, since it is our preferred model. According to the results in Row 1, a one 
standard deviation increase in centrality gain directly increases utility by 0.4963, whereas the 
indirect increase in utility through expected earnings is only 0.0016 (which is 0.32% of the direct 
effect). Moreover, in Column 3, we increase the predicted incomes by one standard deviation. We 
can see that although the increase in utility due to higher expected incomes becomes larger (0.0207 
vs. 0.0016), it is still much smaller than the effects of the centrality gain. In the last row, we 
estimate the indirect effect of centrality gain through years of college and the increase in utility 
due to a one standard deviation increase in years of college. The calculation is based on parameters 
in Column 4 of Table 7. The results show that compared with the direct effect of centrality gain, 
the indirect effect through years of college is still very small, but it is slightly higher than the 
indirect effect through future incomes (1.66% of the direct effect). Also, a one standard deviation 
increase in years of college leads to a larger increase in utility than a one standard deviation 
increase in future earnings (0.0323 vs. 0.0207). 
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In Table 10, we also compare the change in utility due to a one standard deviation increase in 
high school GPA with the change in utility due to a one standard deviation increase in centrality 
gains. With higher high school GPAs, teenagers would expect more years of college and higher 
future earnings.  In Column 2, we can see that a one standard deviation increase in high school 
GPA only increases teenagers’ utilities by 0.0030, which is 0.60% of the direct social payoffs.57 
5.2. Heterogeneity Tests 
In this section, we test whether the short-term returns and long-term economic returns from high 
school friendships are different for students with different attributes. Thus, in Table 8, we show 
the results of the third stage for students from different racial groups (Panel 1-3) and from different 
maternal education groups (Panel 4-6).58 We can see that the marginal utility of the centrality gains 
for African Americans and Hispanics are much higher than the marginal utility of centrality gains 
for whites. These results indicate that disadvantage minorities care more about gaining popularity 
than whites.  
Moreover, the two minority groups also have higher (and more significant) returns on predicted 
earnings than whites. According to results in Table 9, the ratio between the indirect and the direct 
effects of centrality gain is the highest for African Americans. Table 10 shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in high school GPA also has larger impacts on African Americans’ utilities. 
These results support the finding in Lang and Manove (2011), which showed that conditional on 
ability, African Americans have higher educational attainment than whites. This is likely because 
                                                          
57 This calculation is based on the coefficient of high school GPA and the coefficient of years of college in 
Table 5 (Column 2 and 4 in Panel 2), as well as parameters in Column 1 of Table 7. 
58 The two categories that are omitted from the table are other race and maternal education missing. We did 
not include results for students from other racial groups, since their population is much smaller than the 
population of the three racial groups shown in the table. Moreover, based on our definition of “other race”, 
the compositions of this racial group are complicated, which may not be informative enough to reveal these 
students’ preferences. In addition, it is unclear that what information is contained in the maternal education 
missing group. Therefore, we also exclude this group from the heterogeneity test. 
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holding everything else constant, the marginal utilities of education and future earnings may be 
higher for African Americans. Therefore, they are more likely to make more efforts at school in 
order to get higher levels of education and higher future incomes. 
In addition, our findings are related to the “Acting white” literature which pointed out that 
African Americans put more effort into school (such as by answering questions actively in class 
and studying more hours) tend to be less popular among their own racial group, since these 
behaviors are considered “Acting white” (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Fryer and Torelli, 2010). 
Thus, to gain social status, some African Americans may decrease their effort to conform to the 
norms of their own racial groups. Our results partially conflict with the Acting white literature, 
since we find that conditional on the same social payoffs, African Americans value future success 
more than whites. However, due to the sample of African Americans being small, we cannot verify 
whether the payoffs on centrality are the same for African Americans and whites in this paper. As 
shown in Table 11, the coefficient on the interaction between predicted centrality and black 
dummy variable is negative but insignificant.  
In the end, when we split the sample by maternal education groups, we find that students with 
college-educated mothers enjoy higher returns from being popular. The social returns for the other 
two groups are roughly the same as the average social returns of the full sample. Furthermore, 
students with high school dropout mothers have higher payoffs from predicted incomes than 
students from the other two groups. Results in Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with these findings. 
5.3. Robustness Tests and Balancing Tests 
In this section, we test the robustness of our major findings. We also check the validity of our 
identification strategy by running balancing tests for the predicted centrality measure.  
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Previously, we set the power weight of the Katz-Bonacich centrality to 0.1. This is consistent 
with the choice for power weight in previous literature (Haynie, 2001). However, we need to check 
if results in the previous sections are driven by the choice of the power weight. According to Miura 
(2012), the absolute value of the power weight should be less than the largest eigenvalue of the 
adjacency matrix. Among the 345 friendship networks, the smallest largest eigenvalue is 0.12. 
Therefore, in the robustness test, we change the power weight to 0.05 and 0.12. 
Table 12 shows the Stage 3 model estimations by using different power weights.59 Although the 
magnitudes of the parameters in the three panels are different (because of different power weights 
scale the centrality measure differently), the basic results are similar to previous findings. 
Regardless of which power weight we use, the coefficients of centrality gain are always positive 
and significant and their magnitudes are much higher than the magnitudes of the coefficients of 
expected income.60 The only exception is the coefficient of predicted income in Panel 3.  
Next, in Table 13, we present results of the balancing tests. An important assumption we made 
in the second stage is that after we control for the school by type and school by grade fixed effects, 
the predicted centrality measure should not correlate with unobservable characteristics that 
influence teenagers’ outcomes. To test this assumption, following Altonji et al. (2005) and Bifulco 
et al. (2011, 2014), we use teenagers’ observed characteristics as a guide for their unobserved 
characteristics. Then we check whether predicted centrality is correlated with the variables that are 
not used to define teenagers’ types or are not included in our regressions.  
                                                          
59 The full set of the three-stage model results are in the Appendix, Table A2-A4 and Table A9-A11, 
respectively. 
60 We also calculate the changes in utilities due to a one standard deviation increase in the centrality gains 
for different power weights. These results are in Appendix, Table A6-A7 and Table A13-A14. 
The results of the heterogeneity tests for different power weights are in Table A5 and A12. In general, we 
find similar patterns in the differential returns on centrality gain and expected income. 
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The results show that the predicted centrality is correlated with four out of six variables that are 
included in the balancing test. The F-statistics indicate that these observed characteristics can 
together explain the predicted centrality. Therefore, we are concerned that the estimations from 
regressions using the predicted centrality measure might be biased. However, we also notice that 
the magnitudes of the parameters that are significant in the balancing tests are very small. It is 
probably that even if there is bias, the level of the bias is trivial.  
Hence, in Table 14, we add these balancing variables to all the Stage 2 models and see if the 
coefficients of the predicted centrality measure have significant changes. It turns out that most of 
the coefficients are robust, except for the one in the high school GPA regression. It is reduced by 
about 10%. We argue that since outcomes such as years of college and earnings are determined a 
long time after high school, they are less likely to be correlated with the household level variables 
that are used in the balancing tests. Therefore, the bias should be very limited. Nevertheless, we 
also recognize the simultaneity between high school GPA and centrality, as well as the potential 
bias associated with the estimations in the high school GPA regressions.61 
6. Conclusion 
Previous papers found that teenagers obtain both immediate payoffs and long-term economic 
gains from high school friendships. In this paper, we investigate whether the immediate payoffs or 
the long-term economic gains have more important influences on teenagers’ friendship choices. 
By using the Add Health data and a three-period dynamic model, we find that when teenagers 
choose friends at high school, they take into account both short-term and long-term payoffs from 
friends. However, the immediate payoffs, such as returns on popularity and high school GPAs, are 
much more important for determining their friendship choices.  
                                                          
61 Results of the balancing tests for different power weights are showed in Table A8 and A15. 
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Moreover, we also test whether the returns on popularity and future earnings are different for 
students from different racial groups and different maternal education groups. Our major finding 
shows that African American and Hispanic students have higher returns on both centrality and 
future earnings than whites. These findings may help policymakers design policies to improve 
teenagers’ outcomes from social network perspective. For example, changes in students’ 
compositions may alter some teenagers’ decisions on friendships and thus lead to different 
outcomes. 
There are several limitations in this paper. First, in the Stage 2 model, we assume that high 
school GPAs are determined by teenagers’ centrality. However, some unobserved factors may 
drive both higher levels of centrality and higher high school GPAs. This may lead to biased 
estimations. Indeed, in the balancing tests, the coefficient of the predicted centrality is reduced 
when we include additional control variables. In future research, we will explore other methods to 
reduce this kind of bias. Second, although the discussions about the differential returns on future 
earnings for African Americans and whites are related to the “Acting White” literature, our 
findings do not support nor overturn the analyses in the previous papers. On the one hand, our 
results show that African Americans have higher returns on future earnings than whites. One the 
other hand, we also find that African Americans value popularity more than whites. However, 
there is not enough evidence to show that when face the tradeoff between popularity and future 
earnings, how African Americans would choose. Third, in this paper, we only consider one long-
term outcomes, future incomes. Other outcomes that are related to high school friendships may 
worth future research to investigate, such as crime rates and health behaviors. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 1: Friendship Patterns 
Variable 
 
Wave I Sample Wave III Sample Wave IV Sample 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Centrality 1.682 0.500 1.679 0.479 1.683 0.484 
N 18,424 2,462 2,067 
White-White 0.526 0.499 - - - - 
White-Black 0.014 0.116 - - - - 
White-Hispanic 0.037 0.190 - - - - 
White-Other 0.062 0.242 - - - - 
Black-White 0.011 0.106 - - - - 
Black-Black 0.074 0.263 - - - - 
Black-Hispanic 0.011 0.105 - - - - 
Black-Other 0.010 0.098 - - - - 
Hispanic-White 0.034 0.181 - - - - 
Hispanic-Black 0.011 0.106 - - - - 
Hispanic-Hispanic 0.066 0.248 - - - - 
Hispanic-Other 0.014 0.117 - - - - 
Other-White 0.060 0.237 - - - - 
Other-Black 0.011 0.103 - - - - 
Other-Hispanic 0.013 0.115 - - - - 
Other-Other 0.046 0.109 - - - - 
Mom HS Dropout- 
Mom HS Dropout 
0.010 0.101 - - - - 
Mom HS Dropout-
Mom Some College 
0.030 0.170 - - - - 
Mom HS Dropout-
Mom College Degree 
0.012 0.110 - - - - 
Mom Some College-
Mom HS Dropout 
0.028 0.165 - - - - 
Mom Some College- 
Mom Some College 
0.225 0.417 - - - - 
Mom Some College-
Mom College Degree 
0.131 0.338 - - - - 
Mom College Degree-
Mom HS Dropout 
0.011 0.104 - - - - 
Mom College Degree-
Mom Some College 
0.125 0.331 - - - - 
Mom College Degree- 
Mom College Degree 
0.143 0.351 - - - - 
N 47,953 - - 
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Table 1 (Continue). Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 2: Education and Labor Market Outcomes 
Variable Wave I Sample Wave III Sample Wave IV Sample 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
High School GPA - - 2.618 0.744 2.647 0.738 
High School 
Graduate 
- - 0.945 0.228 0.950 0.219 
Years of College - - - - 2.893 2.068 
Log Income - - - - 10.504 0.934 
N - 2,462 2,067 
Panel 3: Individual Characteristics 
Variable Wave I Sample Wave III Sample Wave IV Sample 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
White 0.610 0.488 0.525 0.499 0.543 0.498 
Black 0.118 0.322 0.139 0.345 0.133 0.340 
Hispanic 0.140 0.347 0.164 0.370 0.159 0.365 
Other 0.132 0.339 0.173 0.378 0.165 0.372 
Mom High School 
Dropout 
0.076 0.265 0.081 0.273 0.083 0.276 
Mom Some College 0.459 0.498 0.439 0.496 0.443 0.497 
Mom College 0.298 0.457 0.317 0.465 0.321 0.467 
Number of People in 
Household 
4.135 1.236 4.253 1.230 4.239 1.234 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
0.643 1.125 0.726 0.868 0.723 0.858 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.754 0.431 0.763 0.425 0.773 0.419 
Mother Born in US 0.758 0.428 0.727 0.446 0.740 0.439 
Born in US 0.891 0.311 0.884 0.320 0.890 0.313 
Adopted 0.025 0.155 0.054 0.227 0.056 0.230 
N 18,424 2,462 2,067 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Tertile in Centrality 
Panel 1: Friendship Pattern (Wave I Individual Matches with Potential Friends) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mean 
Top  
Tertile 
Middle 
Tertile 
Bottom 
Tertile 
Centrality 1.682 2.225 1.579 1.242 
White-White 0.526 0.636 0.515 0.430 
White-Black 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.016 
White-Hispanic 0.037 0.035 0.036 0.041 
White-Other 0.062 0.063 0.060 0.064 
Black-White 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.013 
Black-Black 0.074 0.047 0.075 0.100 
Black-Hispanic 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.016 
Black-Other 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.013 
Hispanic-White 0.034 0.036 0.032 0.034 
Hispanic-Black 0.011 0.005 0.013 0.015 
Hispanic-Hispanic 0.066 0.028 0.063 0.104 
Hispanic-Other 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.017 
Other-White 0.060 0.059 0.065 0.055 
Other-Black 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.014 
Other-Hispanic 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.017 
Other-Other 0.046 0.037 0.052 0.048 
Mom HS Dropout- 
Mom HS Dropout 
0.010 0.005 0.010 0.016 
Mom HS Dropout-
Mom Some College 
0.030 0.021 0.032 0.036 
Mom HS Dropout-
Mom College Degree 
0.012 0.010 0.013 0.014 
Mom Some College-
Mom HS Dropout 
0.028 0.021 0.029 0.033 
Mom Some College- 
Mom Some College 
0.225 0.213 0.234 0.227 
Mom Some College-
Mom College Degree 
0.131 0.154 0.130 0.111 
Mom College Degree-
Mom HS Dropout 
0.011 0.009 0.011 0.012 
Mom College Degree-
Mom Some College 
0.125 0.149 0.121 0.106 
Mom College Degree- 
Mom College Degree 
0.143 0.189 0.138 0.105 
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Table 2 (Continue). Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 2: Wave III and Wave IV Variables 
Variable Full Sample 
Mean 
Top  
Tertile 
Middle 
Tertile 
Bottom 
Tertile 
High School GPA 2.617 2.795 2.616 2.431 
High School 
Graduate 
0.945 0.960 0.954 0.922 
Years of College 2.893 3.295 2.911 2.473 
Log Income 10.504 10.668 10.468 10.370 
Panel 3: Individual Characteristics 
Variable Full Sample 
Mean 
Top  
Tertile 
Middle 
Tertile 
Bottom 
Tertile 
White 0.610 0.711 0.596 0.523 
Black 0.118 0.082 0.123 0.148 
Hispanic 0.140 0.087 0.140 0.194 
Other 0.132 0.120 0.141 0.136 
Mom High School 
Dropout 
0.076 0.050 0.075 0.103 
Mom Some College 0.459 0.461 0.461 0.454 
Mom College 0.298 0.361 0.295 0.239 
Number of People in 
Household 
4.135 4.144 4.161 4.099 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
0.643 0.639 0.638 0.651 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.754 0.806 0.760 0.696 
Mother Born in US 0.758 0.819 0.754 0.701 
Born in US 0.891 0.930 0.890 0.854 
Adopted 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.028 
Notes: In column 1, we show the mean of each variable by using the full sample. In column 2,3, and 4, we divide 
the sample based on top tertile, middle tertile, and bottom tertile of the Katz-Bonacich centrality. The descriptive 
statistics in Panel 1 are from the sample used in Stage 1 model (Table 2).  Panel 2 samples are from Stage 2 
model (Table 3). Panel 3 shows the means of the individual level data.  
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Table 3. Number of Reciprocal Friends and Non-Reciprocal Friends 
  Number of Non-Reciprocal Friends (only 𝒋 nominated 𝒊 as a friend) 
Number of 
Reciprocal 
Friends 
Sample 
Size 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >=8 
0 18,974 11,662 
 
(61.46%) 
 
4,064 
 
(21.42%) 
1,764 
 
(9.30%) 
816 
 
(4.30%) 
352 
 
(1.86%) 
178 
 
(0.94%) 
81 
 
(0.43%) 
32 
 
(0.17%) 
25 
 
(0.13%) 
1 6,356 2,873 
 
(45.20%) 
 
1,864 
 
(29.33%) 
925 
 
(14.55%) 
414 
 
(6.51%) 
163 
 
(2.56%) 
63 
 
(0.99%) 
35 
 
(0.55%) 
12 
 
(0.19%) 
7 
 
(0.11%) 
2 3,524 1,278 
 
(36.27%) 
 
1,107 
 
(31.41%) 
590 
 
(16.74%) 
312 
 
(8.85%) 
137 
 
(3.89%) 
60 
 
(1.70%) 
27 
 
(0.77%) 
6 
 
(0.17%) 
7 
 
(0.20%) 
3 1,549 447 
 
(28.9%) 
 
462 
 
(29.8%) 
322 
 
(20.8%) 
162 
 
(10.5%) 
80 
 
(5.2%) 
42 
 
(2.7%) 
20 
 
(1.3%) 
10 
 
(0.6%) 
4 
 
(0.3%) 
4 529 132 
 
(24.95%) 
 
145 
 
(27.41%) 
102 
 
(19.28%) 
74 
 
(13.99%) 
42 
 
(7.94%) 
17 
 
(3.21%) 
7 
 
(1.32%) 
5 
 
(0.95%) 
5 
 
(0.95%) 
5 108 19 
 
(17.59%) 
 
33 
 
(30.56%) 
22 
 
(20.37%) 
19 
 
(17.59%) 
5 
 
(4.63%) 
4 
 
(3.70%) 
3 
 
(2.78%) 
2 
 
(1.85%) 
1 
 
(0.93%) 
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Table 4. Multinomial Logit Model, School Fixed Effects and Grade Fixed Effects (Decaying 
factor=0.1) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not  
 Coefficients 
Simulated Centrality Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 9.278*** 
(0.588) 
Black 0.845*** 
(0.090) 
Hispanic 0.471*** 
(0.056) 
Other 0.451*** 
(0.050) 
Mom High School Dropout 0.134** 
(0.058) 
Mom College Degree 0.087*** 
(0.026) 
Mom Education Missing 0.019 
(0.032) 
White-Black -1.288*** 
(0.082) 
White-Hispanic -0.361*** 
(0.055) 
White-Other Races -0.189*** 
(0.034) 
Black-White -2.201*** 
(0.115) 
Black-Hispanic -0.983*** 
(0.101) 
Black-Other Races -1.114*** 
(0.111) 
Hispanic-White -0.836*** 
(0.068) 
Hispanic-Black -0.683*** 
(0.093) 
Hispanic-Other Races -0.780*** 
(0.091) 
Other Races-White -0.643*** 
(0.058) 
Other Races-Black -0.717*** 
(0.122) 
Other Races-Hispanic -0.839*** 
(0.105) 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
Some College 
-0.192*** 
(0.065) 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.520*** 
(0.080) 
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Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.120 
(0.078) 
Mom Some College-Mom High 
School Dropout 
-0.182*** 
(0.037) 
Mom Some College-Mom College 
Degree 
-0.088*** 
(0.024) 
Mom Some College-Mom Education 
Missing 
-0.130*** 
(0.025) 
Mom College Degree-Mom High 
School Dropout 
-0.582*** 
(0.066) 
Mom College Degree-Mom Some 
College 
-0.185*** 
(0.033) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.357*** 
(0.043) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom High 
School Dropout 
-0.050 
(0.046) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom Some 
College 
-0.065* 
(0.037) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.183*** 
(0.048) 
N 6,914,746 
Note: Omitted categories are white, mom some college, white-white link, black-black link, Hispanic-Hispanic 
link, other-other link, mom high school dropout-mom high school dropout link, mom some college-mom some 
college link, mom college degree-mom college degree link, and mom education missing-mom education missing 
link. This regression controls for school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
school and grade level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 5. High School and Young Adulthood Outcomes, Using Predicted Katz-Bonacich 
Centrality (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 1: High School Results (Wave III) 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 0.968*** 
(0.269) 
0.085 
(0.101) 
R-squared 0.397 0.269 
N 1,846 2,218 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results (Wave IV) 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 2.091*** 
(0.788) 
0.738 
(0.610) 
0.511** 
(0.225) 
0.285 
(0.230) 
Age -0.405*** 
(0.088) 
-0.160** 
(0.078) 
-0.015 
(0.061) 
0.021 
(0.060) 
High School GPA - 1.344*** 
(0.082) 
- 0.047 
(0.063) 
High School Graduate - 0.344 
(0.227) 
- -0.100 
(0.200) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.082 
(0.050) 
0.075 
(0.052) 
Years of College - - - 0.062** 
(0.025) 
R-squared 0.438 0.559 0.387 0.409 
N 1,821 1,821 1,132 1,132 
Note: All regressions control for school by type fixed effects and school by grade fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school by type level. The high school GPA regression only includes individuals whose high school 
GPAs are available in Wave III survey. The income regressions only include individuals who worked at least 10 hours 
a week. We also include an indicator of those whose high school GPAs are missing in Panel 2 Column 3 and 4 (their 
high school GPAs are assigned 0). Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 6. High School and Young Adulthood Results, IV Regressions (Using Predicted 
Centrality to Instrument Centrality) (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 1: High School Results (Wave III) 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable High School GPA High School Graduation 
Centrality 0.209*** 
(0.052) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
N 2,097 2,462 
First Stage 4.632*** 
(0.598) 
4.809*** 
(0.579) 
F-test 60.03 68.98 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results (Wave IV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Centrality 0.448*** 
(0.144) 
0.161 
(0.121) 
0.117*** 
(0.042) 
0.067 
(0.047) 
Age -0.405*** 
(0.081) 
-0.162** 
(0.072) 
-0.014 
(0.055) 
0.019 
(0.055) 
High School GPA - 1.333*** 
(0.078) 
- 0.044 
(0.056) 
High School Graduate - 0.329 
(0.211) 
- -0.107 
(0.181) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.081* 
(0.045) 
0.074 
(0.046) 
Years of College - - - 0.061** 
(0.023) 
N 2,066 2,066 1,409 1,409 
First Stage 4.664*** 
(0.636) 
4.577*** 
(0.632) 
4.380*** 
(0.767) 
4.275*** 
(0.764) 
F-test 53.85 52.48 32.56 31.29 
Note: All regressions control for school by type fixed effects and school by grade fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school by type level. The high school GPA regression only includes individuals whose high school 
GPAs are available in Wave III survey. The income regressions only include individuals who worked at least 10 hours 
a week. We also include an indicator of those whose high school GPAs are missing in Panel 2 Column 3 and 4 (their 
high school GPAs are assigned 0). Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 7. Multinomial Logit Model Using Predicted Income and Simulated Centrality Gain, School by Type and Grade Fixed 
Effects (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
for link 𝒊𝒋 
9.978*** 
(0.353) 
9.978*** 
(0.353) 
9.973*** 
(0.353) 
9.923*** 
(0.350) 
9.924*** 
(0.350) 
9.923*** 
(0.350) 
Predicted Income 0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.069* 
(0.038) 
-0.114 
(0.195) 
0.046*** 
(0.018) 
0.070** 
(0.035) 
0.056 
(0.169) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
- -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0006 
(0.0007) 
- - -0.000 
(0.001) 
Predicted Years of College    0.079*** 
(0.020) 
0.079*** 
(0.020) 
0.079*** 
(0.020) 
White-Black -1.437*** 
(0.103) 
-1.437*** 
(0.103) 
-1.437*** 
(0.103) 
-1.435*** 
(0.104) 
-1.435*** 
(0.104) 
-1.435*** 
(0.104) 
White-Hispanic -0.414*** 
(0.072) 
-0.414*** 
(0.072) 
-0.414*** 
(0.072) 
-0.412*** 
(0.072) 
-0.412*** 
(0.072) 
-0.412*** 
(0.072) 
White-Other Races -0.206*** 
(0.034) 
-0.206*** 
(0.034) 
-0.206*** 
(0.034) 
-0.204*** 
(0.034) 
-0.204*** 
(0.034) 
-0.204*** 
(0.034) 
Black-White -2.995*** 
(0.136) 
-2.995*** 
(0.136) 
-2.995*** 
(0.136) 
-2.999*** 
(0.136) 
-2.999*** 
(0.136) 
-2.999*** 
(0.136) 
Black-Hispanic -1.114*** 
(0.136) 
-1.114*** 
(0.136) 
-1.114*** 
(0.136) 
-1.113*** 
(0.136) 
-1.113*** 
(0.136) 
-1.113*** 
(0.136) 
Black-Other Races -1.300*** 
(0.124) 
-1.300*** 
(0.124) 
-1.300*** 
(0.124) 
-1.303*** 
(0.124) 
-1.303*** 
(0.124) 
-1.303*** 
(0.124) 
Hispanic-White -1.060*** 
(0.131) 
-1.060*** 
(0.131) 
-1.060*** 
(0.131) 
-1.061*** 
(0.131) 
-1.061*** 
(0.131) 
-1.061*** 
(0.131) 
Hispanic-Black -1.044*** 
(0.138) 
-1.044*** 
(0.138) 
-1.044*** 
(0.138) 
-1.046*** 
(0.138) 
-1.046*** 
(0.138) 
-1.046*** 
(0.138) 
Hispanic-Other Races -0.972*** 
(0.131) 
-0.972*** 
(0.131) 
-0.972*** 
(0.131) 
-0.974*** 
(0.131) 
-0.974*** 
(0.131) 
-0.974*** 
(0.131) 
Other Races-White -0.665*** 
(0.082) 
-0.665*** 
(0.082) 
-0.665*** 
(0.082) 
-0.668*** 
(0.082) 
-0.668*** 
(0.082) 
-0.668*** 
(0.082) 
Other Races-Black -1.062*** 
(0.192) 
-1.062*** 
(0.192) 
-1.062*** 
(0.192) 
-1.062*** 
(0.193) 
-1.062*** 
(0.193) 
-1.062*** 
(0.193) 
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Other Races-Hispanic -0.934*** 
(0.150) 
-0.933*** 
(0.150) 
-0.933*** 
(0.150) 
-0.933*** 
(0.150) 
-0.934*** 
(0.150) 
-0.934*** 
(0.150) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom Some College 
-0.185** 
(0.085) 
-0.184** 
(0.085) 
-0.184** 
(0.085) 
-0.184** 
(0.085) 
-0.183** 
(0.085) 
-0.183** 
(0.085) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom College Degree 
-0.468*** 
(0.134) 
-0.468*** 
(0.134) 
-0.467*** 
(0.134) 
-0.465*** 
(0.134) 
-0.465*** 
(0.134) 
-0.465*** 
(0.134) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom Education Missing 
-0.006 
(0.083) 
-0.006 
(0.083) 
-0.005 
(0.083) 
-0.007 
(0.083) 
-0.006 
(0.083) 
-0.006 
(0.083) 
Mom Some College-Mom 
High School Dropout 
-0.183*** 
(0.039) 
-0.183*** 
(0.039) 
-0.183*** 
(0.039) 
-0.184*** 
(0.039) 
-0.184*** 
(0.039) 
-0.184*** 
(0.039) 
Mom Some College-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.087*** 
(0.025) 
-0.087*** 
(0.025) 
-0.087*** 
(0.025) 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
Mom Some College-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
High School Dropout 
-0.670*** 
(0.111) 
-0.670*** 
(0.111) 
-0.670*** 
(0.111) 
-0.669*** 
(0.111) 
-0.669*** 
(0.111) 
-0.669*** 
(0.111) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Some College 
-0.227*** 
(0.040) 
-0.227*** 
(0.040) 
-0.227*** 
(0.040) 
-0.227*** 
(0.040) 
-0.227*** 
(0.040) 
-0.227*** 
(0.040) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.437*** 
(0.062) 
-0.437*** 
(0.062) 
-0.437*** 
(0.062) 
-0.435*** 
(0.062) 
-0.435*** 
(0.062) 
-0.435*** 
(0.062) 
Mom Education Missing-
Mom High School Dropout 
-0.038 
(0.056) 
-0.038 
(0.056) 
-0.037 
(0.056) 
-0.038 
(0.056) 
-0.038 
(0.056) 
-0.038 
(0.056) 
Mom Education Missing-
Mom Some College 
-0.121** 
(0.057) 
-0.121** 
(0.057) 
-0.121** 
(0.057) 
-0.122** 
(0.057) 
-0.122** 
(0.057) 
-0.122** 
(0.057) 
Mom Education Missing-
Mom College Degree 
-0.263*** 
(0.082) 
-0.263*** 
(0.082) 
-0.262*** 
(0.082) 
-0.263*** 
(0.082) 
-0.263*** 
(0.082) 
-0.263*** 
(0.082) 
Constant -3.663*** 
(0.203) 
-3.690*** 
(0.224) 
-3.151*** 
(0.515) 
-3.535*** 
(0.191) 
-3.650*** 
(0.211) 
-3.610*** 
(0.438) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 
N 5,973,087 5,973,087 5,973,087 5,973,087 5,973,087 5,973,087 
Note: Omitted categories are white-white link, black-black link, Hispanic-Hispanic link, other-other link, mom high school dropout-mom high school dropout link, 
mom some college-mom some college link, mom college degree-mom college degree link, and mom education missing-mom education missing link. All 
regressions control for school by type and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at school by type level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 126 
 
Table 8. Heterogeneity Tests (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 1. Blacks Only 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not friends 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
14.194*** 
(0.586) 
14.195*** 
(0.575) 
14.204*** 
(0.560) 
Predicted Income 0.100*** 
(0.018) 
-0.293 
(0.316) 
0.335 
(0.499) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - 0.024 
(0.020) 
-0.070 
(0.094) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - 0.004 
(0.005) 
N 487,371 487,371 487,371 
Panel 2: Whites Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
9.468*** 
(0.359) 
9.461*** 
(0.359) 
9.461*** 
(0.359) 
Predicted Income 0.056 
(0.045) 
-0.279 
(0.243) 
0.263 
(0.711) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - 0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.048 
(0.094) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - 0.003 
(0.004) 
N 4,020,473 4,020,473 4,020,473 
Panel 3: Hispanics Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
12.818*** 
(0.961) 
12.822*** 
(0.961) 
12.815*** 
(0.960) 
Predicted Income 0.071*** 
(0.018) 
0.124** 
(0.049) 
-0.282 
(0.280) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.003 
(0.002) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.002 
(0.001) 
N 832,673 832,673 832,673 
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Table 8 (Continue). Heterogeneity Tests (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 4: Mother High School Dropouts Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
9.738*** 
(0.086) 
9.726*** 
(0.860) 
9.771*** 
(0.869) 
Predicted Income 0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.433 
(0.265) 
-1.513*** 
(0.383) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.015 
(0.010) 
0.162*** 
(0.042) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
N 331,147 331,147 331,147 
Panel 5: Mother High School Graduates and Some College Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
9.628*** 
(0.493) 
9.627*** 
(0.493) 
9.626*** 
(0.494) 
Predicted Income 0.054 
(0.035) 
0.045 
(0.124) 
-0.091 
(0.555) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - 0.0004 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.054) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0004 
(0.002) 
N 2,697,338 2,697,338 2,697,338 
Panel 6: Mother College Graduates Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
10.574*** 
(0.707) 
10.576*** 
(0.705) 
10.572*** 
(0.703) 
Predicted Income 0.053 
(0.037) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
-0.053 
(0.306) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0005 
(0.0009) 
N 2,082,932 2,082,932 2,082,932 
Note: The models used in this table are the same as the models in Table 7. All regressions include school by type and 
grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at school by type level. Parameters of all the link match variables are 
not shown in the table. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 9. Change in Utility with One Standard Deviation Increase in Centrality Gain 
(Decaying Factor=0.1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Direct 
Effect  
Indirect 
Effect 
One S.D. 
Increase in 
Income 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (2) 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (3) 
Full Sample 0.4963 0.0016 0.0207 0.32% 4.17% 
Blacks Only 0.6573 0.0024 0.0318 0.37% 7.45% 
Whites Only 0.5000 0.0015 0.0184 0.30% 4.02% 
Hispanics 
Only 
0.5961 0.0017 0.0249 0.29% 3.76% 
Mom HS 
Dropouts 
Only 
0.4908 0.0018 0.0214 0.37% 7.77% 
Mom Some 
College Only 
0.4637 0.0013 0.0173 0.28% 3.69% 
Mom College 
Only 
0.5354 0.0014 0.0181 0.26% 3.72% 
 Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
One S.D. 
Increase in 
Years of 
College 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (2) 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (3) 
Full Sample 0.4935 0.0082 0.0323 1.66% 6.55% 
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Table 10. Change in Utility with One Standard Deviation Increase in High School GPA 
(Decaying Factor=0.1)   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 One S.D. Increase in 
Centrality Gain  
One S.D. Increase in 
High School GPA 
Ratio between (1) 
and (2) 
Full Sample 0.4963 0.0030 0.60% 
Blacks Only 0.6573 0.0042 0.64% 
Whites Only 0.4996 0.0028 0.56% 
Hispanics 
Only 
0.5963 0.0036 0.60% 
Mom HS 
Dropouts 
Only 
0.4902 0.0033 0.67% 
Mom Some 
College Only 
0.4637 0.0026 0.56% 
Mom College 
Only 
0.5355 0.0026 0.49% 
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Table 11. Stage 2 Heterogeneity Test (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 1: High School Results (Wave III) 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 0.988*** 
(0.271) 
0.063 
(0.109) 
Predicted Centrality 
× Black 
-0.247 
(1.277) 
0.292 
(0.232) 
Predicted Centrality 
× Hispanic 
-0.306 
(1.078) 
0.210 
(0.177) 
R-squared 0.397 0.269 
N 1,846 2,218 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results (Wave IV) 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 2.176*** 
(0.806) 
0.860 
(0.621) 
0.483* 
(0.217) 
0.250 
(0.228) 
Predicted Centrality 
× Black 
-1.820 
(4.617) 
-3.522 
(3.801) 
0.547 
(2.183) 
0.926 
(1.877) 
Predicted Centrality 
× Hispanic 
-1.712 
(2.339) 
-1.018 
(1.257) 
2.389 
(3.447) 
1.694 
(3.450) 
High School GPA - 1.345*** 
(0.082) 
- 0.045 
(0.063) 
High School 
Graduate 
- 0.356 
(0.226) 
- -0.104 
(0.200) 
Years of College - - - 0.062** 
(0.026) 
R-squared 0.438 0.559 0.387 0.409 
N 1,821 1,821 1,132 1,132 
Note: The models used in this table are the same as the models in Table 5. All regressions include school by type 
and school by grade fixed effects. In Panel 2, we also control for age in Columns 1-4 and control for lo hours 
worked in Columns 3-4. Standard errors are clustered at school by type level. Parameters of all the link match 
variables are not shown in the table. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 12. Robustness Tests (Different Decaying Factors) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not friends 
Panel 1: Decaying Factor=0.05 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
for link 𝒊𝒋 
95.315*** 
(2.282) 
95.315*** 
(2.282) 
95.302*** 
(2.280) 
Predicted Income 0.068*** 
(0.034) 
0.083** 
(0.042) 
-0.039 
(0.152) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.0008 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0005 
(0.0006) 
Panel 2: Decaying Factor=0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
for link 𝒊𝒋 
9.978*** 
(0.353) 
9.978*** 
(0.353) 
9.973*** 
(0.353) 
Predicted Income 0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.069* 
(0.038) 
-0.114 
(0.195) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0006 
(0.0007) 
 
Panel 3: Decaying Factor=0.12 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
for link 𝒊𝒋 
3.088*** 
(0.353) 
3.894*** 
(0.337) 
3.811*** 
(0.294) 
Predicted Income -0.015 
(0.071) 
1.816*** 
(0.315) 
0.835 
(1.222) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.117*** 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.160) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.005 
(0.007) 
Note: Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 13. Balancing Tests for Predicted Centrality  
Dependent Variable: Predicted Centrality 
 Decaying factor=0.1 Decaying factor=0.05 Decaying factor=0.12 
Number of 
People in 
Household 
-0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.00003 
(0.0001) 
Number of 
School Kids in 
Household 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
Mother Born in 
US 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
Born in US 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
Adopted -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.0006) 
N 18,327 18,281 18,320 
R-squared 0.618 0.538 0.877 
F-test 5.45 9.83 9.19 
Fpvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All the regressions include school by type and school by grade fixed effects. Significance is defined as 
follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 14. Additional Balancing Tests (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 1: High School Results 
 (1) (2) 
a. Without Balancing Variables 
 High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 0.968*** 
(0.269) 
0.085 
(0.101) 
b. With Balancing Variables 
 High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 0.866*** 
(0.258) 
0.070 
(0.102) 
Number of People in 
Household 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.204*** 
(0.049) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
Mother Born in US -0.123* 
(0.068) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
Born in US -0.021 
(0.067) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
Adopted -0.242** 
(0.114) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
R-squared 0.415 0.274 
F-test 3.28 0.55 
P-value 0.000 0.878 
N 1,846 2,218 
Note: Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 14 (Continue). Additional Balancing Tests (Decaying factor=0.1) 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a. Without Balancing Variables 
 Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 2.091*** 
(0.788) 
0.738 
(0.610) 
0.511** 
(0.225) 
0.285 
(0.230) 
b. With Balancing Variables 
 Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 2.022*** 
(0.772) 
0.762 
(0.619) 
0.518** 
(0.218) 
0.308 
(0.232) 
Age -0.394*** 
(0.089) 
-0.158** 
(0.079) 
-0.010 
(0.061) 
0.025 
(0.061) 
High School GPA - 1.317*** 
(0.082) 
- 0.048 
(0.063) 
High School 
Graduate 
- 0.339 
(0.234) 
- -0.096 
(0.191) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.077 
(0.047) 
0.069 
(0.048) 
Years of College - - - 0.062** 
(0.026) 
Number of People in 
Household 
-0.041 
(0.052) 
-0.021 
(0.047) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.021 
(0.028) 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
0.051 
(0.066) 
0.066 
(0.059) 
-0.008 
(0.049) 
-0.016 
(0.049) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.537*** 
(0.136) 
0.264* 
(0.138) 
0.024 
(0.088) 
-0.040 
(0.086) 
Mother Born in US -0.197 
(0.226) 
-0.129 
(0.222) 
0.055 
(0.175) 
0.060 
(0.177) 
Born in US -0.076 
(0.224) 
0.000 
(0.216) 
-0.041 
(0.094) 
-0.037 
(0.096) 
Adopted -0.154 
(0.240) 
0.051 
(0.215) 
0.090 
(0.143) 
0.100 
(0.139) 
R-squared 0.449 0.562 0.391 0.413 
F-test 2.94 1.08 0.80 0.62 
P-value 0.001 0.379 0.649 0.824 
N 1,821 1,821 1,132 1,132 
Note: all the regressions include school by type and school by grade fixed effects. Significance is defined as follows: 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 1: Decaying factor=0.1 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max N 
Data Income 
 
10.504 0.934 0 13.181 1,409 
Predicted Income 
 
9.883 0.868 1.172 18.027 5,973,087 
Centrality 
(Wave III Sample) 
1.679 0.479 1.111 4.367 2,462 
Centrality 
(Wave IV Sample) 
1.683 0.483 1.111 4.367 2,067 
Predicted Centrality 
(Wave III Sample) 
1.149 0.104 1.016 2.206 2,462 
Predicted Centrality 
(Wave IV Sample) 
1.150 0.108 1.020 2.206 2,067 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
(Stage 1 Sample) 
0.175 0.063 0.111 1.089 6,914,746 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
(Stage 3 Sample) 
0.175 0.062 0.111 0.775 5,973,087 
Panel 2: Decaying factor=0.05 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max N 
Predicted Income 8.868 0.855 0.178 16.977 5,780,023 
Centrality 
(Wave III Sample) 
1.229 0.127 1.053 1.826 2,456 
Centrality 
(Wave IV Sample) 
1.230 0.128 1.053 1.826 2,062 
Predicted Centrality 
(Wave III Sample) 
1.073 0.039 1.010 1.299 2,456 
Predicted Centrality 
(Wave IV Sample) 
1.073 0.039 1.013 1.299 2,062 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
(Stage 1 Sample) 
0.062 0.008 0.053 0.125 6,914,746 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
(Stage 3 Sample) 
0.063 0.008 0.053 0.125 5,780,023 
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Table A1 (Continue). Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 3: Decaying factor=0.12 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max N 
Predicted Income 6.941 0.939 0 17.996 5,754,965 
Centrality 
(Wave III Sample) 
2.046 1.070 1.136 32.610 2,463 
Centrality 
(Wave IV Sample) 
1.234 0.135 1.053 2.165 2,068 
Predicted Centrality 
(Wave III Sample) 
1.148 0.049 0 1.395 2,463 
Predicted Centrality 
(Wave IV Sample) 
1.148 0.051 0 1.395 2,068 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
(Stage 1 Sample) 
0.264 0.180 0.136 11.047 6,914,746 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
(Stage 3 Sample) 
0.265 0.146 0.136 2.317 5,754,965 
Note: predicted income is calculated based on estimation in Table 2 Panel 2 Column 3. 
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Table A2. Multinomial Logit Model, School Fixed Effects and Grade Fixed Effects 
(Decaying factor=0.05) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not  
 Coefficients 
Simulated Centrality Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 95.939*** 
(3.162) 
Black 0.896*** 
(0.095) 
Hispanic 0.509*** 
(0.060) 
Other 0.449*** 
(0.052) 
Mom High School Dropout 0.179** 
(0.058) 
Mom College Degree 0.083*** 
(0.026) 
Mom Education Missing 0.082** 
(0.031) 
White-Black -1.240*** 
(0.084) 
White-Hispanic -0.329*** 
(0.053) 
White-Other Races -0.169*** 
(0.036) 
Black-White -2.258*** 
(0.119) 
Black-Hispanic -0.977*** 
(0.105) 
Black-Other Races -1.147*** 
(0.114) 
Hispanic-White -0.876*** 
(0.070) 
Hispanic-Black -0.645*** 
(0.094) 
Hispanic-Other Races -0.810*** 
(0.094) 
Other Races-White -0.638*** 
(0.060) 
Other Races-Black -0.653*** 
(0.121) 
Other Races-Hispanic -0.790*** 
(0.104) 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom Some 
College 
-0.231*** 
(0.066) 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.587*** 
(0.082) 
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Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.107 
(0.076) 
Mom Some College-Mom High School 
Dropout 
-0.139*** 
(0.038) 
Mom Some College-Mom College 
Degree 
-0.095*** 
(0.025) 
Mom Some College-Mom Education 
Missing 
-0.069*** 
(0.025) 
Mom College Degree-Mom High School 
Dropout 
-0.528*** 
(0.067) 
Mom College Degree-Mom Some 
College 
-0.178*** 
(0.033) 
Mom College Degree-Mom Education 
Missing 
-0.295*** 
(0.041) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom High 
School Dropout 
-0.073 
(0.048) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom Some 
College 
-0.124*** 
(0.036) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom College 
Degree 
-0.257*** 
(0.049) 
N 6,914,746 
Note: Omitted categories are white, mom some college, white-white link, black-black link, Hispanic-Hispanic link, 
other-other link, mom high school dropout-mom high school dropout link, mom some college-mom some college link, 
mom college degree-mom college degree link, and mom education missing-mom education missing link. This 
regression controls for school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at school and grade 
level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
  
 139 
 
Table A3. High School and Young Adulthood Results, Using Predicted Katz-Bonacich 
Centrality (Decaying factor=0.05) 
Panel 1: High School Results 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 3.634*** 
(0.705) 
0.440** 
(0.196) 
R-squred 0.407 0.269 
N 1,841 2,212 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 6.813*** 
(1.946) 
1.847 
(1.503) 
1.609* 
(0.923) 
1.031 
(0.896) 
Age -0.420*** 
(0.090) 
-0.175** 
(0.081) 
-0.017 
(0.061) 
0.020 
(0.061) 
High School GPA - 1.338*** 
(0.084) 
- 0.039 
(0.061) 
High School Graduate - 0.388* 
(0.226) 
- -0.095 
(0.199) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.075 
(0.052) 
0.068 
(0.053) 
Years of College - - - 0.066*** 
(0.025) 
R-squred 0.436 0.555 0.387 0.411 
N 1,818 1,818 1,128 1,128 
Note: All regressions control for school by type fixed effects and school by grade fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school by type level. The income regressions only include individuals who worked at least 10 hours a 
week. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A4. Multinomial Logit Model Using Predicted Income and Simulated Centrality 
Gain, School by Type and Grade Fixed (Decaying factor=0.05) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality Gain for 
link 𝒊𝒋 
95.315*** 
(2.282) 
95.315*** 
(2.282) 
95.302*** 
(2.280) 
Predicted Income 0.068*** 
(0.034) 
0.083** 
(0.042) 
-0.039 
(0.152) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.0008 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0005 
(0.0006) 
White-Black -1.415*** 
(0.112) 
-1.415*** 
(0.112) 
-1.415*** 
(0.112) 
White-Hispanic -0.398*** 
(0.072) 
-0.398*** 
(0.072) 
-0.398*** 
(0.072) 
White-Other Races -0.188*** 
(0.036) 
-0.188*** 
(0.036) 
-0.188*** 
(0.036) 
Black-White -2.976*** 
(0.144) 
-2.976*** 
(0.144) 
-2.976*** 
(0.144) 
Black-Hispanic -1.100*** 
(0.153) 
-1.100*** 
(0.153) 
-1.100*** 
(0.153) 
Black-Other Races -1.249*** 
(0.130) 
-1.249*** 
(0.130) 
-1.249*** 
(0.130) 
Hispanic-White -1.114*** 
(0.139) 
-1.114*** 
(0.139) 
-1.114*** 
(0.139) 
Hispanic-Black -1.048*** 
(0.155) 
-1.048*** 
(0.155) 
-1.048*** 
(0.155) 
Hispanic-Other Races -1.028*** 
(0.140) 
-1.028*** 
(0.140) 
-1.027*** 
(0.140) 
Other Races-White -0.656*** 
(0.082) 
-0.656*** 
(0.082) 
-0.656*** 
(0.083) 
Other Races-Black -1.009*** 
(0.207) 
-1.008*** 
(0.207) 
-1.009*** 
(0.207) 
Other Races-Hispanic -0.878*** 
(0.156) 
-0.878*** 
(0.156) 
-0.878*** 
(0.157) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom Some College 
-0.160* 
(0.087) 
-0.160* 
(0.087) 
-0.159* 
(0.087) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom College Degree 
-0.561*** 
(0.160) 
-0.561*** 
(0.160) 
-0.560*** 
(0.160) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom Education Missing 
0.022 
(0.086) 
0.023 
(0.086) 
0.023 
(0.086) 
Mom Some College-Mom High 
School Dropout 
-0.142*** 
(0.038) 
-0.142*** 
(0.038) 
-0.142*** 
(0.038) 
Mom Some College-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
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Mom Some College-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
High School Dropout 
-0.634*** 
(0.114) 
-0.634*** 
(0.114) 
-0.634*** 
(0.114) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Some College 
-0.216*** 
(0.039) 
-0.216*** 
(0.039) 
-0.216*** 
(0.039) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.360*** 
(0.061) 
-0.360*** 
(0.061) 
-0.360*** 
(0.061) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom 
High School Dropout 
-0.097* 
(0.058) 
-0.097* 
(0.058) 
-0.097* 
(0.058) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom 
Some College 
-0.170*** 
(0.059) 
-0.170*** 
(0.059) 
-0.169** 
(0.059) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.357*** 
(0.084) 
-0.357*** 
(0.084) 
-0.357*** 
(0.084) 
Constant -7.956*** 
(0.241) 
-8.025*** 
(0.292) 
-7.697*** 
(0.375) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.109 
N 5,780,023 5,780,023 5,780,023 
Note: Omitted categories are white, mom some college, white-white link, black-black link, Hispanic-Hispanic 
link, other-other link, mom high school dropout-mom high school dropout link, mom some college-mom some 
college link, mom college degree-mom college degree link, and mom education missing-mom education missing 
link. All regressions control for school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
school and grade level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A5. Heterogeneous Tests (Decaying factor=0.05) 
Panel 1. Blacks Only 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
115.326*** 
(3.316) 
115.403*** 
(3.209) 
115.407*** 
(3.194) 
Predicted Income 0.132*** 
(0.031) 
-0.237 
(0.462) 
-0.135 
(0.154) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - 0.025 
(0.032) 
0.007 
(0.052) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - 0.001 
(0.004) 
N 436,305 436,305 436,305 
Panel 2: Whites Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
91.533*** 
(2.392) 
91.519*** 
(2.396) 
91.518*** 
(2.396) 
Predicted Income 0.054 
(0.042) 
-0.494 
(0.336) 
-0.804 
(0.795) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - 0.031 
(0.019) 
0.068 
(0.100) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.001 
(0.004) 
N 3,957,581 3,957,581 3,957,581 
Panel 3: Hispanics Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
116.534*** 
(5.561) 
116.56*** 
(5.548) 
116.55*** 
(5.548) 
Predicted Income 0.075*** 
(0.018) 
0.120*** 
(0.044) 
-0.174 
(0.223) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.003 
(0.003) 
0.036 
(0.029) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.001 
(0.001) 
N 797,469 797,469 797,469 
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Table A5 (Continue). Heterogeneous Tests (Decaying factor=0.05) 
Panel 4: Mother High School Dropouts Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
94.735*** 
(6.195) 
94.847*** 
(6.186) 
95.097*** 
(6.248) 
Predicted Income 0.072*** 
(0.026) 
0.735*** 
(0.238) 
-1.292 
(1.335) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.159 
(0.123) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.006 
(0.004) 
N 292,493 292,493 292,493 
Panel 5: Mother High School Graduates and Some College Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
92.766*** 
(3.028) 
92.767*** 
(3.028) 
92.764*** 
(3.026) 
Predicted Income 0.057* 
(0.031) 
0.029 
(0.124) 
-0.033 
(0.404) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - 0.002 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.043) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0002 
(0.0014) 
N 2,653,373 2,653,373 2,653,373 
Panel 6: Mother College Graduates Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
100.245*** 
(4.857) 
100.253*** 
(4.852) 
100.241*** 
(4.845) 
Predicted Income 0.063* 
(0.037) 
0.129 
(0.080) 
-0.002 
(0.254) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.004 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.0005 
(0.0010) 
N 2,051,676 2,051,676 2,051,676 
Note: The models used in this table are the same as the models in Table 5. All regressions include school by type 
and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at school by type level. Parameters of all the link match 
variables are not shown in the table. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A6. Change in Utility with One Standard Deviation Increase in Centrality Gain 
(Decaying Factor=0.05) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Direct 
Effect  
Indirect 
Effect 
One S.D. 
Increase in 
Income 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (2) 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (3) 
Full Sample 0.6771 0.0008 0.0217 0.12% 3.20% 
Blacks Only 0.7804 0.0014 0.0392 0.18% 5.02% 
Whites Only 0.6768 0.0006 0.0169 0.09% 2.50% 
Hispanics 
Only 
0.7894 0.0008 0.0272 0.10% 3.45% 
Mom HS 
Dropouts 
Only 
0.6678 0.0008 0.0202 0.12% 3.02% 
Mom Some 
College Only 
0.6482 0.0006 0.0184 0.09% 2.84% 
Mom College 
Only 
0.7149 0.0007 0.0211 0.10% 2.95% 
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Table A7. Change in Utility with One Standard Deviation Increase in High School GPA 
(Decaying Factor=0.05)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 One S.D. Increase in 
Centrality Gain  
One S.D. Increase in 
High School GPA 
Ratio between (1) 
and (2) 
Full Sample 0.6771 0.0034 0.50% 
Blacks Only 0.7804 0.0060 0.77% 
Whites Only 0.6768 0.0029 0.43% 
Hispanics 
Only 
0.7894 0.0040 0.51% 
Mom HS 
Dropouts 
Only 
0.6678 0.0037 0.55% 
Mom Some 
College Only 
0.6482 0.0029 0.45% 
Mom College 
Only 
0.7149 0.0033 0.46% 
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Table A8. Additional Balancing Tests (Decaying factor=0.05) 
Panel 1: High School Results 
 (1) (2) 
a. Without Balancing Variables 
 High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 3.634*** 
(0.705) 
0.440** 
(0.196) 
b. With Balancing Variables 
 High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 3.379*** 
(0.711) 
0.404** 
(0.197) 
Number of People in 
Household 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
-0.018 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.182*** 
(0.049) 
0.023 
(0.021) 
Mother Born in US -0.116* 
(0.067) 
0.013 
(0.027) 
Born in US -0.020 
(0.067) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
Adopted -0.249** 
(0.109) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
R-squared 0.425 0.274 
F-test 3.06 0.55 
P-value 0.000 0.881 
N 1,841 2,212 
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Table A8 (Continue). Additional Balancing Tests (Decaying factor=0.05) 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a. Without Balancing Variables 
 Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 6.813*** 
(1.946) 
1.847 
(1.503) 
1.609* 
(0.923) 
1.031 
(0.896) 
 
b. With Balancing Variables 
 Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 6.365*** 
(1.967) 
1.734 
(1.520) 
1.526 
(0.945) 
1.053 
(0.914) 
Age -0.410*** 
(0.091) 
-0.173** 
(0.082) 
-0.013 
(0.062) 
0.025 
(0.062) 
High School GPA - 1.314*** 
(0.084) 
- 0.041 
(0.062) 
High School 
Graduate 
- 0.386 
(0.234) 
- -0.094 
(0.189) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.070 
(0.049) 
0.062 
(0.050) 
Years of College - - - 0.066** 
(0.025) 
Number of People in 
Household 
-0.032 
(0.052) 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
-0.030 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.029) 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
0.040 
(0.068) 
0.060 
(0.060) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
-0.019 
(0.049) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.520*** 
(0.137) 
0.271* 
(0.137) 
0.016 
(0.090) 
-0.049 
(0.087) 
Mother Born in US -0.195 
(0.224) 
-0.125 
(0.221) 
0.053 
(0.175) 
0.059 
(0.177) 
Born in US -0.073 
(0.224) 
0.004 
(0.218) 
-0.035 
(0.096) 
-0.030 
(0.098) 
Adopted -0.062 
(0.251) 
0.159 
(0.234) 
0.115 
(0.144) 
0.119 
(0.138) 
R-squared 0.447 0.559 0.392 0.416 
F-test 2.78 1.10 0.76 0.64 
P-value 0.001 0.356 0.695 0.802 
N 1,818 1,818 1,128 1,128 
Note: all the regressions include school by type and school by grade fixed effects. Significance is defined as 
follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A9. Multinomial Logit Model, School Fixed Effects and Grade Fixed Effects 
(Decaying factor=0.12) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not 
 Coefficients 
Simulated Centrality Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 1.178* 
(0.613) 
Black 0.727*** 
(0.081) 
Hispanic 0.350*** 
(0.060) 
Other 0.399*** 
(0.047) 
Mom High School Dropout 0.059 
(0.061) 
Mom College Degree 0.165*** 
(0.031) 
Mom Education Missing -0.067 
(0.035) 
White-Black -1.442*** 
(0.087) 
White-Hispanic -0.466*** 
(0.065) 
White-Other Races -0.269*** 
(0.035) 
Black-White -2.100*** 
(0.107) 
Black-Hispanic -0.995*** 
(0.095) 
Black-Other Races -1.074*** 
(0.106) 
Hispanic-White -0.726*** 
(0.062) 
Hispanic-Black -0.726*** 
(0.095) 
Hispanic-Other Races -0.716*** 
(0.089) 
Other Races-White -0.597*** 
(0.055) 
Other Races-Black -0.816*** 
(0.125) 
Other Races-Hispanic -0.891*** 
(0.107) 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom Some 
College 
-0.117* 
(0.068) 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.342*** 
(0.082) 
 149 
 
Mom High School Dropout-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.131 
(0.080) 
Mom Some College-Mom High School 
Dropout 
-0.265*** 
(0.043) 
Mom Some College-Mom College 
Degree 
-0.000 
(0.028) 
Mom Some College-Mom Education 
Missing 
-0.222*** 
(0.028) 
Mom College Degree-Mom High School 
Dropout 
-0.744*** 
(0.074) 
Mom College Degree-Mom Some 
College 
-0.255*** 
(0.036) 
Mom College Degree-Mom Education 
Missing 
-0.516*** 
(0.057) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom High 
School Dropout 
-0.048 
(0.046) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom Some 
College 
0.018 
(0.042) 
Mom Education Missing-Mom College 
Degree 
-0.009 
(0.056) 
Constant 0.056 
(0.181) 
N 6,914,746 
Note: Omitted categories are white, mom some college, white-white link, black-black link, Hispanic-Hispanic link, 
other-other link, mom high school dropout-mom high school dropout link, mom some college-mom some college link, 
mom college degree-mom college degree link, and mom education missing-mom education missing link. This 
regression controls for school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at school and grade 
level. The decaying factor of the Katz-Bonacich centrality is set to 0.12. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A10. High School and Young Adulthood Results, Using Predicted Katz-Bonacich 
Centrality (Decaying factor=0.12) 
Panel 1: High School Results 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 5.340*** 
(1.389) 
0.559 
(0.411) 
R-squared 0.400 0.270 
N 1,846 2,218 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 12.450*** 
(3.782) 
5.086* 
(3.007) 
3.847*** 
(1.329) 
2.696** 
(1.281) 
Age -0.407*** 
(0.087) 
-0.162** 
(0.078) 
-0.013 
(0.061) 
0.021 
(0.060) 
High School GPA - 1.337*** 
(0.083) 
- 0.043 
(0.062) 
High School Graduate - 0.338 
(0.226) 
- -0.103 
(0.199) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.084* 
(0.050) 
0.077 
(0.052) 
Years of College - - - 0.061** 
(0.025) 
R-squared 0.440 0.559 0.389 0.410 
N 1,821 1,821 1,132 1,132 
Note: All regressions control for school by type fixed effects and school by grade fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school by type level. The income regressions only include individuals who worked at least 10 hours a 
week. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A11. Multinomial Logit Model Using Predicted Income and Simulated Centrality 
Gain, School by Type and Grade Fixed (Decaying factor=0.12) 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality Gain 
for link 𝒊𝒋 
3.088*** 
(0.353) 
3.894*** 
(0.337) 
3.811*** 
(0.294) 
Predicted Income -0.015 
(0.071) 
1.816*** 
(0.315) 
0.835 
(1.222) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.117*** 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.160) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.005 
(0.007) 
White-Black -1.511*** 
(0.103) 
-1.459*** 
(0.106) 
-1.457*** 
(0.106) 
White-Hispanic -0.472*** 
(0.081) 
-0.435*** 
(0.077) 
-0.434*** 
(0.076) 
White-Other Races -0.246*** 
(0.034) 
-0.209*** 
(0.034) 
-0.209*** 
(0.034) 
Black-White -2.882*** 
(0.145) 
-3.007*** 
(0.160) 
-2.989*** 
(0.159) 
Black-Hispanic -1.093*** 
(0.151) 
-1.085*** 
(0.154) 
-1.083*** 
(0.154) 
Black-Other Races -1.236*** 
(0.121) 
-1.267*** 
(0.128) 
-1.263*** 
(0.127) 
Hispanic-White -1.041*** 
(0.129) 
-1.119*** 
(0.144) 
-1.118*** 
(0.144) 
Hispanic-Black -1.123*** 
(0.145) 
-1.096*** 
(0.148) 
-1.096*** 
(0.148) 
Hispanic-Other Races -0.949*** 
(0.133) 
-0.978*** 
(0.135) 
-0.976*** 
(0.135) 
Other Races-White -0.681*** 
(0.080) 
-0.693*** 
(0.081) 
-0.693*** 
(0.081) 
Other Races-Black -1.134*** 
(0.202) 
-1.096*** 
(0.205) 
-1.097*** 
(0.205) 
Other Races-Hispanic -0.968*** 
(0.161) 
-0.956*** 
(0.157) 
-0.953*** 
(0.157) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom Some College 
-0.102 
(0.089) 
-0.128 
(0.083) 
-0.127 
(0.082) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom College Degree 
-0.411*** 
(0.146) 
-0.484*** 
(0.157) 
-0.482*** 
(0.157) 
Mom High School Dropout-
Mom Education Missing 
-0.012 
(0.086) 
-0.003 
(0.083) 
-0.003 
(0.083) 
Mom Some College-Mom 
High School Dropout 
-0.217*** 
(0.040) 
-0.183*** 
(0.041) 
-0.184*** 
(0.041) 
Mom Some College-Mom 
College Degree 
-0.065** 
(0.027) 
-0.076*** 
(0.027) 
-0.077*** 
(0.028) 
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Mom Some College-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.169*** 
(0.030) 
-0.131*** 
(0.031) 
-0.131*** 
(0.031) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
High School Dropout 
-0.751*** 
(0.121) 
-0.704*** 
(0.119) 
-0.703*** 
(0.118) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Some College 
-0.249*** 
(0.044) 
-0.228*** 
(0.044) 
-0.227*** 
(0.044) 
Mom College Degree-Mom 
Education Missing 
-0.511*** 
(0.070) 
-0.459*** 
(0.069) 
-0.458*** 
(0.068) 
Mom Education Missing-
Mom High School Dropout 
-0.031 
(0.057) 
-0.041 
(0.058) 
-0.042 
(0.058) 
Mom Education Missing-
Mom Some College 
-0.064 
(0.061) 
-0.098 
(0.061) 
-0.099 
(0.061) 
Mom Education Missing-
Mom College Degree 
-0.200** 
(0.086) 
-0.254*** 
(0.086) 
-0.254*** 
(0.086) 
Constant -1.967*** 
(0.445) 
-9.189*** 
(1.215) 
-6.747** 
(3.112) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.074 0.082 0.082 
N 5,754,965 5,754,965 5,754,965 
Note: Omitted categories are white, mom some college, white-white link, black-black link, Hispanic-Hispanic 
link, other-other link, mom high school dropout-mom high school dropout link, mom some college-mom some 
college link, mom college degree-mom college degree link, and mom education missing-mom education missing 
link. All regressions control for school fixed effects and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
school and grade level. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A12. Heterogeneous Tests (Decaying factor=0.12) 
Panel 1. Blacks Only 
Dependent Variable: =1 if 𝒊 nominated 𝒋 as a friend, =0 if not 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
5.355*** 
(0.479) 
5.638*** 
(0.656) 
5.650*** 
(0.717) 
Predicted Income 0.172*** 
(0.050) 
0.527* 
(0.315) 
-1.257 
(0.873) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.032 
(0.029) 
0.275* 
(0.147) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.017** 
(0.008) 
N 420,239 420,239 420,239 
Panel 2: Whites Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
3.099*** 
(0.404) 
3.634*** 
(0.452) 
3.891*** 
(0.409) 
Predicted Income -0.074 
(0.110) 
2.579*** 
(0.476) 
5.817*** 
(1.253) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.160*** 
(0.033) 
-0.543*** 
(0.128) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
N 3,951,359 3,951,359 3,951,359 
Panel 3: Hispanics Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
4.815*** 
(0.415) 
4.939*** 
(0.427) 
4.679*** 
(0.487) 
Predicted Income 0.072*** 
(0.024) 
0.452* 
(0.255) 
-0.352 
(0.488) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.026 
(0.017) 
0.105 
(0.106) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.006 
(0.006) 
N 795,252 795,252 795,252 
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Table A12 (Continue). Heterogeneous Tests (Decaying factor=0.12) 
Panel 4: Mother High School Dropouts Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
2.934*** 
(0.597) 
2.215*** 
(0.416) 
2.388*** 
(0.368) 
Predicted Income 0.081* 
(0.044) 
1.960*** 
(0.629) 
7.443*** 
(1.745) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.101*** 
(0.036) 
-0.736*** 
(0.188) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - 0.023*** 
(0.007) 
N 294,080 294,080 294,080 
Panel 5: Mother High School Graduates and Some College Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
2.986*** 
(0.414) 
3.858*** 
(0.541) 
3.800*** 
(0.442) 
Predicted Income -0.029 
(0.109) 
1.969*** 
(0.557) 
1.302 
(1.822) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.128*** 
(0.037) 
-0.040 
(0.245) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 -  -0.004 
(0.011) 
N 2,630,928 2,630,928 2,630,928 
Panel 6: Mother College Graduates Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Simulated Centrality 
Gain for link 𝒊𝒋 
3.398*** 
(0.413) 
4.756*** 
(0.554) 
4.738*** 
(0.479) 
Predicted Income -0.028 
(0.134) 
2.287*** 
(0.559) 
1.983 
(2.626) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟐 - -0.152*** 
(0.039) 
-0.113 
(0.338) 
(𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞)𝟑 - - -0.002 
(0.015) 
N 2,047,254 2,047,254 2,047,254 
Note: The models used in this table are the same as the models in Table 5. All regressions include school by type and 
grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at school by type level. Parameters of all the link match variables are 
not shown in the table. Significance is defined as follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table A13. Change in Utility with One Standard Deviation Increase in Centrality Gain 
(Decaying Factor=0.12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Direct 
Effect  
Indirect 
Effect 
One S.D. 
Increase in 
Income 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (2) 
Ratio 
between (1) 
and (3) 
Full Sample 0.3299 -0.0062 -0.0086 -1.88% -2.61% 
Blacks Only 0.4966 0.0614 0.0867 12.36% 17.46% 
Whites Only 0.3657 -0.0336 -0.0444 -9.19% -12.14% 
Hispanics 
Only 
0.4641 0.0267 0.0408 5.75% 8.79% 
Mom HS 
Dropouts 
Only 
0.3051 0.0324 0.0437 10.62% 14.32% 
Mom Some 
College Only 
0.3118 -0.0116 -0.0164 -3.72% -5.26% 
Mom College 
Only 
0.3626 -0.0115 -0.0166 -3.17% 4.58% 
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Table A14. Change in Utility with One Standard Deviation Increase in High School GPA 
(Decaying Factor=0.12)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 One S.D. Increase in 
Centrality Gain  
One S.D. Increase in 
High School GPA 
Ratio between (1) 
and (2) 
Full Sample 0.3299 -0.0007 -0.21% 
Blacks Only 0.4966 0.0071 1.43% 
Whites Only 0.3657 -0.0036 -0.98% 
Hispanics 
Only 
0.4641 0.0036 0.78% 
Mom HS 
Dropouts 
Only 
0.3051 0.0038 1.25% 
Mom Some 
College Only 
0.3118 -0.0014 0.45% 
Mom College 
Only 
0.3626 -0.0014 0.39% 
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Table A15. Additional Balancing Tests (Decaying factor=0.12) 
Panel 1: High School Results 
 (1) (2) 
a. Without Balancing Variables 
 High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 5.340*** 
(1.389) 
0.559 
(0.411) 
b. With Balancing Variables 
 High School GPA High School Graduation 
Predicted Centrality 4.874*** 
(1.329) 
0.487 
(0.413) 
Number of People in 
Household 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.202*** 
(0.049) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
Mother Born in US -0.122* 
(0.067) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
Born in US -0.018 
(0.067) 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
Adopted -0.234** 
(0.112) 
-0.011 
(0.026) 
R-squared 0.418 0.275 
F-test 3.23 0.54 
P-value 0.000 0.888 
N 1,846 2,218 
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Table A15 (Continue). Additional Balancing Tests (Decaying factor=0.12) 
Panel 2: Young Adulthood Results 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
a. Without Balancing Variables 
 Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 12.450*** 
(3.782) 
5.086* 
(3.007) 
3.847*** 
(1.329) 
2.696** 
(1.281) 
b. With Balancing Variables 
 Years of 
College 
Years of 
College 
Log Income Log Income 
Predicted Centrality 12.021*** 
(3.705) 
5.176* 
(3.049) 
3.972*** 
(1.313) 
2.938** 
(1.300) 
Age -0.396*** 
(0.089) 
-0.160** 
(0.079) 
-0.008 
(0.062) 
0.026 
(0.061) 
High School GPA - 1.311*** 
(0.083) 
- 0.043 
(0.063) 
High School 
Graduate 
- 0.333 
(0.233) 
- -0.100 
(0.190) 
Log Weekly Working 
Hours 
- - 0.079* 
(0.047) 
0.072 
(0.049) 
Years of College - - - 0.061** 
(0.026) 
Number of People in 
Household 
-0.041 
(0.052) 
-0.021 
(0.047) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
Number of School 
Kids in Household 
0.050 
(0.066) 
0.065 
(0.059) 
-0.008 
(0.049) 
-0.015 
(0.049) 
Live with Both 
Parents 
0.530*** 
(0.136) 
0.263* 
(0.137) 
0.014 
(0.087) 
-0.046 
(0.084) 
Mother Born in US -0.195 
(0.223) 
-0.129 
(0.221) 
0.056 
(0.174) 
0.060 
(0.176) 
Born in US -0.078 
(0.225) 
-0.001 
(0.216) 
-0.043 
(0.094) 
-0.039 
(0.096) 
Adopted -0.133 
(0.239) 
0.060 
(0.216) 
0.090 
(0.143) 
0.107 
(0.138) 
R-squared 0.451 0.563 0.393 0.415 
F-test 2.91 1.08 0.80 0.64 
P-value 0.001 0.380 0.646 0.803 
N 1,821 1,821 1,132 1,132 
Note: all the regressions include school by type and school by grade fixed effects. Significance is defined as 
follows: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
 
 
